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Abstract 
 
On Evildoers: A Foucaultian Analysis of the Discursive 
Structuring of Contemporary Terrorism 
 
Azra Naseem 
 
Terrorism is routinely portrayed in the twenty first century as an evil perpetrated by 
Arab/Muslim barbarians—Evildoers—waging a holy war against the Western 
civilisation. This study challenges not just this present understanding of terrorism, but 
the very existence of a ding an sich of terrorism. Using a combination of Foucault’s 
archaeological and genealogical methods it provides an alternative history of the 
phenomenon in the form of a history of its discursive structuring: the regimes of 
practices that governed what could and could not be thought of, identified, defined, 
known, judged and punished as ‘terrorism’ during particular epochs, and particular 
places. 
 
It asserts that the conceptual anchor point of the present Evildoer-terrorist is the rebel 
who opposes established order, and identifies the first such figure in modern Western 
history as the Devil who rebelled against God and came to play a significant politico-
religious role in Western societies of the Middle Ages. The discourse of ‘terrorism’ 
emerged from the epistemic spaces created from the separation of religion and politics 
in the eighteenth century, from when onwards rebellion was no longer a sin but a 
crime. Since then, various other rebels have been brought under the domain of 
terrorism during different epochs, the latest of whom is the Evildoer. This is not to say 
that the Devil remained a blatant constant in the forefront of Western terrorism 
discourse, but that the various rebels share a conceptual history that made it possible 
for the contemporary terrorist to be the Evildoer that he is. 
 
How the rebels came to be known as terrorists during various epochs and the various 
mechanisms implemented to defend societies against them, it is argued, are 
irrevocably linked: one could not exist without the other. The contemporary terrorist 
cannot be known as an Evildoer without the War on Terror; at the same time, the War 
on Terror cannot be waged without the knowledge of the terrorist as an Evildoer. To 
demonstrate this power/knowledge dyad at work, this study analyses what was said 
and done about terrorism by the United States and the United Kingdom, the foremost 
allies in the War on Terror, during its first ten years. In the differences in their 
discourses emerges not just the ontological uncertainty of terrorism but also how these 
mechanisms for establishing the ‘truth’ of terrorism function as mechanisms of power. 
It is asserted that the Evildoer has made possible, and was made possible by, some of 
the most significant changes in how power is exercised in Western societies since the 
separation of religion and politics in the eighteenth century.   
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Introduction 
 
Terrorism became evil in the twenty-first century. Acts of terrorism, as it came 
to be widely accepted during this period, were acts of violence threatened or 
carried out against the Western civilisation by Evildoers—Arab/Muslim 
barbarians who were fanatical in their belief in Islam and hatred of liberal 
norms. The degree of truth that this knowledge of terrorism attained in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century was such that it became nigh on impossible 
for Western societies to think otherwise: not only was the terrorist nothing but an 
Evildoer, but only an Evildoer could be a terrorist.  
 
Just how true this truth about terrorism is at present became evident on 22 July 
2011 when Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Norwegian man, detonated a 
bomb at government buildings in Oslo, killing eight people and injuring many 
others. Breivik then proceeded to kill sixty-nine more people, mostly teenagers, 
at a political gathering on the island of Utøya. Despite the clearly stated 
political motives1 behind Breivik’s destructive violence, the terror that it 
engendered, and the Norwegian (and international) laws that defined Breivik’s 
actions as ‘terrorism’, Norway—and Western societies at large—struggled to 
name, speak of, judge and punish Breivik as a terrorist once his identity began 
to emerge—‘blonde, tall’, ‘Nordic looking’, ‘native Norwegian’. Not an 
Evildoer. 
 
How this present truth about terrorism—acts of violence threatened or 
committed by Evildoers against the Western civilisation—came to be, and the 
mechanisms of power that constituted and were constituted by this truth, are 
the subjects of this enquiry. It proceeds on the basis that the present truth about 
terrorism is not a truth discovered but a truth constructed. It is asserted that 
terrorism is not a metaphysical entity existing as an immutable abstract, the 
                                                       
1 Andreas Breivik, ‘2083: A Declaration of European Independence’ (2011). Full text accessed at: 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/60849766/Anders-Behring-Breivik-Manifesto-2083-–-A-
European-Declaration-of-Independence-By-Andrew-Berwick on 25 September 2011 
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hidden truth of which awaits exposure. This is, of course, not to deny that acts 
of violence are committed in the pursuit of particular political goals. They are. 
What is argued is that terrorism does not exist outside of its discourse, that is, 
‘all that was said in the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, 
traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and 
possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be 
taken as its own’2.  
 
Approaching terrorism as a discourse means abandoning the ontological 
certainty that underpins it, not a step commonly taken in the field of Terrorism 
Studies. Although a new sub-field of Critical Terrorism Studies has recently 
been established with the aim of introducing some much needed uncertainty 
into the given of terrorism, the overwhelming majority of work produced in the 
field and related disciplines remains uncritically accepting of the idea that 
somehow, somewhere, something called ‘terrorism’ exists outside of the 
definitions they produce, apply, or analyse. Most enquiries into the origins of 
terrorism, for instance, are based on the assumption that someday, sometime in 
the past, terrorism emerged fully formed and recognisable as such from the 
annals of history. All that remained was for the historian to correctly identify in 
the past the first time an act occurred that most closely resembles the present 
given of terrorism, and trace its progress from then to now. This very same 
conviction is present in the attempts to know ‘the terrorist’—a seemingly 
metaphysical being studied, analysed and understood as different from other 
humans by their very nature or nurture.  
 
Is it not possible that this complacent conformity of conviction forestalls other 
ways of knowing terrorism, and thus other ways of responding to its said 
threats? Abandoning ontological certainty does not make a subsequent analysis 
easy—after all, without epistemological certainty how can it be said for certain 
that the world is and should be ordered a given way? But, to what extent has 
this order been established precisely for the purpose of precluding thinking 
otherwise? Approaching terrorism as a discourse opens up the possibility for 
asking a different set of questions—if terrorism did not begin with the first act 
                                                       
2 Michel Foucault, The archaeology of knowledge (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1972), 
35 
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now known as terrorism, then how did it begin? If there is no given truth of 
terrorism, how did we come to know what we now know as the truth about 
terrorism? What made such knowledge possible? What are its relations to 
power? Leaving aside the ontological certainty of terrorism thus means asking a 
different set of questions than are asked by those convinced of its epistemic 
realism. It entails asking not whether ‘terrorism’ is defined properly in existing 
literature but whether ‘terrorism’ exists outside of the literature that defines it. 
It asks not who the original ‘terrorist’ was, but traces the history of the concept 
of ‘terrorism’. It asks not if existing ‘terrorism’ knowledge is independent of 
power, but whether knowledge of ‘terrorism’ is at all possible without power. It 
asks not whether Western civilisation can survive without the ‘new kind’ of 
responses against the ‘new terrorist’ but whether the ‘new terrorist’ can survive 
without civilisation’s defences against him.  
 
Why such an analysis of terrorism? Foucault’s histories were motivated by ‘his 
judgement that certain current social circumstances—an institution, a 
discipline, a social practice—[was] “intolerable”’3. And so it is with this work. 
The War on Terror, said to have been made necessary by wholly new and 
unprecedented dangers posed to Western civilisation by the ‘new terrorist’—
the Evildoer—is now in its eleventh year. By some reliable estimates the War 
and its related violence has already claimed a million casualties. Roughly 
250,000 people—civilian and military—have been killed. The military 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq led by the United States are still continuing, 
and many new such operations are being launched in other parts of the world. 
International rules of warfare, judgement and punishment have been deemed 
inadequate and cast aside to deal with the unprecedented new dangers the 
Evildoer is said to pose. The prisons in Guàntanamo Bay, specially constructed 
for the Evildoer, where hundreds were held captive and tortured without 
access to justice, remain open. The presence of the Dangerous Muslim, a 
variation of the Evildoer resident within societies of the civilised West has, at 
the same time, apparently necessitated a vast array of new mechanisms for 
monitoring and surveillance of populations.  
 
                                                       
3 Andre Glucksmann, "Michel Foucault's Nihilism," in Michel Foucault: Philosopher, ed. Timothy 
J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), 336-339. 
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All these practices, and the Evildoer that is said to have made them necessary, 
present themselves as without an alternative, inevitable: How can the Western 
civilisation defend itself except by waging a war against such an evil? How can 
the world be made safer except by killing the Evildoers, or at least by removing 
them from the boundaries of civilisation? How can civilised Western societies 
survive its infiltration by the Evildoer except by monitoring the Dangerous 
Muslims—potential Evildoers—that live among their populations? This study 
aims to remove this air of necessity from present day terrorism by showing that 
the past ordered things quite differently and that the processes leading to these 
practices of the present were by no means inevitable, thereby opening up space 
to think otherwise.  
 
To accomplish this purpose, this study uses a combination of Foucault’s 
archaeological and genealogical methods. In his early archaeological analyses4, 
Foucault distinguishes between discursive formations and non-discursive 
practices, and pays relatively little attention to the latter.5 Hubert L. Dreyfus 
and Paul Rabinow have suggested that Foucault abandoned the archaeological 
method altogether in favour of the genealogical method6. While to some extent 
this is true, both methods contain elements of the other. As Thomas Flynn 
asserted in a critique of Foucault’s approaches to history, the 
power/knowledge dyad that Foucault brought into focus with his genealogical 
method ‘merely elaborates’ the juridicative and veridicative functions of 
‘practice’ he outlined in the archaeological method as ‘that which establish and 
apply norms, and at the same time, render true/false discourse possible.7 
Foucault’s own reflections support this argument. In a 1977 interview, for 
example, he said he was aware that he had ‘scarcely used’ the word ‘power’ in 
his earlier works. But, he said, ‘When I think back now, I ask myself what else it 
was that I was talking about, in Madness and Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinic, 
                                                       
4 The History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. 
5 Thomas Flynn, “Foucault’s mapping of history,” in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 
edited by Gary Gutting, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 31. 
6 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics 
(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1982) 
7 Thomas Flynn, “Foucault’s mapping of history,” in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 
edited by Gary Gutting, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32. 
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but power?’8 If distinctions were to be made between the two methods, 
Foucault explained, ‘then ‘archaeology’ would be the appropriate methodology 
of this analysis of local discursivities, and ‘genealogy’ would be the tactics 
whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the 
subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play.’9 
 
Organisation and structure 
Chapter One examines the various ways in which terrorism has been known in 
the West since it became a subject of study in the social sciences in the 1960s. It 
explores the treatment of terrorism in this literature, and the role that certain 
ways of knowing terrorism played in the emergence of the ‘new terrorist’—the 
Evildoer—of the present. The purpose of the chapter is not to establish whether 
the knowledge of terrorism contained in the literature is right or wrong, or true 
or false. Rather, it is to question the ontological certainty that underpins the 
literature and to explore how this certainty has prevented other ways of 
knowing terrorism. It proposes that the history of terrorism does not necessarily 
have to be the history of its theories or its linguistic transformations; rather, it 
argues, that the history of modern terrorism begins with the concept of the rebel 
who opposes the established order perceived to be good. It thus proposes that 
the history of today’s terrorism, with the Arab/Muslim Evildoer as its main 
protagonist, begins with the Devil, the original rebel in Western thought who 
by opposing God rebelled against all that was good. 
 
Chapter Two explores relations between the concepts of evil, terror, knowledge 
and political power in medieval Western societies, and proposes that it is in 
these societies and the mechanisms of control that arose around the figure of 
the Devil that the historical a priori of today’s Evildoer is found. The presence of 
the Devil created the conditions of possibility in which rebellion could be 
conceived of as a sin, allowing the establishment of the Church as the most 
coherent socio-political authority of the time, and also the creation of political 
power in the form of divinely ordained monarchies. It is during this period, 
                                                       
8 Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge: selected interviews & other writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin 
Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 115. 
9 Ibid., 85. 
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when the Church, God and Devil dominated Western thought that Islam first 
takes hold in Western thought as a Christian heresy. It is also during this 
period, the Reformation era, that the depiction of Mohammed, the Muslim 
prophet, as the Devil or the Anti-Christ also gains currency in Western thought.  
 
Chapter Three focuses on the transformations that took place in Western society 
with the separation of religion from political power, and proposes that it is from 
the new epistemic spaces created by this separation that the discourse of 
‘terrorism’ first emerges. With radical enlightenment thinkers questioning the 
existence of God, the idea of the Devil as His grand cosmic antagonist fails to 
hold as much traction in Western thought as it did during earlier times, creating 
the conditions of possibility in which the very concept of evil changes from one 
intertwined with God to one embedded within the social contract itself. 
Following on from the first secular rebel who emerged during the French 
Revolution who came to be known as the ‘terrorist’, this Chapter identifies three 
distinctive epochs in which disparate rebels have emerged in Western history 
only to be forcibly brought into the domain of terrorism, and constituted as 
different types of ‘terrorists’.  
 
These epochs are identified as the period between the French Revolution and 
the Industrial Revolution, when various revolutionaries were constituted as 
terrorists; the period between the industrial revolution and the mid 1900s when 
the radical proletarian fighting against the perceived injustices of 
industrialisation were known as terrorists; and late 1960s onwards when those 
rebelling against colonialism and perceived injustices of the global system were 
brought into the domain of terrorism. Towards the end of the millennium, as 
Western social and political thought turned towards Armageddon and 
apocalyptic discourses took hold, the foremost rebel became the Arab/Muslim 
barbarian fighting against Israel’s occupation of Palestine. The Chapter does not 
assert that the Devil was a blatant constant throughout these transformations in 
how Western societies came to know the various rebels during these epochs, 
but that he formed the historical a priori, the common conceptual point, of these 
disparate figures who would have remained separate had they not been 
brought under the same system of regularities called ‘terrorism’. 
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Chapter Four brings the focus back to the present of terrorism, and the figure of 
the Evildoer. From here onward the method of analysis becomes overtly 
genealogical rather than archaeological. That is to say, the focus from this 
Chapter onwards is on exploring the mechanisms that make it possible for such 
disparate figures as the Devil, the proletarian radical, the freedom fighter and 
the Arab/Muslim barbarian to be brought together to form the figure of the 
Evildoer, and the domain of evil terrorism. This Chapter focuses on what the 
then President of the United States, George W. Bush, said about terrorism in the 
first few years of the War on Terror. President Bush was the foremost authority, 
or the chief enunciative figure, in the discourse of terrorism for a period of 
about seven years (2001-2008). For this purpose, every thing that President Bush 
officially said about terrorism from September 2001 to September 2004 is 
examined not to uncover ‘what was being said in what was said’ nor to judge 
its standards of grammar and oratory but to identify the connections, if any, 
between the present knowledge of terrorism as an evil and its historical a priori, 
and then to identify the conditions that made it possible to say what was said. 
This Chapter also highlights what was said about terrorism so its connection to 
what was done about terrorism can also be examined, as is necessary in a 
Foucaultian discourse analysis.  
 
Chapter Five focuses on the links between these official discursive practices and 
more general such practices during the same period. To do so, it analyses the 
body of ‘popular literature’ on the subject of terrorism published in the United 
States in the first ten years of the War on Terror, using the concept of the will to 
truth as discussed in Foucault’s The Order of Discourse10. Through these 
                                                       
10 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the text: a poststructuralist reader, ed. 
Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 48-78. The first English Language 
translation of this text, a lecture given by Foucault at the Collége de France on December 2, 
1970, appeared in April 1971 as Robert Swyer, trans., “Orders of Discourse,” in Social Science 
Information 10, no. 2 (1971). It was later pointed out, however, by Meaghan Morris and Paul 
Patton, eds., Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), 102-5 in 
that the version contained several mistranslations. The most frequently used version of the 
essay is the 1971 “The Discourse on Language” included as an annex in Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972). This study uses Michel Foucault, 
“The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the text: a poststructuralist reader, ed. Robert Young 
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explorations, it is demonstrated how existing narratives in Western thought—
which can be traced back to the medieval concept of the Devil—are reanimated 
as the domains of religion and political power re-connect around the figure of 
the ‘new’ religious terrorist—the Evildoer. The analysis of this literature also 
allows a demonstration of the unspoken but rigid body of societal rules that 
govern a given discourse during a particular period of time, including certain 
utterances as legitimate while excluding others as false on the basis of a 
spurious division between truth and falsity or madness and folly. 
 
Chapter Six (along with Chapter Seven) is an exploration of the links between 
what was said about terrorism during the present epoch and what was done 
about it during this same period. It is asserted in this study that particular types 
of subjects of knowledge, orders of truth, or domains of knowledge cannot exist 
‘except on the basis of political conditions that are the very ground on which 
the subject, the domains of knowledge, and the relations with truth are 
formed.’11 It is not that political conditions mask the truth or are an obstacle to 
getting to the truth – they are the means by which subjects of knowledge, and 
hence the truth, are formed. Chapter Six explores these power/knowledge 
relations by examining the United States’ treatment of suspected Evildoer-
terrorists in its custody, especially in Guàntanamo Bay, where the ‘worst of the 
worst’ prisoners were held.12 By focusing on this specific point of the 
application of power, this Chapter shows how on the one hand 
power/knowledge relations establish and apply norms, controls and exclusions 
while on the other hand they render true/false discourse possible. The Chapter 
demonstrates how the treatment of the prisoners and the knowledge that the 
United States produced of the Evildoer are irrevocably linked, and that one 
could not have existed without the other.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
(Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), which is written in much clearer English, while the 
meaning remains true to what is found in “The Discourse on Language”. 
11 Michel Foucault, Power: Essential works of Michel Foucault, ed. James D. Faubion, vol. 3, 1954-
1984 (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 15. 
12 Sue Anne Pressley, “At Guàntanamo Bay, a peaceful night,” The Washington Post, January 13, 
2002. 
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Chapter Seven provides further support for the assertion in this study that 
terrorism is an ontological uncertainty, and also reinforces the argument that 
knowledge and power are constitutive of each other by asking: how does a 
society, which upholds the same liberal values as does the United States, but 
does not have the same knowledge of the Evildoer, treat individuals it regards 
as terrorists? Are actions the same when orations are different? Is knowledge of 
a subject the same when it is acted upon differently? For answers, this Chapter 
compares the counter-terrorism mechanisms of the United States with that of 
the United Kingdom. In the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 almost 
the entire world stood in solidarity with the United States13. Yet, by the time the 
United States led the invasion of Iraq in 2003, differences over what to say and 
do about terrorism had led to one of the greatest rifts in the history of 
transatlantic relations.14 The United Kingdom government, however, stood 
‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States, and promised that it, too, ‘will 
not rest until this evil is driven from our world.’15  
 
This Chapter which focuses on the counterterrorism strategy of the United 
Kingdom (Contest) shows that despite being closely allied with the United 
                                                       
13 “UN Security Council Condemns Terrorist Attacks on U.S.,” The Columbia International 
Affairs Online, September 12, 2001, accessed July 22, 2011, 
http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_02.html; “North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) Charter,” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, accessed July 22, 2011, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.; “EU Presidency Statement - 
September 11 attacks in the US,” European Union, accessed July 22, 2011, http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_56_en.htm; “We are all Americans now”, Le Monde, 
September 13, 2001, accessed July 22, 2011, http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-
bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=721875. 
14 As stated in the New York Post, see “For a paper's view on Iraq, just ask the owner,” The 
Guardian, February 26, 2003, accessed July 22, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/feb/16/comment.iraqandthemedia; “Between 
cheese-eating surrender monkeys and fire-eating war junkies,” The Guardian, July 6, 2006, 
accessed July 22, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/jul/06/comment.july71; First proposed in 
Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, June/July 2002; later expanded into a 
book: Robert Kagan, Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).  
15 Tony Blair, “Blair’s statement in full,” BBC News, September 11, 2001, accessed July 22, 2011, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1538551.stm. 
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States in its military operations abroad, there were stark differences in how the 
two states dealt with suspected terrorists: the United States excluded Evildoers 
by either imprisoning them or killing them while the United Kingdom included 
them through mechanisms of normalisation. This Chapter asserts that these 
differences are due to differences in how the two sides knew terrorism—the 
social and political conditions in which their respective knowledges of 
terrorism were grounded were different, producing different ways of knowing 
the ‘same enemy’. It is argued that the rules governing discursive formations 
and the ordering of a discourse means that not only is it possible that what is 
considered as valid and legitimate during a particular epoch may be rejected 
partially and/or entirely as illegitimate during another period of time; but also 
in another geographic location during the same period of time. 
 
The history and analyses of what is known as terrorism today in this study is 
also a social critique, and an exploration of how power is exercised in Western 
societies today. It is argued that despite the widely held belief that the War on 
Terror is a ‘new kind of response’ to a ‘new kind of terrorist’, the two models of 
control that the United States and the United Kingdom implemented to defend 
against the ‘new enemy’ are as old as the Evildoer himself. The United States 
excluded the Evildoer from civilization by banishing him from human society. 
The United Kingdom neutered the threat from the potential Evildoer, the 
dangerous Muslim, by normalizing him. Both models of exercising power are not 
only old, having been in place since the Middle Ages, but are the only two major 
models for control of individuals to have existed in the West16.   
 
Foucault has argued that one of the main problems with contemporary analyses 
of power is that political thought and theory remain unwilling to detach 
themselves from the concept of sovereignty. He suggests that for a 
comprehensive analysis of how power functions in modern liberal democracies, 
what is needed is ‘a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem 
of sovereignty, not therefore around the problems of law and prohibition.’17 It 
was his argument that the models of exclusion were replaced by methods of 
                                                       
16 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: lectures at the Collége de France 1974-1975 (London: Verso, 2003), 44. 
17 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: selected interviews & other writings, 
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 121. 
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inclusion in the eighteenth century, which appears to suggest that 
normalisation or governmentality replaced sovereign power as the main form of 
power in Western societies. This perception is strengthened by the emphasis he 
placed on the need for political analysts and theorists to ‘cut off the King’s 
head’18 in order to fully comprehend the mechanisms of power in modern 
society. It would be a mistake, however, to understand these calls to cut off the 
King’s head as a suggestion by Foucault that sovereign power no longer exists, 
or that he asserted ‘the State isn’t important.’19 Foucault maintained throughout 
that ‘sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral 
constituents of the general mechanisms of power in our society,’20 and that ‘they 
are the two things that constitute—in an absolute sense—the general 
mechanisms of power in our society.’21 
 
What he was not able to foresee from his vantage point, Judith Butler has 
argued, is what form the co-existence of sovereignty and governmentality 
would take in the present circumstances. She asserts that as the present 
historical condition is marked by governmentality, implying the loss of 
sovereignty to some degree, that loss is compensated through the resurgence of 
sovereignty within the field of governmentality22. As shall become evident, the 
mechanisms of control and defence implemented in the ‘new’ defences against 
the ‘new’ terrorism in the United States invested its President with the 
unilateral and ultimate power to decide when, how and where the Evildoers 
would be entitled to a trial of any sort23. The moment this happens, Butler 
asserts, ‘it is as if we have returned to a historical time in which sovereignty 
was indivisible, before the separation of powers has initiated itself as a 
                                                       
18 Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality, vol. 1, An introduction (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 88. 
19 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: selected interviews & other writings, 
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 122. 
20 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: selected interviews & other writings, 
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 108. 
21 Michel Foucault, Society must be defended (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 37. 
22 Ibid, 56.  
23 John Yoo, “Memorandum for William J Haynes, Jr. General Counsel, Department of 
Defense: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees [Draft],” 
January 9, 2002, accessed June 8, 2010, 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020109.pdf, 34. 
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precondition of political modernity.’24 Butler does not explain how the past 
turns out to structure the contemporary field in this anachronistic manner, 
however. This study does so by showing how the progress of terrorism’s past 
into terrorism’s present was made possible by the re-animation of the old 
concept of the Devil in a modern context, reactivating not just the discursive 
practices of the old, but also methods of establishing the truth, knowledge 
production and models of control constructed around the figure of the Devil. It 
is the Evildoer that was both constituted by and made it possible for both 
exclusion and inclusion to work together in tandem, and in their intermingling 
introduced a new power that is at the same time the oldest form of power that 
the world has known. 
 
 
 
                                                       
24 Judith Butler, Precarious Life (London: Verso, 2004), 54. 
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1. The discourse of terrorism 
 
It is true, there could be a metaphysical world; the absolute possibility of it is 
hardly to be disputed. We behold all things through the human head and cannot 
cut off this head; while the question nonetheless remains what of the world would 
still be there if one had it cut off. 
Friedrich Neitzsche, Human, All Too Human 
 
Terrorism, predicted the 1936 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, would soon 
become a subject of interest ‘only to antiquarians’25. The opposite has been 
true—just six decades later, terrorism has become one of the most studied 
subjects in the human sciences in the twenty-first century. Interest in terrorism 
as an academic subject began in the late 1960s, when ‘international terrorism’ is 
also said to have begun. Research into the subject ‘took off’ in the 1970s, 
expanded in the 1980s and 1990s26, and exploded in the twenty-first century 
following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States27. Not 
surprisingly, a large body of knowledge now exists on terrorism, its causes, 
methods, effects, the mindset of the terrorist, and the best defences against it.  
 
This chapter comprises a genealogical critique of this body of knowledge, and 
poses the questions: What does this knowledge tell us terrorism is? Does this 
knowledge occlude or clarify the origins and history of terrorism? How 
independent is this knowledge from power? Is this the only way to know 
terrorism? Critical analyses of existing terrorism knowledge have increased in 
recent years, especially in the newly established subfield of Critical Terrorism 
Studies. Ruth Blakely28 and Jeroen Gunning29, among others, have traced direct 
                                                       
25 J. B. S. Hardman, “Terrorism,” in Encylopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 14 (1936), edited by E. 
R. Seligman, 575-579. 
26 Edna O. F. Reid, “Evolution of a body of knowledge: an analysis of terrorism research,” 
Information Processing and Management 33, no. 1 (1997). 
27 Avishag Gordon, “Terrorism and knowledge growth: a database and Internet analysis,” in 
Research on Terrorism: trends, achievements and failures, ed. Andrew Silke (New York: Frank Cass, 
2004), 119-137; Avishag Gordon, “Terrorism as an academic subject after 9/11: searching the 
Internet reveals a Stockholm Syndrome trend,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005). 
28 Ruth Blakeley, “Bringing the state back into terrorism studies,” European Consortium for 
Political Research 6 no. 3 (2007). 
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links between political power and the body of terrorism knowledge that 
burgeoned during the ‘take-off’ period of terrorism knowledge in the 1970s and 
1980s. Pioneers in the Critical Terrorism Studies field identified four separate 
weaknesses in what has been called ‘traditional terrorism studies’ or ‘orthodox 
terrorism studies’: ‘embarrassing methodological weaknesses’; having its 
theoretical and institutional origins in orthodox security and counter-
insurgency studies which leads analysts to adopt state-centric priorities and 
perspectives that reproduce a limited set of assumptions and narratives; direct 
links between terrorism experts/scholars and state institutions/sources of 
power; and its problem-solving theory which ‘takes the world as it finds it’ and 
thus fails to question the extent to which the status quo is implicated in the 
‘problem’ of terrorism30. The analysis of terrorism knowledge in this chapter 
probes deeper than these obvious links between political power and 
‘embedded’ or ‘generic’ terrorism experts identified, and rightly so, in Critical 
Terrorism Studies. The analysis contained herein is based on Foucault’s assertion 
that knowledge is simply not possible without political power—one cannot 
exist without the other.  
 
Terrorism: the known knowns 
The problem of the problem of definition 
Despite the diverse—often disparate—content of the literature on terrorism, 
much of it shares a single premise: a seemingly unshakeable conviction that 
terrorism is an ontological certainty. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
wide-ranging debate, discussion and disagreement over what terrorism really is. 
International attempts to identify the ‘true’ meaning of terrorism date back to 
the 1920s and have so far resulted in thirteen international and seven regional 
treaties31. None of them define terrorism. In the twenty-first century itself, with 
                                                                                                                                                                
29 Jeroen Gunning, “Babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical terrorism 
studies,” European Political Science 6 (2007). 
30 Richard Jackson, “Introduction: the case for critical terrorism studies,” European Political 
Science 6 (2007). 
31 For a list of international and regional treaties on ‘terrorism’, see “United Nations 
Conventions deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” 
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each significant act it regarded as terrorism, the United Nations has passed a 
new resolution condemning the act, and renewed the call to find a universal 
definition of ‘terrorism’32. So far all such efforts have been in vain.  
 
What makes terrorism so difficult to define? It is a question, like the pursuit of 
the ‘right’ definition of terrorism itself, which has occupied analysts since the 
1980s.  A large share of the literature on terrorism suggests that the problem lies 
within the nature of the term: emotive, laden with ideological connotations, 
irreconcilable antagonisms, pejorative inferences, moral, social and value 
judgements, as well as being inherently imbued with semantic instability.  As 
such, many regard terrorism as an ‘essentially contested concept’, doomed by 
its very nature to endless disputes about its proper uses on the part of its 
users33.  
 
There are a variety of different conceptualisations of terrorism in the existing 
literature. Predominant among them are conceptualisations of terrorism as a 
crime, a form of politics, a form of warfare, a method of communication, and a 
                                                                                                                                                                
Treaty Collection, accessed August 31, 2010, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml&menu=MTDSG. 
32 The incidents after which the United Nations called for a universal definition of “terrorism” 
or passed a new resolution regarding the need for counter-terrorism include: Resolution No. 
1368 passed the day after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and Resolution 
1373 adopted on November 28, 2001; Resolution 1535 adopted on March 26, 2004 following the 
attacks on the transport system of Madrid on March 11, 2004; Resolution 1566 adopted on 
October 8, 2004 after the attacks on a school in Beslan the previous month; and Resolution 1624 
passed on September 14, 2005 following the July 7, 2005 attacks on the London transport 
system. See Javier Rupérez, “The UN’s fight against terrorism: five years after 9/11, ARI 
83/2006,” United Nations Articles, UN Action to Counter Terrorism, September 6, 2006, 
accessed August 31, 2010, http://www.un.org/terrorism/additionalresources.shtml. See also 
“UN seeks definition of terrorism,” BBC News, July 26, 2005, accessed 31 August 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4716957.stm for news of the United Nations call 
for a universal definition of “terrorism” following the July 7, 2005 London bombings. 
33 William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003). ‘Essentially contested concepts’ was a term put forward by Walter B. Gallie in The 
Importance of language, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), 121-
146. 
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religious act34. As a crime, terrorism is either ‘mala prohibita’ (wrong because it is 
prohibited by statute) or ‘mala per se’ (wrong in itself). When viewed as political, 
‘terrorism’ is a rational choice strategy employed by individuals or groups in 
the pursuit of particular goals.35 Within this framework, the terrorist - like Homo 
economicus - evaluates the personal benefits and costs before choosing terrorism 
as a strategy. Analysts who view terrorism from a war paradigm point to the 
tendency among terrorists to define themselves as warriors, or they explain 
terrorism as a war crime rather than an act of just war36. From a communication 
perspective, terrorism is either a form of propaganda or theatre37. 
Conceptualised in terms of religion, terrorism is triggered by divine motivation 
that makes the terrorist and his actions more nihilistic, apocalyptic and, 
therefore, more lethal38.  
 
                                                       
34 Alex P. Schmid, “Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
16, no. 2 (2004). 
35 Martha Crenshaw, “The logic of terrorism: terrorist behavior as a product of choice,” 
Terrorism and Counter Terrorism 2, no. 1 (1998); William M. Landes, “An economic study of U.S. 
aircraft hijackings 1961-1976,” Journal of Law and Economics 21, no. 1 (1978); Walter Enders and 
Todd Sandler, “The effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies: a vector-autoaggression-
intervention analyses,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993).   
36 David C. Rapoport, “The Politics of Atrocity,” in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. 
Yonah Alexander and Seymour M. Finger (New York: John Jay Press, 1977); Ariel Merari, 
Encyclopaedia of Human Behaviour, vol. 4 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1994), 401. 
37 Brian M. Jenkins, “International terrorism: a new mode of conflict,” in International terrorism 
and world security, ed. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (London: Croom Helm, 1975); Geoffrey 
Jackson, ”Terrorism and the News Media,” Terrorism and political violence 2, no. 4 (1990); Ralph 
E. Dowling, “Terrorism and the media: a rhetorical genre,” Journal of Communication 36, no. 1 
(1986); Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as communication: insurgent terrorism and the 
western news (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Paul Wilkinson, “The media and terrorism: a 
reassessment,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 2 (1997); Gabriel Weimann and Conrad 
Winn, The theater of terror: mass media and international terrorism (New York: Longman, 1994). 
38 Ian O. Lesser et al., Countering the new terrorism (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999); Walter Laqueur, 
“Postmodern terrorism: new rules for an old game,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (1996); Walter 
Laqueur, The new terrorism: fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: St Andrews University Press, 
2006); Harvey W. Kushner, The future of terrorism: violence in the new millennium (London: Sage 
Publications, 1998); Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Philip Zelikow, “Catastrophic terrorism: 
tackling the new danger,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (1999); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the mind 
of God: the global rise of religious violence (Berkley: University of California Press, 2000). 
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The differences in conceptualising terrorism accompany different 
understandings of it: for some it is a ‘weapon of the weak’ while for others it is 
‘propaganda of the deed’. For some it is a form of globalised informal violence39 
and for others theatre40; a logical political strategy41; the manifestation of a 
particular psychological condition42; ideologically based rebellion43; a ‘political 
phenomenon par excellence’44; violence driven and justified in theological 
terms45; a tactic of war46; the result of political ambitions and designs of 
expansionist states47; a new mode of conflict48; or most recently, a ‘global Jihad’ 
by ‘radicalised’ Muslims49 and therefore an evil threatening civilisation itself.  
 
For many analysts, the ‘problem of the problem of definition’50 is both a source 
of frustration and worry. Research by Schmid and Jongman in the 1980s that 
solicited the opinion of some two hundred members of the terrorism research 
                                                       
39 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and interdependence (New York: Addison Wesley 
Longman, 2001). 
40 Brian M. Jenkins, “International terrorism: a new mode of conflict,” in International terrorism 
and world security, ed. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (London: Croom Helm, 1975); Gabriel 
Weimann and Conrad Winn, The theater of terror: mass media and international terrorism (New 
York: Longman, 1994). 
41 Martha Crenshaw, “The logic of terrorism: terrorist behavior as a product of choice,” 
Terrorism and Counter Terrorism 2, no. 1 (1998). 
42 Jerrold M. Post, ”Terrorist psycho-logic: terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological 
forces,” in Origins of terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind, ed. Walter Reich 
(Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998), 25-40. 
43 Konrad Kellen, “Ideology and rebellion: terrorism in West Germany,” in ibid, 43-58. 
44 Ehud Sprinzak, “The psychopolitcal formation of extreme left terrorism in a democracy: the 
case of the Weathermen,” in ibid, 78. 
45 David C. Rapoport, “Sacred terror: a contemporary example from Islam,” in ibid, 103-130. 
46 N. Fotion, Boris N. Kashnikov and Joanne K. Lekea, Terrorism: the new world disorder (London: 
Continuum, 2007). 
47 Binyamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the west can win (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 
1986), 7. 
48 Brian M. Jenkins, “International terrorism: a new mode of conflict,” in International terrorism 
and world security, ed. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (London: Croom Helm, 1975). 
49 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004); Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005). 
50 H. H. A. Cooper, “Terrorism: the problems of definition revisited,” American Behavioral 
Scientist 44, no. 6 (2001): 881-882. 
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community found most analysts shared the view that definitions of terrorism 
were ‘confused, irrelevant’ or ‘hopeless’.51 Many were uncertain as to ‘the right 
way to think about the problem’ [emphasis added] and appeared fatigued by 
the need to continue solving basic conceptual problems.52  
 
Central to the ‘problem of definition’ discussed in the literature is the question: 
is it possible to identify terrorism, much less judge and punish it, without first 
defining it? Opinion is divided. Walter Laqueur, one of the most prominent and 
prolific contributors to the field, thinks it is ‘manifestly absurd’ to assume that 
terrorism cannot be studied without a definition. According to Laqueur, we 
know terrorism when we see it53. Jack Gibbs countered that it is ‘no less 
“manifestly absurd” to pretend to study terrorism without at least some kind of 
definition’54. Without the right definition, this argument goes, it is impossible to 
say whether terrorism is a threat at all, what its nature is, or even if there could 
be a theory of terrorism55. It is argued further that unless the right definition of 
terrorism is found, states will remain free to ‘unilaterally and subjectively 
determine what constitutes terrorist activity’;56 and the term will stay open to 
subjective interpretation and opportunistic appropriation by self-interested 
forms of power.57  
 
The above arguments and recurrent disputes over what terrorism really is, the 
right way to think about terrorism, and the warnings about the gravity of 
potential consequences of failing either task are all founded on the conviction 
that terrorism is an ontological certainty. They assume that if only the term 
‘terrorism’ can be shed of much of the semantic, political and emotional 
baggage that it has been identified as carrying, analysts can uncover its inherent 
                                                       
51 Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, 
concepts, data bases, theories, and literature (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988), 61. 
52 Ibid, 1. 
53 Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), 5. 
54 Jack P. Gibbs, “Conceptualisation of terrorism,” American Sociological Review 54, no. 3 (1989): 
329. 
55 Grant Wardlaw, Political terrorism: theory, tactics and counter-measures (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 3. 
56 Ben Saul, Defining terrorism in international law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5. 
57 Ibid., 3. 
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truth. They also assume that if analysts can all work together towards 
identifying the right way to think about terrorism, its true form will come into 
sharp focus, revealing it for what it really is. Once the truth about terrorism is 
known, self-interested forms of power can no longer appropriate it to their 
circumstances and advantage.  
 
Psychologising Terrorism 
These very same efforts, frustrations and convictions underpin analysts’ efforts 
to identify who ‘the terrorist’ really is. What type of person turns to terrorism? 
What makes someone commit acts of terrorist violence? Since the 1960s, 
analysts from a variety of disciplines within the human sciences—chief among 
them psychiatry, psychology, criminology, political science and sociology—
have attempted to scientifically order, tabulate and illustrate characteristics that 
distinguish ‘the terrorist’ from other human beings.  
 
A rich tapestry of theories—from the Freudian view of aggression as an innate 
and instinctive human trait; ethology; the frustration-aggression theory which 
links the frustration of being prevented from attaining a goal or engaging in 
particular behaviour with aggression; social learning theory which regards 
aggression as learned; to cognitive theory based on the notion that people 
interact with their environment based on how they perceive and interpret it; 
and even biological or physiological variables such as an individual’s serotonin 
levels, hormones, psychophysiological and neurophysiological factors and their 
relationship with an individual’s behaviour—have all been applied to available 
data in order to identify the nature of ‘the terrorist’58. Statistical models that 
apply ‘risk factors’ identified by ‘literally hundreds of studies in psychology, 
criminology, sociology and other behavioural sciences’ as contributors to 
general violence have also been developed and applied in efforts to illustrate 
the psychological anatomy of ‘the terrorist’59.  
 
The results have been as varied as the conceptualisations, the definitions, and 
the theories. Early psychiatric studies identified the ‘terrorist personality’ as one 
                                                       
58 Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004), 11-15. 
59 Ibid., 16. 
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shaped by hostility towards parents, driven towards committing acts of 
‘terrorism’ as a result of early abuse and maltreatment60. Pathological 
narcissism was identified in the 1970s, for example, as having a strong link with 
the development of a ‘terrorist personality’61, a connection which has since been 
regularly explored by psychiatric analyses of ‘terrorism’.62 By the 1980s, when 
Schmid and Jongman undertook their analysis of ‘terrorism studies’ discussed 
above, a body of literature existed that identified ‘the terrorist personality’ as 
spoilt, disturbed, cold and calculating, perverse, excited by violence, psychotic, 
maniac, irrational and fanatical63.  
 
Some analyses proffer descriptions of ‘the terrorist’ in even greater detail—an 
individual reared by a violent father (often alcoholic) and a religious mother 
(often a zealot), sexually shy, timid and passive; his first sexual encounter 
would often be with women two to twenty years older than himself. He would 
be over-protective towards his younger sisters; would have achieved little and 
would possess limited potential to earn more64. Another ‘profiled’ the ‘terrorist’ 
as depressed, an-hedonic, lacking the ability to form any interpersonal 
                                                       
60 Lewis G. Feuer, The conflict of generations (New York: Basic Books, 1969). 
61 Gustav Morf, Terror in Quebec (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970). 
62 Christopher Lasch, The culture of narcissism: American life in the age of diminishing expectations 
(New York: Norton, 1979); John W. Crayton, “Terrorism and the psychology of the self,” in 
Perspectives on Terrorism, ed. Lawrence Z. Freedman and Yonah Alexander (Delaware: Scholarly 
Resources, 1983); André Haynal, Miklós Molnár and Gérard de Puymége, Fanaticism: a historical 
and psychoanalytical study (New York: Schocken Books, 1983); Jerrold M. Post, “Notes on a 
Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior,” Terrorism: An International Journal 7, no. 3 (1984); 
Jerrold M. Post, “Hostilité, Conformité, Fraternité: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior," 
International Journal of Group Psychotherapy 36, no. 2 (1986); Jerrold M. Post, ”Current 
Understanding of Terrorist Motivation and Psychology: Implications for a Differentiated 
Antiterrorist Policy,” Terrorism 13, no. 1 (1990); Richard M. Pearlstein, The Mind of the Political 
Terrorist (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1991). 
63 Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, 
concepts, data bases, theories, and literature (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1988), 7-98. 
64 David G. Hubbard, Winning Back the Sky: A Tactical Analysis of Terrorism (San Francisco: 
Saybrook, 1986). 
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relationships, cruel, wanton, and recklessly indifferent to the value of human 
life65.  
 
The psychological makeup of individuals, according to this literature, also 
determined which particular type of ‘terrorism’ such a typical ‘terrorist’ would 
gravitate towards. Right-wing terrorists, for example, were said to be more 
likely than their left-wing counterparts to be individualistic and to possess basic 
psychological traits that reflect an authoritarian-extremist personality.66 The 
pathological nature of the ‘terrorist’ identified by such literature strongly 
advises that any policies seeking to defend society from the enemy should 
‘energetically enter the market for men’s minds’67. By the end of the 1990s, the 
pathology of the ‘terrorist’ had been determined to the extent that certain 
individuals were seen as psychologically compelled to commit acts of 
‘terrorism’68. ‘Terrorists’ did not resort to violence as a wilful choice. Acts of 
‘terrorism’ were not ‘an intentional choice selected from a range of perceived 
alternatives’69. In other words, terrorists could not help but be ‘terrorists’; he 
could only exist as a ‘terrorist’ and nothing else: ‘I bomb therefore I am’70.  
 
Psychological analyses of terrorists, like other approaches to understanding 
terrorism, have its many critics. Walter Laqueur argued, for example, that 
although ‘most terrorists have been young, some very young’, and ‘the vast 
majority have been male’, ‘terrorists’ are not bound by a common thread of 
                                                       
65 Robert A. Friedlander, “The Psychology of Terrorism: Contemporary Views,” in Managing 
Terrorism: Strategies for the Corporate Executive, ed. Patrick J. Montana and George S. Roukis 
(Westport, Connecticut: Quorum, 1983). 
66 Risto Freid, “The Psychology of the Terrorist,” in Terrorism and Beyond: An International 
Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict, ed. Brian M. Jenkins (Santa Monica, California: 
Rand, 1982), 119-24. 
67 Jeanne N. Knutson, “Toward a United States Policy on Terrorism,” Political Psychology 5, no. 2 
(1984). 
68 Jerrold M. Post, “’It’s us against them’: The group dynamics of political terrorism,” Terrorism 
10 (1987). 
69 Jerrold M. Post, ”Terrorist psycho-logic: terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological 
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psycho-sociological factors71. There are no ‘genetic factors, psychological 
difficulties in early childhood, a disturbed family life, or identification with the 
underclass’ that create a typical ‘terrorist’. Attempting to create a profile of ‘the 
typical terrorist’ was a thankless task as ‘there never was such a person’.72  
Psychological profiling of the ‘typical terrorist’, according to critics of the 
practise, is not just empirically unsound, but also de-politicises ‘terrorism’73. 
Based on the premise that the psychology of ‘terrorism’ could not be considered 
separate from political, historical, familial and group dynamic as well as 
organic and ‘accidental, coincidental factors’74, some analysts began to take a 
more nuanced approach to the ‘psychology of a terrorist’. John Horgan and 
Max Taylor, for example, suggested that becoming a ‘terrorist’ was a slow 
process involving a variety of different factors that influenced an individual at 
three distinct stages—becoming a terrorist, remaining one, and leaving 
‘terrorism’75. Building on the explanations of ‘terrorism’ as a political strategy 
rather than a pathological condition, such analyses argued that for a proper 
understanding of the psychology of ‘terrorism’ it is essential to consider an 
individual’s motives and vulnerability to a given environment. The quest for 
such an understanding, Horgan argued, ‘should not be confused with a search 
for the ‘terrorist personality’76   
 
The hunt for the ‘terrorist personality’, however, has continued unabated, each 
new analysis building on earlier findings to validate their truth. Following 11 
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September 2001, for example, the Arab/Muslim became a separate object of this 
body of knowledge as research findings showed that ‘traumatic’ gender 
segregation in Islamic societies leads to fundamentalism and violent political 
activity. ‘Suicide bombing is one result of hating one’s sexual impulses.’77  
Muslim men, it is suggested, turn to terrorism out of sexual frustration, as their 
sexual appetites—unduly titillated by the West—remain unfulfilled in the 
repressed Islamic world. These young men, unable to cope with the sexual 
frustration festering in the clash between their world and the West, turn to 
violence, which is directed towards the West as the symbolic creator of their 
sexual frustrations.78 Previous psychiatric analyses had learned from the 
writings of terrorists themselves that ‘the explosion of the bomb has come to be 
regarded as something of an ersatz orgasm.’79  
 
Historicising Terrorism 
Clearly evident from the literature is the underlying conviction that there is a 
metaphysical entity called a ‘terrorist’, a figure that is by nature different from 
other human beings. With this certainty, several analysts have traced the 
beginnings of terrorism and the emergence of the ‘original terrorist’. When did 
the first act of terrorism occur? Who was the first person in history to have 
committed an act of terrorism? Various answers have been offered. Most often 
identified as the first known terrorists are the Thugs of India from 2,500 years 
ago, the Sicarii of Judea from 66-73 CE, and the Assassins of the eleventh 
century.80 The French Revolution is another commonly cited ‘beginning’ of 
                                                       
77 Elaine Hoffman Baruch, “Psychoanalysis and Terrorism: The Need for a Global 
'Talking Cure,” Psychoanalytic Psychology 20, no. 4 (2003). 
78 Stuart J. Kaufman, "Social Identity and the Roots of Future Conflict," Department of Political 
Science, University of Kentucky (October, 2003). 
79 Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Transaction Publications, 2001), 
167. 
80 The Sicarii were ‘a radical anti-Roman religious movement’ whose members used short 
swords to attack people, seemingly randomly, in broad daylight in crowded places to 
‘demonstrate the state’s impotence and to strike fear beyond their immediate targets’. The 
Assassins were a Shia Muslim group that operated from 1090 to 1275, and the Thugs were an 
Indian secret society taking its inspiration from the Hindu religion, who are believed to have 
first appeared over 2,500 years ago. They are said to have lasted for over 600 years, ‘possibly 
killing as many as 500,000 people’. The Assassins ‘used only the dagger at close range, by this 
  25 
modern terrorism. Yet another date frequently pinpointed as the date on which 
modern terrorism started is July 22, 1968, when a Palestinian group hijacked an 
El Al Israeli Airlines flight from Rome to Tel Aviv81. With the beginning of the 
War on Terror, historical analyses of terrorism have been taken further and 
further back into the past in pursuit of the original terrorist. One publication in 
2002, for example points to the assassin of Roman Emperor Julius Caesar as the 
first terrorist. According to the narrative, since then ‘the terrorist’ has become 
progressively more dangerous from ancient Rome to twenty-first century New 
York: ‘From the murder of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. to the atrocious airplane 
attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorists have been the cause of many of the 
monumental events of human experience’82.  
 
The totalising nature of such historical narratives does not exclude the 
transformations in terrorism. On the contrary, there is a vast amount of 
literature that traces, identifies and explains changes in terrorism and their 
causes. A widely accepted explanation, first proposed in 2003 by David C. 
Rapoport, and built on by himself and others later83, is that terrorism comes in 
waves—each wave lasts forty to forty five years before receding. Terrorism’s 
first wave rose in the 1880s as the Anarchist Wave, and lasted forty years. It was 
followed by the Anti-Colonial Wave that began in the 1920s and had faded by 
the 1960s. The third, the New Left Wave, began in the late 1960s and had 
dissipated by the 1990s. The fourth, or the Religious Wave, began in 1979 and 
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will last for another twenty years or so84. Terrorism is thus an inevitable, almost 
natural, phenomenon imbued with inherent mechanisms of survival: ‘The 
pattern suggests a human lifecycle pattern, where dreams that inspire fathers 
lose their attractiveness for sons.’85  
 
Rapid modernisation, lack of democracy, too much democracy, the industrial 
revolution, the manufacture of dynamite, the airline industry, the 
communications revolution, the Internet, poverty, global inequality, 
globalisation, American expansionism, Islamic fanaticism, and a worldwide 
return to an increased degree of piety have all been identified in the literature 
as causes of changes in terrorism. Common to this vast literature that discusses 
the many transformations and changes in terrorism throughout history is the 
conviction that change cannot ever signify a complete break with its past: 
terrorists’ methods, targets, beliefs, ideologies, consequences—everything about 
terrorism, in fact—can change but that thing called terrorism, that metaphysical 
thing, it remains the same. Changes in the world cause inevitable and necessary 
changes in terrorism, but in the end it will always remain true to its own secret 
self.  
On ‘old’ terrorism versus ‘new’ terrorism 
This given of a metaphysical terrorism is also at the heart of one of the most 
intense debates about and of terrorism in the twenty-first century: was the 
terrorism of 11 September 2001 really so new and different as to warrant as 
distinct a departure from orthodox counterterrorism as the War on Terror? 
Opinion is divided. Opponents of the ‘new terrorism’ theory argue that 
terrorism can only be new if it is viewed ‘without properly consulting history’86, 
replete as it is with examples of terrorism.  
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Such critics of the ‘new’ terrorist or terrorism theory are somewhat justified in 
saying that ‘terrorism seems to be a subject with almost no history.’87 Research 
shows that prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks only 3.9 per cent of academic 
articles analysing terrorism had a historical focus88. Of these, only half looked at 
the phenomenon before the 1960s89. It is not, however, correct to say that 
proponents of the ‘new’ terrorism theory ignored history to arrive at the 
conclusion that the twenty first century is seeing a new terrorism and a new 
terrorist. As far back as the 1970s, Walter Laqueur pointed to the Thugs of India 
from 2,500 years ago, the Sicarii of Judea in 66-73 CE, and the Assassins of the 
eleventh century as being among the ‘earliest known examples’ of terrorism.90 
As the twentieth century drew to a close, it was commonplace among 
proponents of the ‘new’ terrorism theory to point to the three groups in history 
to show how very ‘new’ terrorism had become at the turn of the century and to 
warn just how much more newer and dangerous it could become in the new 
millennium.91  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United 
States whatever historical focus previously seen in analyses of terrorism 
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‘effectively collapsed’ falling from the meagre 3.9 per cent to just 1.7 per cent 
between 2002 and 200492. When historical focus did make a revival in the 
following years, an interesting change had occurred in analysts’ treatment of 
the three ‘early examples of modern terrorism’ - the Thugs, the Sicarri and the 
Assassins. They were now most often cited not by proponents of the ‘new’ 
terrorism theory as evidence of how new terrorism was in the twenty first 
century, but by critics of the ‘new’ terrorism theory as evidence of how very old 
it is.93 For proponents of the ‘new terrorism’ theory, examples from history 
provide ample empirical evidence to support their thesis that ‘old’ terrorism 
had mutated into something ‘new’ and dangerous. For critics of the theory, 
however, the presence of the three groups provides evidence that nothing 
‘except time and place, distinguishes the objectives (or methods)’ of some 
ancient terrorist from those of the ‘new’ terrorists.94 The Assassins ‘appear in 
many ways to be forerunners of today’s jihadists,’95 ‘their willingness to die in 
pursuit of their missions echoed by today’s suicide bombers.’96   
 
How is it more correct to seek a continuous line that connects the dagger 
wielding Assassin of the tenth century with the suicide bomber of the second 
millennium than it is to declare the existence of a ‘new’ terrorism every time a 
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significant change occurs in the motives and methods of those labelled 
terrorists? The contradictory treatment of the aforementioned three groups 
lauded as ‘historical examples of modern terrorists’ in analyses of research on 
terrorism is not a singular occurrence, but reflects a seemingly ingrained habit 
among analysts who turn to history for explanations of contemporary 
terrorism. In the small collection of historical analyses of terrorism available, it 
is commonplace to find that ‘history is (ab)-used to suit the predetermined 
needs of experts’ and that ‘historical themes do not seem to be grounded in 
pure historical studies, but are chosen more on what are perhaps preconceived 
ideas about important developments in terrorism.’97 Such methods facilitate use 
of the same groups from history as evidence to support two diametrically 
opposed arguments and contribute substantially to ‘a problematic state of 
affairs in terrorism studies.’98   
 
Whether or not it is factually correct to assert that ‘new terrorism’s’ proponents 
ignored history to advance their argument, the disagreement raises an 
important question: would an increased focus on history provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of terrorism today? Both sides are in agreement 
that it would. David C. Rapoport asserted in 1984, for example, that it was 
‘simply wrong’ for his colleagues to ‘analyse contemporary experiences as 
though the statement declaring them sui generis is itself clear and at the same 
time provides the only evidence needed to establish the case!’99. He proposed 
the ‘wave theory’ instead. Andrew Silke made the very same observation in 
2009. While it was natural to focus on the immediate after an attack as 
destructive as those of 11 September 2001, he said; such a strong focus on 
contemporary issues ran ‘the real risk of losing an understanding of the broader 
context of terrorist conflicts, patterns, and trends and without such awareness 
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important lessons can be missed’100. Silke was ‘thankful’ when research showed 
historical focus in terrorism analyses had increased from 1.7 per cent between 
2002–4 to 2.8 per cent in 2005–07.101   
 
Is the increased focus on history something to celebrate? Does it provide us 
with a better knowledge of how terrorism began? Or does it, with its 
assumption of terrorism’s ontological certainty, obfuscate rather than illuminate 
how terrorism began, and how it has come to be understood today? Histories of 
terrorism that are based on the ontological certainty of ‘terrorism’ find it 
possible to make clear relations between Osama bin Laden who masterminded 
the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ‘terrorist’ who murdered Julius 
Caesar102 and to see ‘today’s jihadists’ in the Assassins of the tenth century CE103 
precisely because they are written on the basis of such a certainty. They assume 
that throughout the vast expanses of time that are included in the analyses, 
‘words had kept their meaning, […] desires still pointed in a single direction, 
and […] ideas still retained their logic.’104 With ‘terrorism’ as a given, what 
remains for the historian to do is to identify in the past individuals, groups or 
actions with similar characteristics to those of ‘terrorism’ or ‘the terrorist’ at the 
present, and simply order the position of each of them in relation to each other, 
and to the given of ‘terrorism’. Various disparate phenomena are in this manner 
brought in line and arranged around a single centre: ‘terrorism’. Thus, history 
could provide examples of religious terrorism, political terrorism, revolutionary 
terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, or however many different categories of 
terrorism that are said to exist in the present—all with traceable relations and 
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connections to each other and to the seemingly clear ontological horizon of 
‘terrorism’.  
 
In this manner, readers are provided with a ready-made synthesis of a unitary, 
singular phenomena of ‘terrorism’ making it possible to ‘group a succession of 
dispersed events, to link them to one and the same organising principle [...] to 
discover, already at work with each beginning, a principle of coherence and the 
outline of a future unity.’105 Such an ordering of the past is made possible by the 
belief that there exists among all these disparate individuals and groups from 
specific spatial and temporal epochs ‘a system of homogenous relations: a 
network of causality’ through which can be derived ‘relations of analogy that 
show how they symbolise one an other, or how they all express one and the 
same core.’106  It is only by denying these different groups ‘the difference proper 
to every beginning’107, and by applying ‘a retrospective hypothesis’108 that it 
becomes possible to describe these disparate groups collectively as ‘terrorists’. 
These analyses also assume that the specific social, economic, cultural and 
political structures and practices of the various epochs in which these groups 
existed and operated were all subject to the same type of transformation, and 
that contained in their history is ‘a kernel of the present’ that has ‘progressed 
such that it now defines our condition.’109  
 
What happens when the ontological certainty of terrorism is abandoned? For 
one thing, it releases the analyst from the constraint of having to seek a 
totalising history of the phenomenon, and from the need to regard 
discontinuity as a ‘stigma of temporal dislocation’ that is her prime task to 
remove at all costs.110 It becomes possible, in other words, to show that the 
history of terrorism is not one that is ‘wholly and entirely that of its progressive 
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refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient’ but 
one which is made up of its ‘various fields of constitution and validity, that of 
its successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it 
developed and matured.’111 The history of ‘terrorism’ then becomes a history of 
its discourse.  
 
Foucault, discourse, and terrorism 
As defined by Foucault, discourse extends beyond simply the language used 
for speaking about, analysing or classifying the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’, or 
the ‘terrorist’. It includes the social, political and cultural structures and 
practices that exist in specific periods of time that create the ‘grids of 
intelligibility’ according to which the ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ can be thought 
about, spoken of and acted towards. All instances where this study refers to the 
term discourse, it should be understood as referring to Foucault’s definition of 
the term; that is: 
 
all that was said in the statements that named it [terrorism, in this study], divided 
it up, described it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, 
judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that 
were to be taken as its own’112.  
 
Although this definition of discourse was provided at the very beginning of this 
study, it has been repeated here to assert the importance of refraining from 
reading discourse as referring to language alone; an increasingly common 
practice in terrorism studies. This is especially true, unfortunately, within the 
newly formed field of Critical Terrorism Studies.113 Foucault was clear on the 
place of language in discourse: 
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Of course, discourses are composed of signs: but they do more than use these signs 
to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language 
and to the speech. It is this ‘more’ that we must reveal and describe114. 
While discourse is a problem of formations of language and concepts, it is also 
one of extra-discursive structures and practices specific to a particular period 
that make it possible to think what is thought, to say what is said, and do what 
is done during that period. Instead of particular actors using language and 
words intentionally to manipulate discourse to further their own purposes, 
what they say and what they do are determined by a large extent by discourse. 
As shall become clear from this study, terrorism discourse is not simply the 
words used to describe, define, analyse and discuss terrorism – it is all that is 
said and done about terrorism – the discourse of terrorism is what terrorism is. 
 
Somewhat unusually for a Foucaultian discourse analysis, this study employs 
only Foucault’s ideas and methods without recourse to other similar figures to 
complement, modify or qualify what Foucault has to say. As Jan Selby pointed 
out, it is customary for Foucault to be ‘employed alongside a raft of other, 
mostly francophone, authors – Derrida, Lacan, Barthes, Baudillard, Virilio, 
Deleuze, and so on’115. This practice has become so normal that 
‘poststructuralist IR theorists have often not developed specifically Foucauldian 
readings of international politics’ and Foucault has come to be regarded as ‘one 
of a collective of postmodern social theorists’116.  
While Selby’s criticisms of these practices are developed primarily for the 
purpose of highlighting how they have led to an underestimation of interesting 
parallels and convergences between Foucault and non-poststructuralist 
theorists—Marx in particular—they also highlight how the specificity of 
Foucault’s positions have often been lost as a result of this commonplace 
practice in International Relations. This study asserts, and shows, that using 
Foucault’s ideas alone, without pressing into service other authors—be it 
poststructuralist or not, within or without IR—can make a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of some of the most complex issues of the 
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present. In addition to bringing back the specificity of Foucault’s positions, 
doing a specifically Foucaultian discourse analysis also helps return to the 
limelight some of Foucault’s earlier works that have been largely abandoned in 
IR in favour of his later works such as genealogical and biopolitical critiques.  
This is not to claim that this study is unique among recent scholarship to train 
its gaze specifically on Foucault. Several new publications have emerged in 
recent years that use Foucault-inspired approaches to analysing terrorism and 
the current War on Terror117. Among them, Julian Reid’s The Biopolitics of the 
War on Terror, for example, is specifically Foucaultian in approach. Reid 
describes his work as ‘a book not about Foucault, but an examination of the 
problem of war and its relation to the development of liberal societies’ wrought 
through ‘Foucauldian thought’118. Although he finds it necessary ‘to go 
someway beyond Foucault’ to include other specific thinkers influenced by 
him, Reid’s work is ‘an overtly Foucauldian analysis’119 of the War on Terror. In 
a similar vein, there has also been recent scholarship that has revived Foucault’s 
archaeological method, which, as highlighted before, has been described as 
having been abandoned by Foucault in favour of genealogy. Andrew Neal’s 
archaeological analysis of the concept of exception stands out in this regard. In 
Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-terrorism, Neal shows that not only is 
the archaeological method more suitable than genealogy for analysing some 
phenomena and concepts, but also that sometimes scholarship that derives its 
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inspiration from Foucault, such as Giorgio Agamben’s work on exceptionalism, 
misreads Foucault120.  
This has been somewhat true in the field of Critical Terrorism Studies. Much of 
the scholarship that has emerged in the field in recent years question the 
ontological certainty of terrorism and claim to question power/knowledge 
relations underpinning the discourse of terrorism. However, the attempt to 
create a separate discipline—in itself an exercise which Foucault’s 
understanding of discourse would deem highly suspicious—and to establish a 
broad critical agenda has led to an elision of some of the specificities of 
Foucault’s definitions of discourse and genealogical critique121. By digging only 
into Foucault’s toolbox of methods, this study adheres closely to Foucault’s 
thoughts on history and means of conducting archaeological and genealogical 
investigations of a problem of our present. In so doing, it provides a specifically 
Foucaultian analysis of terrorism that probes deeper into the origins and 
power/knowledge relations that constitute it than do critical terrorism analyses 
that take wider and broader stances.  
Terrorism: unknowing the knowns 
When terrorism is seen as a discourse, and ‘terrorism’ and ‘the terrorist’ are 
shed of their metaphysical status and the ‘givenness’ attached to them 
removed, it becomes possible to trace a different history of the terrorist in which 
the question is not ‘What is the moment in history in which he first emerged?” 
but ‘How was he formed? How did he emerge?” The historical account of 
‘terrorism’ provided in this study is archaeological in the sense that rather than 
being a ‘transcendental’ analysis that seeks to identify universal structures that 
underlie all knowledge about ‘terrorism’, it looks at historical archives to 
uncover the conditions that made it possible to think, speak and act on 
‘terrorism’ and ‘the terrorist’ in different ways over various epochs in history. It 
is genealogical in the sense that it distances itself from the quest for a 
metaphysical origin of ‘terrorism’ or ‘the terrorist’ subject, taking care not to 
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‘neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history.’122 The ethos of such a critique 
can be described as ‘an incitement to study the form and consequences of 
universals in particular historical situations and practices grounded in 
problems raised in the course of particular social and political struggles.’123 In 
putting aside the universal of ‘the terrorist’, a genealogy requires the analyst to 
‘dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself’ and ‘to 
arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within 
a historical framework’. Thus it calls into question transcendental structures 
and received values that permeate present western ‘terrorism’ discourse, and 
examines how the subject of the Evildoer has emerged from the interplay 
between discourse, power and subjectivation.  
 
It is asserted that acts of violence do not naturally occur as acts of terrorism: they 
become terrorism only when they are identified, categorised, labelled, defined, 
understood and known as such. How is it, for instance, that Osama bin Laden’s 
declaration of war against the United States—a unique occurrence in history of 
a man declaring and waging war against a state—came to be known as 
terrorism and not by a new name reflecting the uniqueness of the act? Or how is 
it that the War on Terror—the first time in history that a state has launched full-
scale military campaigns against another in a war against a concept—is 
understood as a new form of counter-terrorism and not an entirely unique 
occurrence with its own name? Finding out requires analysing the discourse of 
terrorism—the regimes of practices according to which these acts were 
perceived, identified, known, judged, countered and punished as ‘terrorism’.  
 
This is not to say that terrorism discourses function arbitrarily and that the 
mere application of the label ‘terrorism’ or a deliberate re-categorisation of an 
act as ‘terrorism’ or vice versa can change what is known as terrorism. On the 
contrary, terrorism discourse, like all other discourses, is subject to an unspoken 
but rigid body of socially sanctioned rules—specific to particular epochs—that 
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govern what can and cannot be thought of, seen as, spoken of and acted upon 
as terrorism in that particular period of time. Accepting terrorism as its 
discourse means, therefore, analysing these regimes of practices, identifying the 
tacit rules that govern them, and tracing the changes that occur in them.  
 
One of the main occupations of Terrorism Studies, as discussed earlier, has been 
to seek the origins of terrorism and the terrorist: the right way to think about 
terrorism would emanate from such a discovery, on this analysis. The different 
conceptualisations of terrorism, its many definitions and theories become a 
‘problem’ only if we seek a single origin and an uninterrupted single history of 
terrorism. If, instead, terrorism is regarded as a discourse, its history is made up 
of its ‘various fields of constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of 
use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured’124.  
 
Take, for example, the common assertion that modern terrorism began at the 
time of the French Revolution (1789 – 1799). It is indeed true that this is the 
etymology of the word ‘terrorism’. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) in its 
first definition of the term, published in 1866, provides two meanings. The first 
being:  
 
[A] policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the 
employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorising or condition of 
being terrorised.125.   
 
This is a meaning of ‘terrorism’ close to the original usage of the word ‘terror’, 
derived from Middle English terrour, from the old French word terreur, derived 
in turn from Latin noun terror and the Latin verb terre. Terre is defined in 
English as ‘to frighten’. A ‘terrorist’ was, thus: ‘anyone who attempts to further 
his views by a system of coercive intimidations.’126. The second meaning of 
‘terrorism’ provided by OED (1866) is that it is ‘a system of terror’, ‘government 
intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during 
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the Revolution of 1789–94, the system of the ‘Terror’ (1793–1794)’. This meaning 
clearly imbues it with political connotations directly related to the French 
Revolution.  
 
While the etymology of the word is patently associated with the French 
Revolution, by no means did the term remain yoked solely to the carriage of 
politics throughout history. On the contrary, the new word ‘terrorism’ was used 
interchangeably with the earlier concept of terror, meaning ‘to frighten’, and 
was used regularly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to 
casually refer to someone, or even something, that caused another to be 
frightened. A brief survey of Western academic journals from a variety of 
disciplines in the human sciences published in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries shows various references to terrorism made in this context. 
Richard Wagner, better known as one of the greatest composers of Western 
classical music was, for example, described as a terrorist127. If not for ‘Pharisee 
terrorism’, authorship of the Christian religious tract The Pentateuc would not 
have been attributed to Moses128. Natural phenomena were a tool in the arsenal 
of ‘the terrorist Hindu’ religion.129 Industrial workers on the picket lines were 
terrorists.130 Disobedient young boys who jumped in front of trains and scared 
the living daylight out of train drivers were terrorists131. The advance of 
liberalism and the rise of criticism combined could lead to ‘mental terrorism’ in 
all except the most balanced intellectual minds132. The secret to the progress of 
the Mayan civilisation was not its armed forces, but the theocratic government’s 
‘spiritual terrorism’.133 Practitioners of witchcraft in the British colony of 
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Jamaica in the 1700s were terrorists.134 A mysterious long low black schooner 
that ‘acted strangely’ off the cost of America’s Long Island and New Jersey in 
1839 ‘spread terrorism’ in the seaport towns.135 The 1928 Archbishop of Paris 
Cardinal Dubois was a terrorist.136 The American white supremacist group Ku 
Klux Klan were terrorists137. Members of the Italian Mafia were ‘terrorists’138. 
The cannibals of the Human Leopard Society of Sierra Leone who devoured 
human flesh were terrorists.139 The ‘terrorism’ of twentieth century jazz bands 
could only be countered with the terrorism of pipe bands140. Puritan censorship 
organisations in Boston were terrorists141. ‘Spiritual terrorism’ was part of the 
Buddhist religion.142  
 
Terrorism: knowing the unknowns 
Where have these different knowledges of terrorism disappeared to? How is it 
that it is no longer possible to think of terrorism as ‘to frighten’? Moreover, how 
is it that some of these terrorists of bygone eras are no longer included in the 
discourse of terrorism? A history of the discourse of terrorism requires seeking 
out these subjugated knowledges, that is, ‘knowledges that have been 
disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated 
knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, 
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knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity.’143 It 
requires playing these local, discontinued or non-legitimised knowledges off 
against the unitary theoretical instance of ‘terrorism’ which claims to be able to 
filter these disparate knowledges, prioritise, categorise, and organise them in 
what is said to be a ‘true body of knowledge’ in the name of expertise that is 
said to be in the hands of a few.  
 
The history of terrorism that this study uncovers thus groups together and puts 
into the same category of ‘subjugated knowledges’ on the one hand ‘historical, 
meticulous, precise technical expertise’ and, on the other, ‘singular, local 
knowledges, the non-commonsensical knowledges that people have, and which 
have in a way been left to lie fallow, or even kept in the margins.’144 The ‘true 
body of knowledge’ of terrorism that exists today, and was discussed above, 
was formed not by discovery of the original terrorist, or the true psyche of the 
terrorist, but by exclusion of certain knowledges that were deemed non-
commonsensical or illegitimate or inferior. The history of terrorism that this 
study provides is an attempt to unearth these ‘forgotten’ knowledges and trace 
the processes by which they were excluded so that the knowledges that were 
deemed legitimate could be generalised and accepted as ‘true’.  
 
It is argued that without the strategies adopted by political power for 
generalising the knowledges that have been so legitimised, there can be no ‘true 
body of knowledge’ about terrorism. Foucault outlined four main stages in 
which political power undertakes this process of generalisation. First it 
eliminates and disqualifies ‘useless and irreducible knowledges’; then they are 
normalised, making it possible to fit them together and make them 
communicate with each other; thirdly the knowledges are organised into an 
hierarchy; paving the way to the fourth element of the generalisation process—
a pyramidal centralisation of the knowledges which selects them and ensures 
that the content of these knowledges are both transmitted upward from the 
bottom, and that the overall direction and general organisation it wishes to 
promote can be transmitted downward from the top.145 Locating the subjugated 
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knowledges in the archive of terrorism discourse, and tracing the processes by 
which they were excluded from the discourse of terrorism so that the ‘truth’ 
about the phenomenon can be formed, is what this study considers to be the 
history of terrorism. And it is a history that begins with the Devil.  
 
The concept of the Evildoer 
Tracing the history of terrorism from the French Revolution to the present day, 
or from the first individual or group who carried out a suicide bomb attack in 
the pursuit of a political goal, requires not just the subjugation of a variety of 
different knowledges of terrorism but also the assumption that the history of its 
theory and the history of its concept are the same. On the contrary, concepts are 
theoretically polyvalent and the history of a concept does not begin with, nor 
follow, the same trajectory as its linguistic progress and meanings or its 
theoretical history. The same concept can function in a variety of theoretical 
contexts146. Foucault’s analysis of Classical empirical sciences in The Order of 
Things, for instance, showed that the disparate disciplines of general grammar, 
analysis of wealth, and natural history that emerged during the period shared 
more conceptual similarities with each other than with their contemporary 
counterparts; philology, economics and biology147.  
 
The twenty first century terrorist has little in common with those ‘hellhounds 
called terrorists’ Edmund Burke wrote about in the lead up to the French 
Revolution. The eighteenth century revolutionaries were driven by a need to 
dismantle structures of power built on the ‘idea of God, employed for so long 
by flatterers to secure monstrous and unlimited powers for the heads of 
empires’148. The present terrorist, on the other hand, is fanatically religious, has 
no negotiable demands—political or otherwise—and is out to annihilate 
Western civilisation. In today’s knowledge of terrorism, the new terrorist is an 
Evildoer, a Holy Warrior in the eternal battle between Good and Evil, fighting 
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on the side of Evil149. The historical narratives of the two terrorists are not the 
same and are, if anything, widely divergent. Yet, their conceptual anchor point 
is the same: the irreducible ‘impulse by which a single individual, a group, a 
minority, or an entire people says, “I will no longer obey,” and throws the risk 
of their life in the face of an authority they consider unjust.’150 It is from these 
moments in history where individuals and/or groups gave into the impulse, an 
impulse that is ‘more solid and closer to experience than “natural rights”’, and 
declared they did not want to be governed a particular way, that all the various 
types of terrorists present in the body of terrorism knowledge that exists today 
have emerged. And, although now excluded from the ‘true body of knowledge’ 
of terrorism and therefore from its ‘true’ history, it is the Devil—the original 
rebel—that is at the beginning of the history of the concept of terrorism.  
 
As James Der Derian said in his genealogical analysis of Western diplomacy, 
beginning the history of a phenomenon as ‘serious’ as terrorism with 
mythology is a decision that most likely ‘appear as anathema to those in the 
realist, neo-realist, and non-realist schools alike’151. But, also as Der Derian 
pointed out, there are many boon companions for analysts undertaking the task 
of drawing ‘sense out of nonsense, logic from mytho-logic’—Hegel, Marx, 
Neitzsche, Foucault and Barthes to name but a few. In Foucault’s words: 
 
If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, 
he finds that there ‘is something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless 
and essential secret but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence 
was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.152 
Although this study begins the history of terrorism with the emergence of the 
Devil it does not by any means contend that the Devil has remained a blatant 
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constant in the discourse of terrorism since. As mentioned before, history is not 
a continuum; nor is, therefore, the history of terrorism a continuous one. Rather, 
it is one marked by breaks, by different moments of time when there was a 
‘wrenching-away that interrupt[ed] the flow of history, and its long chains of 
reasons’, when it came to the point ‘for a man to be able, ‘really’, to prefer the 
risk of death to the certainty of having to obey.’153  
 
Beginning from Lucifer’s rebellion against God, history has had many such 
figures, ‘because no authority is capable of making it [refusal to obey] utterly 
impossible’.154 What shape or form the rebel takes depends on how society 
responds to—and is capable of responding to—the rebel during the given 
period of time in which he or she emerges. Lucifer, the angel who stood against 
God and committed the ultimate rebellion, for example, had been in the Bible 
since the Old Testament, but it was only with the advent of Christianity in the 
Middle Ages, and with the establishment of pastoral power and divinely 
ordained monarchies, that Lucifer became The Devil, God’s grand cosmic 
antagonist and the personification of evil. As is explored in detail in Chapter 
Two, it is mechanisms of power that made knowledge of the Devil as evil 
possible while, at the same time, it was knowledge of the Devil as an evil that 
made the epoch’s dominant mechanisms of power—pastoral control and 
divinely ordained monarchies—possible. The analysis in Chapter Two also 
shows how this knowledge of the Devil, and the knowledge that was then 
formed of rebellion as a sin, an evil against an established order that was good, 
has returned to play an important role in making possible the present Evildoer.  
 
Once the social and political conditions in which the Devil emerged and came 
to play such an important role in Western societies changed, however, the Devil 
could no longer exist as the chief rebel—how could the rebel be religious when 
the established order against which he was rebelling was secular? This dynamic 
relationship between knowledge and power—that one cannot exist without the 
other—is what is missing from the existing analyses of terrorism that assume 
that ‘the terrorist’ exists as a metaphysical entity. As Foucault has asserted, it is 
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a myth—based on the assumption that truth itself is an immutable abstract—
that ‘If there is knowledge, it must renounce power. Where knowledge and 
science are found in their pure truth, there can no longer be any political 
power’155. If, instead, truth is ‘a thing of the world’, it is produced ‘by virtue of 
multiple forms of constraints’156 that form a regime or ‘general politics’ of truth: 
the types of discourses that it accepts and allows to function as truth, the 
mechanisms that separate what is true from what is false, how it is sanctioned, 
what procedures and techniques are seen as valuable for establishing the truth, 
and the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true’157.  
 
Mechanisms for establishing the truth—which also act as controls on the 
production of ‘true’ knowledge—and mechanisms for exercising power are 
constitutive of each other. Particular types of subjects of knowledge, orders of 
truth, or domains of knowledge cannot exist ‘except on the basis of political 
conditions that are the very ground on which the subject, the domains of 
knowledge, and the relations with truth are formed.’158 It is not that political 
conditions mask the truth or are an obstacle to getting to the truth – they are the 
means by which subjects of knowledge, and hence the truth, are formed. Truth, 
as Foucault put it, is not ‘the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted 
solitude’, it is, rather, ‘a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of 
multiple forms of constraint.’159 It is through these regimes of truth, that is the 
mechanisms for establishing the truth, that power is exercised in and over 
societies.  
 
‘The terrorist’ and terrorism are not immutable abstracts. The various types of 
terrorists that have appeared in the existing body of ‘terrorism knowledge’ are 
rebels who have refused to obey the established orders of various epochs that 
have been defined in different ways according to how it was possible at the time 
to think of them given the socio-political conditions of the period. This study 
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identifies several such rebels that have emerged since the Devil who—by the 
subjugation of certain knowledges and through the mechanisms for 
establishing truth that prevailed during certain epochs—were brought under 
the same system of regularities that is known as ‘terrorism’. These figures—the 
secular rebel of the French Revolution who emerged from the separation of 
rebellion and sin; the proletarian radical of the industrial revolution; the anti-
colonial freedom fighter; the Arab/Muslim rebel of the Israel/Palestine 
conflict—all have as their conceptual origin the rebel who refuses to obey the 
established order. How they came to be known as terrorists, and of different 
types, depended on the power/knowledge relations that existed in society 
during the particular epochs, as is discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
 
This history of terrorism in the next two chapters, makes it possible to see that 
the Evildoer of the twenty-first century is neither new, nor an entity that exists 
outside of the regimes of practices that define it, study it, know it and then acts 
on this knowledge as if it were a truth that already existed. The terrorist of 
today is the rebel who is seen to most threaten the established order of today: a 
world in which Western thought, culture and political power is seen as the 
most enlightened, the most knowing, and the most right. When Al-Qaeda 
attacked the United States in 2001, a new millennium had just begun after an 
exhausting wait for an apocalypse which never came and a Jesus that never 
returned; tensions were high in the Israel/Palestine conflict; an evangelical 
born-again Christian had just been elected as the President of the United States, 
and the long drawn out war in Afghanistan had at last ended in victory for the 
Taliban. The Cold War was at an end, and International Relations was in 
turmoil both in theory and practice. It was a time of great socio-political turmoil 
and of great American hubris as the world’s only superpower.  
 
Al-Qaeda’s actions on 11 September 2001 was a moment in which history was 
interrupted, when Osama bin Laden, proclaiming to speak on behalf of all 
Muslims in the world refused to accept as just American foreign policy and 
revolted against the established order. It is from the responses to Osama bin 
Laden’s actions, made possible by the specific socio-political conditions of this 
epoch, that the rebel of the present begins to emerge as an Evildoer: an 
Arab/Muslim barbarian who hates liberal Western values and norms long 
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established as the right and good form of governance and of being. As shall be 
seen in the coming chapters, it is this return of the rebel as a sinner that has 
made possible, and was made possible by, forms of political power that have 
long since been thought to belong only in the archives of history. But, as is 
argued in this study—not only is history discontinuous, it is quite possible that 
it is also anachronistic.  
 
Summary 
The body of knowledge about terrorism that currently exists is overwhelmingly 
based on the assumption that ‘terrorism’ is an ontological certainty, which this 
study negates. Histories of terrorism based on this assumption pursue a 
metaphysical figure of ‘the terrorist’, seeking his origins in one page or another 
of history. But, these are histories that read the present back into the past rather 
than histories that use an understanding of the past to know about the present. 
Removing the ontological certainty of terrorism allows differentiation between 
the history of its theory and the history of its concept, which this study locates 
in the concept of the rebel—an individual or group that refuses to obey an 
established order and risks life and limb to stand against that order. It is argued 
that the history of terrorism is a history of the concept of the rebel constituted in 
various different shapes and forms according to the socio-political conditions 
specific to the particular epoch in which each such figure emerged. The history 
of the present concept of terrorism as an Evildoer that this study offers thus 
begins with the Devil of the Middle Ages, the original rebel in modern Western 
history that rebelled against established order and created the conditions of 
possibility in which today’s terrorist—an Arab/Muslim barbarian—could 
(re)emerge as an Evildoer. 
 
 
 
  47 
 
2. Terrorism: the details are in the Devil 
 
‘Well,’ said Socrates, ‘there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and … I should 
particularly like to know whether you agree with me in defining this fear or terror 
as expectation of evil.’ - Protagoras160  
 
Terror, evil and knowledge have been connected in Western thought since the 
beginning of the Greek civilization. In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates defines ‘fear 
or terror’ as ‘the expectation of evil’ and the root of all evils was ignorance: not 
knowing.161 In the Laws, Plato proposed that ‘ignorance is, and always has been, 
the ruin of states […] and the greatest ignorance is the love of what is known to 
be evil, and the hatred of what is known to be good’.162 In Phaedo Plato makes 
the same distinction between knowledge and good, and evil and ignorance, 
asserting the importance of education in progressing from ‘evil to good, from 
ignorance to knowledge’.163 These associations between terror and ignorance, 
evil and knowledge are also found in Enlightenment writers who saw early 
man as being terrorized by his ignorance of the forces of nature, as is discussed 
later in this Chapter.  
 
Before that, however, this Chapter explores the emergence of the Devil in 
Western discourse during the Middle Ages and the politico-religious conditions 
and regimes of practices that made the figure of the Devil possible and 
rendered it true. It examines the early Christian conceptions of evil that 
emerged during this period, and explores how the presence of the Devil created 
the conditions in which terror could become a legitimate form of political 
power. It also traces the links that were formed during this period between the 
Devil and Mohammed, the prophet of Islam, and how these links made it 
possible for Islam to emerge in Western consciousness as a Christian heresy, 
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forming the historical a priori that would later make possible the Evildoer-
terrorist of the twenty-first century.   
 
The continuities between classical Greece and Renaissance Europe in their 
conceptualizations of terror, evil and knowledge referred to at the start of this 
Chapter do not mean that what was understood as evil, what inspired terror, 
and what counted as knowledge about either concept remained the same in the 
intervening period(s). The period in-between—during which European 
societies experienced the advent of Christianity, the Reformation, the Hundred 
Year’s War and the Black Death—represents an epoch significantly different 
from those that had come before and what was to come after.  
 
With the advent of Christianity, the question of evil became a pressing concern 
for medieval European society164: if God was good, and if God was 
omnipresent, why did bad things happen in the world? If God created the 
world and everything in it, then was God the source of evil? Were the 
Manicheans correct that the universe was constituted by God who was 
supremely good and by an evil principle identified in materiality165? In 397-398 
Augustine of Hippo proposed a thesis that was found to be convincing: 
ontologically evil did not exist, it could only ever be the privation of good166. 
God was not the source of evil; evil was the result of Adam’s disobedience and 
his sinful turning away from God. In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine 
argued that the first evil occurs when the Devil, one of God’s rational creatures, 
turns away from God to love ‘certain created goods in preference to God 
himself who is the highest good.’167  God being all that was good, then the 
Devil’s rebellion against God was a rebellion against goodness itself, and thus 
the ultimate evil. In Classical Greece, terror had been the expectation of evil, 
and evil was the unknown. Now that evil was known as the Devil, what 
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became of terror? Did terror now arise from the fear of the Devil? Without a 
doubt, the figure of the Devil that emerged in the Middle Ages as the 
personification of evil was immensely terrifying. The Devil became 
omnipresent in society during this epoch, and affected every aspect of 
individuals’ lives as well as the organization of society as a whole.  
 
With Augustine’s concept of evil, questions arose as to how man could 
overcome the weaknesses in his nature and avoid being tempted by the Devil as 
Adam had been. Could human beings redeem themselves entirely by their own 
effort, or did the ultimate decision depend on the grace of God? Scholastic 
enquiry and Church practices came to agree that the last word was God’s: 
human beings could not entirely overcome the weakness of their nature by 
themselves, but they were obliged to do everything they could to do so. Central 
to the whole process of overcoming evil understood in this way was the 
Church, which played a crucial role in keeping people away from temptation 
and bringing them back to their rational ends168. This role of the Church as the 
guiding light to man’s redemption was made possible by the presence of the 
Devil, who was himself constituted by the regimes of practices that were 
introduced to deal with his presence. The Devil has been identified as the 
creator of evil, but there was a lot that was still unknown about him. What form 
would he take? Where would he strike next? How could He be avoided?  
 
These were essential questions that the Bible, the primary text of Western 
religious discourse to which every commentary on religion ultimately refers 
back for validation, offered only some answers to. The Devil was referred to in 
the Old Testament only implicitly as the serpent that leads Adam and Eve 
astray.169 The New Testament retrospectively validates this reference, and 
points to a variety of different figures that all came to be accepted as referring to 
the Devil - from Satan170, Beelzebub171, Wicked One172, Prince of this World173, 
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The Tempter174, Liar175, and Belial176 to the Ancient Serpent177. The Devil of the 
Bible had many guises, and could appear at any time. And so it was the case 
with the concept of the Devil during the Middle Ages.  
 
Given the Devil’s ubiquitousness, and his proteiform nature, it was necessary 
for human beings to know more about him in order to best avoid him. As the 
ultimate authority on the word of God, and thus the identity and nature of the 
Devil, it was the Church alone that could provide the answers man sought. And 
it did so through homilies, catechisms and regular preaching. These discursive 
practices were tightly regulated by the Church; what should be said in the 
sermons that were preached, what tone that the preacher should take, and how 
the content should be structured were strictly controlled by the upper levels of 
the complex Church hierarchy. Siegfried Wenzel’s analysis of Latin sermons 
from medieval England identified the most common themes in their content as 
being the history of salvation178:  
 
In the beginning, man was created in the image of God. Yielding to the temptation 
by Satan, chief of the fallen angels who envied man’s exalted position, he lost his 
state of grace by sin and was rejected from Paradise and given over to the rightful 
power of the devil. But in his infinite mercy God wanted mankind to return to him, 
for which he first sent Moses and the Old testament prophets; and as these were 
not universally heeded, God sent his own Son, who became man, called sinners to 
repentance, and died for mankind’s salvation.179 
 
The core message, ‘ever-present’, is that ‘although all men and women are born 
sinners, and are most probably affected by some actual, personal sins they may 
hope and trust in God’s mercy, which during life is available through 
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repentance and the sacrament of Penance’180. When the human being dies, and 
again at the end of time, there will be judgement, ‘when the condemned will go 
to eternal punishment, and the saved to their glorious home with God’181. This 
message was delivered in a variety of different forms, using a range of 
rhetorical devices particular to the medieval sermon. Whichever form the 
sermon took, however, ‘a medieval preacher could not make a single statement 
without backing it up with a biblical “authority”’. After the scripture, the 
preachers referred their words to the writings of the Church Father and 
Scholastic texts. By the time of the High Middle Ages, Medieval Christianity 
had drawn a complex moral map—reflected in canon and civil laws—that was 
rooted in reason and revelation, and measured evil according to the degree to 
which they had turned away from goodness and God.182  
 
Dante’s Divine Comedy provides an illustration of the detailed gradations for 
measuring an individual’s distance from Good. The worst evil is committed by 
those who move furthest away from God and, therefore, closest to his chief 
antagonist: the Devil. The gravity of their sin, according to this system of 
gradations, was commensurate with the excellence of the good that it rejected 
or damaged.183 At the very bottom of Dante’s Hell, for example, is Satan and in 
his mouths are caught Judas the betrayer of Jesus, the Son of God, and Cassius 
and Brutus the betrayers of Caesar, founder of the universal empire. The worst 
offenders were damned to an eternity at the bottom of Hell. This medieval 
concept of punishment being meted out according to the excellence of the good 
that it damaged—constituted around the discourse of the Devil—has been 
present in Western discourse since, and was reanimated in the United States 
terrorism discourse of the twenty first century, as is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Three.  
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The Devil we know 
The inter-textual repetition of the sermons, and their status as the ‘word of 
God’, helped rarefy the concept of the Devil. Its positivity was further increased 
by the systematic, rational enquiry into the Bible, and to the study of which 
some religious orders dedicated their entire lives. University education was 
encouraged among priests and, in the medieval university, ‘giving sermons 
represented one of the basic academic activities, together with lectures and 
disputations’.184 Theology was available as a discipline of study in all major 
universities, and many preachers and those in the higher echelons of the church 
held university degrees at various levels. At the same time, it was compulsory 
for all students at England’s medieval universities to attend the weekly 
university sermon185.  Church guidelines for priests stressed an absolute need 
for theological knowledge not only for preaching but also for hearing 
confessions. For a pastor to be able to provide his flock with the knowledge 
they needed for salvation, he ‘must have learning and knowledge, and the 
ability to pass these on and thereby to lead his flock’186.  
 
In other words, it was the Church that delineated the lines according to which 
the Devil could be known, it had control over what could and could not be 
considered legitimate knowledge of him. And it was this knowledge, the limits, 
structure and authenticity of which the Church itself controlled, that informed 
the practices that it put into place to pave the way for man’s redemption and 
which would ultimately make the Church the only coherent socio-economic 
body during this period. With this knowledge the Church was the ultimate 
arbitrator in deciding what inexplicable mysteries of nature could be attributed 
to the powers of God and what to the dark forces that the Devil commanded.  
 
The Church also had the power to identify a human being possessed by the 
Devil, and the knowledge to exorcise it from within her. And according to the 
Church’s acquired body of knowledge, while supernatural action was possible, 
it could only ever emanate from one of two sources: God or the Devil. ‘Any 
magician, therefore, who sought to achieve a marvellous result by means which 
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were neither purely natural nor commanded by God was guilty of allying 
himself either tacitly or expressly, with Satan.’187 The existence of the Devil 
validated the Church as the authority in deciding between good and evil, right 
and wrong, truth and artifice, sinner and saint. The power that the fear of the 
Devil had over Western societies during this epoch is strikingly illustrated by 
‘the war on the Devil’s agents known as witches’, in which between forty and 
fifty thousand people in Europe and colonial North America were executed188.  
 
Historical records have documented the witch-hunt as having been most 
virulent in the Lowlands, France and Germany—where the religious divisions 
of the Reformation had precipitated the most violence189. The Reformation had 
intensified the spectre of Satan, and, in places like Germany where Devil lore 
was common in historical and traditional narratives190; it created widespread 
terror, allowing for the conditions of such a discourse of the Devil to perpetuate 
within the strife ridden societies. The dynamic knowledge/power relations that 
underpin the constitution of a discourse changed in an unprecedented way 
during this period with the development of the printing press. Instead of being 
delivered just from the pulpit to the congregation, knowledge about the Devil’s 
agents—subject to all the controls discussed above—could be more easily 
disseminated now to reach even the peasant classes.  
 
Armed with printed Bibles, catechisms, and Homilies clergymen set out to 
suppress all unorthodox behaviour. Until this time, the official policy of the 
Catholic Church on witchcraft, summarised in Canon Episcopi had been that 
belief in witchcrafts were ‘mere illusions’. The books that appeared on the 
subject of witchcraft in the fifteenth century contended that ‘witches were 
qualitatively different from the rest of humanity, and that the ‘witch sect’ 
included qualitatively-different witches from the ones to which the Canon 
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Episcopi alluded’191. The discourse of evil and the figure of the Devil now found 
in the Witch, gained further validation in intellectual enquiry and was thus 
rendered more ‘true’ with the publication of Malleus Maleficarum by Dominicans 
Sprenger and Kramer in 1487-1489. Adopted as the official text-book of the 
Inquisition, it removed the last impediment to the hunt of witches, and 
illustrates clearly the judicative and veridicative nature of discursive practices 
whereby a certain discourse legitimates a particular way of acting, or vice versa. 
 
Since the devil could be blamed for these woes, it remained merely to identify his 
human agents […] torture and suggestive questioning revealed an extensive 
network of devil worshipping heretics, thus confirming the fantasies of the learned 
jurists who counsel (in imperial jurisdictions) ignorant judges were, by law, 
prescribed to follow192.  
 
Determined to stamp out such diabolical practices, ruled by faith in God and 
the fear of his antagonist, clergymen and rulers in various parts of continental 
Europe inspired fear in whole populations, torturing and killing hundreds of 
thousands, mostly women. Not even children were spared. In 1723 in 
Augsburg, for example, a group of children were alleged to have been seduced 
by the Devil to commit maleficent acts in the city. It was said that an old 
seamstress had led them astray. Twenty children, aged between six and sixteen 
were taken into custody, held in dark cells, often in solitary confinement. It was 
six years before the last of the children were freed193. The Church attempted to 
stamp out ‘all un-acceptable magic, especially the demonic magic of many poor 
countrywomen whose spells and charms and conjuring and cures represented 
the last vestiges of pre-Christian tradition’194.  
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The Devil we don’t know 
The concept of evil as understood during this epoch allowed medieval 
European societies to develop a system of measuring evil according to an 
individual’s distance from God; and a system of punishment that was 
commensurate with said distance. The distance also indicated the excellence of 
the good that had been damaged by the actions of the individual. As discussed 
above, in Dante’s Inferno, the Devil, having rejected God and therefore all that 
was good, had created the most evil and was damned to the bottom of Hell. In 
his mouth were Judas who betrayed Jesus and, Cassius and Brutus who 
murdered Julius Caesar. In the next circle of Hell is Mohammed, the prophet of 
Islam. Mohammed’s closeness to the Devil in Dante’s work is not an exception, 
but reflects how Mohammed was known in the social rubric of the time. 
Mohammed and Islam had, in fact, made their first appearance in European 
general consciousness as Christian heresies—punishments from God for 
Christian misdeeds. 
 
Western knowledge about Mohammed has its roots in the collapse of the 
Byzantine Empire and the seventh century Arab conquest of Palestine and their 
occupation of Bethlehem, preventing Christian pilgrims from visiting the scene 
of the Nativity for the first time in memory. Walter Kaegi traced the first known 
Byzantine reference to the Arab conquest to the 634 Christmas sermon of 
Patriarch Sophronious of Jerusalem195. Sophronious, the foremost Byzantine 
bishop and theologian, delivered the sermon just two years after the death of 
Mohammed and against the backdrop of the Arab conquest. Finding many Old 
Testament parallels to their predicament under the Arab conquest, Sophronius 
said the Saracens’ Arab invasion was a divine punishment: ‘countless sins and 
very serious faults’ had made the Christians unworthy of seeing the sights of 
Bethlehem.’196 Comparing the situation with Adam’s after the Fall, he said that 
while Adam had been barred from paradise by a flaming sword, the sinful 
Christians of the time were barred from Bethlehem by the ‘sword of the 
Saracens, beastly and barbarous, which truly is filled with diabolic savagery’.197  
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Sophronius does not mention Mohammed or Islam in his sermon. Rather, he 
speaks of the Arab invaders as ‘blood-loving’, ‘slime’, terrible, godless and 
without any religious impulse. To destroy them, the sinful Christians must 
correct themselves, repent and stop acts that were hateful to God. In a second 
document, the Doctrina Jacobi Nuper Baptizi, a dialogue which is said to have 
taken place on 13 July 634 between Jacob, a recent compulsory convert to 
Christianity, and several Jews, appears the first reference to Mohammed. He is 
described as ‘the deceiving prophet’ who had appeared amidst the Saracens. In 
this text, which according to Kaegi is the first known Byzantine literary text 
which refers to Mohammed although not by name, is also the first such tract to 
judge Islam, fitting it into the apocalyptic prophecy in Daniel.198 In the years 
that followed, revulsion at the Arab conquest grew. In a letter written by 
Maximus the Confessor to Pater the Illustrious, he asks: 
 
What could be more serious than the evils now enveloping the inhabited world? 
What could be more terrible to those perceiving it than what is happening? What 
could be more piteous or fearful to those who are now suffering than to see a 
barbarous people of the desert overrun a foreign land as though it were their own, 
and to see wild and untamed beasts, whose form alone is human, devour civilised 
government?’199 
 
This early Western knowledge of Arabs as uncivilised barbarians and 
Mohammed and Islam as divine punishments continued well into the next 
century. The Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius, a seventh century Syriac work 
written in reaction to the Islamic conquest of the Near East, for example, speaks 
of the lawlessness and the sins of Christians, and states that it was for this 
reason that ‘God delivered them into the hands of the barbarians’.200 By the late 
seventh century, the Arab conquest had come to be accepted as the fulfilment of 
a divine prophecy, and Islam was seen as the fourth beat in Daniel’s prophecy 
of the apocalypse. Muslims became ‘the enemies of God’, and Islam was ‘the 
detestable doctrine of the beast, that is Mohammed’, as a contemporary 
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observer said speaking of the Arab conquest of Alexandria.201 In the eighth 
century, when the attempts to understand Islam began, it reflected this early 
thinking. By the Middle Ages, the knowledge of Mohammed as a ‘false 
prophet’ and Islam as a divine punishment for Christian sins had become 
accepted as true.  
 
This understanding of Mohammed and Islam continued to be validated 
through commentary and rarefaction even in the later Middle Ages, right 
through the Reformation. The works of Reformation thinkers such as Bullinger, 
Calvin and Luther provide several examples. Heinrich Bullinger, wrote in his 
1567 treatise on Islam, The Turk, that Islam is the evil that arises from Christians’ 
turning away from good. To support his argument he points to how the rise of 
Islam coincided with various internal Church disputes.202 Bullinger maintained 
that Mohammed was a false prophet who had invented his revelations and 
visions, and asserted that Mohammed had put the Koran together with the help 
of a heretical monk and the advice of perverted Jews and false Christians. For 
Bullinger, the syncretic and false nature of Islam was undeniable. He accuses 
Mohammed and Muslims, along with the papacy, of being Anti-Christ203.  
 
Calvin’s thoughts on Islam, documented in his sermons, commentaries and 
other writings—and wholly lacking in citations and references to any 
theological, literary or philosophical authority whatsoever—reflect a similarly 
sceptical attitude towards Islam and Mohammed. In his 1550 Commentary on 
Second Thessalonians, he refers to Mohammed as ‘the man of sin’ and describes 
him as an apostate who turned his followers away from Christ. Like Bullinger, 
Calvin names Mohammed as the Anti-Christ: ‘As Mahomet says that his Al-
Coran is the sovereign wisdom, so says the Pope of his own decrees. For they be 
the two horns of Anti-Christ […]’204 
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Similar thinking informed Martin Luther’s work, who had been an Augustinian 
monk before becoming a Protestant. According to Luther, Augustine himself 
shared the same views of Mohammed and Islam. ‘Augustine held’, said Luther, 
‘Arius’s205 punishment in hell becomes greater every day, as long as their error 
lasts. For Mohammed came out of this sect’206. In Luther’s view, which reflected 
the epoch’s belief in the Church as the establisher of ‘truth’, ‘Mohammed’s 
Koran is such a great spirit of lies that it leaves almost nothing of the Christian 
truth remaining.’207 While ‘the kingdom of Christ is a kingdom of grace, mercy, 
and of all comfort’, according to Luther, ‘the Kingdom of Mohammed is a 
kingdom of revenge, of wrath, and desolation’.208  
 
Luther’s view of Mohammed as Satan or the Devil is always accompanied with 
comparative descriptions of the other Anti-Christ, the Pope. Luther also 
expressed the view that for him the ‘real final Antichrist is the Pope’; 
Mohammed was too coarse, ‘a recognizable black Devil who can deceive 
neither faith nor reasons’ whereas the Devil that is the Pope is ‘a high and 
subtle and beautiful and glistening Devil’. The papal Devil is worse than 
Mohamed because he is the Devil within Christendom, deceiving unwilling 
followers from the inside whereas Mohammed misleads people from the outside. 
The coarse Devil is Mohammed, and Papacy the subtle Devil209.  
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Better the Devil you know? 
‘Is it worse to follow Mahomet or the Devil?’210, asked Benjamin Franklin in Poor 
Richard, the 1740 edition of his bestselling Almanack. For most early American 
observers, Thomas Kidd has argued, the question was redundant – ‘to follow 
one was to follow the other’.211 As seen from the discussion above, the European 
view of Mohammed and Islam was formed in the context of the threat that they 
posed to Christianity. Arabs, in this understanding were barbarians and 
diabolical savages who followed the ‘false prophet’ and his heresies. In the 
sixteenth century, when ‘Barbary pirates’ began capturing and enslaving 
European seafarers, Western discourse found a new object around which the 
Arab/Muslim-barbarian discourse was constituted.  
 
The word Barbary is a term that Europeans used to mark the Maghreb or North 
Africa, which emerged from the Greek word barbaros or the Latin barbarus to 
signify non-Greeks or non-Romans, whose language they did not understand.212 
Euripides, for example, indicated three uses of the term: unintelligible, non-
national, and foreign with an implied inferiority213. In the seventh century, 
Arabs are known to have used the term berbera (to mumble) in reference to the 
language of the natives in lands they invaded214. It has also been suggested that 
Barbara, another derivative, was a categorical label used to denote African tribes 
who opposed communication and trade, and thus ‘whose nature was like that 
of animals’.215 In the context of Arabs and Muslims, Augustine—a native of 
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North Africa—used the term to refer to his countrymen who resisted Roman 
rule and Christianity.  
 
When the ‘Barbary pirates’ began to enslave Europeans, it thus implied the 
captivity of civilised European Christians by Arab-Muslim barbarians. 
Narratives published by such captives who escaped from the ‘Barbary’ 
enslavement in the eighteenth century became North America’s first significant 
acquaintance with Islam, and its first substantial source of ‘knowledge’ about 
the religion. These ‘captivity narratives’, as they came to be known, told tales of 
extreme cruelty by their Muslim captors as well as the many attempts that they 
made to convert their Christian captives to Islam. And, in much the same way 
as European discursive practises were centred on the concept of Islam as a 
divine punishment, in North America Islam became a discursive device that 
reinforced Protestant superiority over other religions, such as Deism or 
Catholicism216, in comparison with the Muslim other.  
 
Thomas Kidd’s study of the North American’s deployment of Islam and 
Mohammed as a rhetorical tactic provides several examples of how the 
captivity narratives were used in this way. When Captain William Foster of 
Roxbury, Massachusetts and his son were captured by North Africans and 
released after three years, Puritan Minister Increase Mather spoke of the case as 
evidence of how prayer had worked to deliver them from their captivity ‘under 
Mahomet’217. Another American captive Joshua Gee, who was captured in 1680, 
wrote of the cruelties he had suffered as a means of showing the comforting 
power of the scripture and prayers. One of the most popular books of the genre 
to be published during this period was Francis Brooks’ Barbarian Cruelty, 
originally published in London in 1693 and reprinted in Boston in 1700. Brooks 
narrated many stories of how Moroccon Emperor Mully Ishmael under whose 
rule he was held captive continuously demanded that Christians convert to 
Islam. Brooks explained his cruelties in relation to the Emperor’s faith in Islam: 
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‘Mahomet their great Prophet possessing them with a Belief, that if he kills any 
one, he merits Heaven by so doing.’218 
 
Cotton Mather, a Puritan Minister who became a key figure in the Salem Witch 
trials, frequently used such narratives in his publications to bolster the 
goodness of Christianity in comparison with Islam and Mohammed, the ‘false 
prophet’. Throughout his works that discuss the capture of Europeans and his 
countrymen by North Africans are references to the ‘Impostor Mahomet’ and 
his ‘accursed Alcoran’; the ‘filthy disciples of Mahomet’; and ‘Mahometan 
Tempters’.219 Using translations of the Qur’an, he suggested in A Pastoral Letter 
to English Captives in Africa (1698) that ‘if Muslims read their holy book 
correctly, they would see that it pointed to Christ as the true Messiah’.220 Even 
in seemingly unrelated works such as his Collection of the best discoveries in nature 
with religious improvements, he uses Mohammed as an aid for driving home the 
message of how Christianity had improved philosophy and discoveries of 
nature.221 
 
One of the most influential texts of this type of writing where Islam and 
Mohammed were used as a means of strengthening Christianity and defending 
it from allegations of falsity was Humphrey Prideaux’s The true nature of 
imposture, fully displayed in the life of Mahomet. Attached was ‘A discourse 
annexed for the vindication of Christianity from the charge of imposture.’222 As 
Prideaux said in anticipation of questions being asked as to why he had chosen 
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to use ‘such a foul picture as that of Mahomet’, ‘so wicked a person as 
Mahomet’ for his case study: 
 
[…] to this I have there two answers to return. 1. Because I have none other to do it 
by, Mahomet being the only Impostor who could ever prevail so far as to establish 
his imposture, and make it a standing religion in the world […]. And, 2dly, How 
foul forever the picture of Mahomet may be, we have no reason from the nature of 
the thing, ever to imagine that any other impostor can have a fairer, till you bring 
us an instance thereof. And these two I hope may be sufficient to clear me from 
acting any way unfairly in this matter[…]223 
 
In the attached ‘Discourse on vindicating Christianity,’ he lists in great detail 
the inherent characteristics of Islam that distinguishes its fraudulent nature, and 
thus its essential differences from Christianity.224 Comparison with the 
wickedness of Mahomet and Islam and ‘proving’ its falsity was thus the best 
possible way that Christians could defend allegations of fraudulence being 
levelled against it by Deists. Prideux thus presented his work as pure and 
objective knowledge. And this was how the book was received; ten editions 
were printed in London alone where it was first published in 1697, and several 
other editions appeared in various British colonies, including a 1723 edition in 
Dublin, Ireland, 1799 edition in Glasgow, Scotland, and in Calcutta, India in 
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1820.  Various American editions appeared from 1796225. In eighteenth century 
Anglo-American thinking, all the characteristics that Prideaux and other such 
writers attributed to Mohammed and Islam, and which he explained in terms of 
the barbaric, lustful and violent nature of ‘the Arabians’, were rendered ‘true’, 
becoming rarefied with inter-textual repetition.  
 
Presenting Mohammed along with the Pope as Satan or Anti-Christ, a practice 
rife during the Middle Ages in Europe, also became valid ‘truths’ during this 
period. The Lutheran leader of New York, for example, said that the Pope was 
the Anti-Christ from the West that the scripture had predicted and ‘Mahomet, 
or Gog and Magog’ was the Anti-Christ that had been predicted to arise in the 
East.226 These ‘truths’ about Arabs, Islam and Mohammed—as well as the 
discursive practises involved in the production of such texts and speeches—
which had continued from the very beginning of Western consciousness of 
Islam right through to the eighteenth century formed part of one of the 
dominant narratives of American religious discourse. As the process of 
secularisation became more consolidated in the next century, it was often 
relegated to the archive of subjugated knowledges but was easily reanimated, 
especially when confronted with a dangerous new enemy, as will be seen 
clearly in the three chapters that follow.  
 
The power of terror 
What is this thing called terror that had such power over people? It is certainly 
a more stable concept than the Devil, is much older, and has retained its 
original Latin meaning of ‘to frighten’ for well over 2,000 years227. Its Greek 
antecedent trésas, is a derivative of tréo, meaning ‘flee from fear, flee away’228. In 
Protagoras, Socrates had defined it as the expectation of evil, but he did not 
elaborate on what the feeling itself was. In fact, when challenged by Prodicus 
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that ordinary fear and terror are two different emotions, Socrates dismisses the 
distinction with a ‘never mind’229. Terror in the Bible, the fundamental text, 
which underpinned and constituted the dominant narrative of the epoch with 
which this Chapter is concerned, does distinguish between the two. It speaks, for 
instance, of fear generated by the expectation of terror and speaks also of ‘the 
sword without, and terror within’230. Terror causes such a degree of fright that 
its expectation is in itself frightening. Terror washes over unsuspecting people 
like a tempest and submerges them in its waters,231 or once ‘the terrors are 
turned upon’ a person, they pursue his soul like the wind and takes away his 
wellbeing232. Terror ‘utterly consumes’ individuals and brings them to 
desolation.233 Terror is a suffering234, and is felt in the heart itself.235  
 
Significantly, terror in the Bible does not refer to this overwhelming emotion 
alone. Terror is also a noun, referring to an undefined, extraordinary act or 
display that is spectacular and destructive that causes people to experience the 
emotion of intense fear in expectation of it, or in witnessing it. Terror as a noun 
causes terror the emotion. God, for example, is described in Deuteronomy 4:34 
as using seven different strategies in ensuring the success of the Exodus: ‘by 
temptations, by signs, and by wonders, and by war, and by a mighty hand, and 
by a stretched out arm, and by great terrors.’236 Terror as an extreme degree of 
fear caused by spectacular acts is also found in Joshua 2, again in reference to 
the events narrated in Exodus. Inhabitants of Jericho are fainting with terror at 
the arrival of Joshua having heard of how God had first wondrously parted the 
Red Sea for him and later destroyed the kings of the Amorites. ‘And as soon as 
we had heard these things, our hearts did melt, neither did there remain any 
more courage in any man because of you.’237 The overpowering emotion that an 
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individual experiences upon seeing, hearing, witnessing or expecting these 
spectacularly destructive acts—‘terrors’—is terror.  
 
The definition of what the particular acts refers to is not spelt out, but is clear 
from the contexts in which it is used in the Bible. ‘I will send my terror ahead of 
you and throw into confusion every nation you encounter. I will make all your 
enemies turn their backs and run’, God warns in Exodus.238 In Leviticus God 
threatens to carry out acts of terror, equal to other forces of destruction such as 
the consumption and the burning ague.239 In Deuteronomy, the extraordinary 
acts of God carried out through Moses are referred to as ‘the great terror that 
Moses shewed in the sight of all Israel’.240 While followers are warned not to 
be afraid of the terror that the evildoer may unleash,241 the above references 
make it clear that God himself quite often used the power of terror. Terror in 
the scripture, and from which it first emerges as a form of political power, is 
available to both God and the Devil equally, and although destructive, it is 
neither evil nor good on its own. It becomes evil only when used by the 
evildoer, the Devil, or when it is used for a purpose that is clearly evil. As God 
represented all that was good and the Devil all that was evil, God’s use of terror 
could only ever be for a good purpose while the Devil’s could only ever be for 
bad.  
 
The historical concept of terror as evil only when used by actors seeking to rebel 
against an established order that is perceived to be inherently good provides 
another way of understanding an issue of increasing concern within Terrorism 
Studies: terrorism is increasingly excluding the state from its discourse. The 
recently established sub-field of Critical Terrorism Studies, which now has its 
own journal, Critical Studies on Terrorism, has as one of its main aims ‘bringing 
the state back into terrorism studies’242. Laying out the commitments of the 
field, Richard Jackson wrote that ‘there is a determination by CTS scholars to 
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redress the current imbalance within traditional terrorism studies and ‘bring 
the state back in’ to terrorism research’243.  
 
In a later work, Jackson argues that ‘the conceptual practices which construct 
terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable.’244 
He argues an act of terrorism is an act of terrorism regardless of who commits 
it. Thus ‘it makes little sense’ to assert that some actors, such as states, are 
precluded from employing the tactics of terrorism. Jackson, along with other 
critical voices within the field of Terrorism Studies245, has argued that this 
practice legitimises state violence while at the same time de-legitimising any 
violence by non-state actors. It is certainly a valid argument that the decision to, 
or not to, include states in Terrorism Studies affects the knowledge that such 
analyses would produce. It is also a valid argument to make that analytical 
silence on acts of terror committed by the state has strengthened the ‘mostly 
unspoken belief’ that Western liberal democratic states in particular never 
engage in terrorism as a matter of policy. Valid as these concerns are, there is a 
different question that needs to be asked: has it ever been any other way?  
 
As the above discussion on the origins of terror as a political weapon showed, 
terror has always been available, and used by opposing sides; it is only 
regarded as evil (or terrorism as it is understood today), when it is used by who 
is perceived to be evil for what it is perceived to be evil. Its powers are 
destructive no matter who uses it, and it rouses the same emotion of terror in 
the individual who anticipates, witnesses, or is damaged by it. But it is 
legitimate when it is used by good, for a good purpose. When this historical 
context from which terror emerged as a political power is included in the 
discourse of terrorism, it becomes less perplexing that both states and terrorism 
analysts preclude acts of terror when it is used by the state. The same 
understanding of terror is also encompassed by the cliché that ‘one man’s 
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terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’, which is discussed in this context in 
more detail later. 
 
The sin of rebellion 
Another aspect in the history of how terror emerged as a political weapon that 
is relevant to the present angst over the preclusion of the state from terrorism 
discourse is that terror has always been legitimate when used by the established 
order. Throughout the Bible, as discussed earlier, God liberally and legitimately 
used terror to gain obedience and quell rebellion. In the Middle Ages, when 
Lucifer’s rebellion against God was understood as an attempt to  ‘create a total 
alternative to the divine order, an ‘adversary culture’ and, within it, to assume 
God’s place’246, challenging the established order in society was taught, and 
known, to be a sin of the first order. This is one of the main reasons that, in the 
Middle Ages, ‘almost no one challenged the essentials of Christianity’ or ‘the 
basic premises of what was taken to be a divinely ordained system of 
aristocracy, monarchy, land-ownership, and ecclesiastical authority.’247  
 
This understanding of rebellion as a sin was reiterated and rarefied by both the 
Church and the rulers in what they said from the pulpit, and in the Homilies 
and catechisms that referred explicitly and implicitly to Lucifer and his sinful 
rebellion against God.248 The Bible refers to rebellion: 
 
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: 
the powers that be are ordained of God.  
Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they 
that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.  
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For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be 
afraid of the power?249  
 
The Certain Sermons or Homilies Appointed to Read in Churches published in 
sixteenth century England provides an example of how the connections made 
between political and religious discourses during this period constituted and 
validated rebellion as an act of evil committed not just against the monarchy, 
but against God and therefore all that was good. This collection of Homilies was 
published in two volumes during the reigns of Edward VI and Elizabeth I and 
was one of the most important texts in sixteenth century England, third only to 
the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer. They provided guidance on a variety 
of different ways in which an individual could seek redemption from correct 
ways to read the scripture to warnings against whoredom and adultery.  
 
There were strict regulations according to which the Homilies were to be 
shared with the public: they had to be delivered every Sunday by the Ministers 
of the Church; and they had to be read ‘diligently and distinctly, that they be 
understanded [sic] of the people’. Edward VI took out a second injunction in 
1547 that elevated the cognitive status of the Homilies even more. He deemed 
that Bishops should not ‘at any time or place, preach, or set forth unto the 
people, any doctrine contrary or repugnant to the effect and intent contained or 
set forth in the king’s highness’ homilies’. These Homilies with their strong 
institutional support from the Church and monarchy explicitly attributes the 
divinely ordained nature of the power of Kings and Princes and establishes the 
‘truth’ of these claims by reference to the Bible:  
 
in very many and almost infinite places as well of the Old Testament as of the 
New, that kings and princes, as well the evil as the good, do reign by God’s 
ordinance, and that subjects are bounden to obey them; that God doth give princes 
wisdom, great power, and authority; that God defendeth them against their 
enemies, and destroyeth their enemies horribly; that the anger and displeasure of the 
prince is as the roaring of a lion, and the very messenger of death; and that the subject that 
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provoketh him to displeasure sinneth against his own soul; with many other things 
concerning both the authority of princes and the duty of subjects250.   
 
The Homilies named Lucifer as the ‘first author’ of rebellion, and spoke of how 
his actions had brought about ‘eternal and everlasting death and damnation’251. 
Only Jesus Christ’s obedience had repaired the damage done. Illustrative of 
how true this connection was during this period is not just the canon and civil 
laws that make them possible, but also popular commentary on the subject, 
such as contained in Dante’s Inferno, as discussed above.252 
 
In the Middle Ages, rebellion understood as a sin meant that terror was a 
legitimate form of power when used to quell action against the established 
order. Documents from the time of the conquest of America by the Spanish 
illustrate just how central this understanding of rebellion was to medieval 
Western society. Once in the New World, discovered in 1492, Spanish 
conquerors practised ‘wanton and controlled’ techniques of terror that were 
deliberate and ‘calculated to induce submission and discipline’, according to an 
account produced in 1583 by a Spanish monk, Batolome de Las Casas253. The 
conquerors displayed their power with spectacular acts of destruction that were 
designed to ‘tame the flock and make it tremble’, Casas wrote.  One 
conquistador, he recorded, ‘gloated in a letter to his sovereign that he had 
recently affected the peaceful submission of Indians by cutting off the hands 
and noses of two hundred prisoners for contumacy’. The conquistador called 
his act ‘an act of justice’ which he was bound to perform in ‘service to the 
king’254.  
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The ‘civilised Christian’ discourse which allowed for the practise of terror as a 
justified means of domination, also made it important to the conquerors that 
their conquest be carried out according to ‘just and Christian principles’. This 
led to the adaptation of a ‘curious legal procedure’ called the Requirement, 
which allowed for the legalisation of the terror practices. It took the form of a 
juridical declaration read aloud to the intended victims which told them, in 
words similar to those found in religious scriptures that, ‘if they do not submit 
at once, the Spaniards will enter the land with fire and sword, will subdue the 
people with force,’ as well as enslave their wives and children, selling and 
disposing of them.255 Spectacular acts of terror that caused an overwhelming 
feeling of fear and awe were, from the very beginning, legitimate when used to 
maintain established authority.  
 
The terror of religion 
The power relations between the discourses of terror, politics and religion made 
possible during this period forms the historical a priori of present-day terrorism 
discourse. Terror – both as a form of destructive power available to both God 
and his grand cosmic antagonist--and as an overwhelming emotion that 
engenders fear and awe--emerged from the surface of religion. This study 
argues that if there is a history of ‘religious terrorism’ to be written, which is not 
totalizing in its nature and objectifying in its effects, this period in Western 
history when terror first emerged as a form of political power legitimized by 
religion would be a good place to start. The many histories of ‘religious 
terrorism’256 that point to the Hindu Thugs who were active 2500 years ago and 
who killed in the name of religion; or to the Sicarii, ‘a radical anti-Roman 
religious movement’ from 66-73 CE Judea; or to the Assassins, a Muslim Shia 
group that operated from 1090 to 1275, are only possible by applying a 
retrospective hypothesis which allows the present to be read back into the past.  
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‘Religious terrorism’ was not initially, or always, understood as an act of terror 
committed by an individual in the name of religion. Rather, it emerged as a 
feeling, an overwhelming emotion of awe and fear engendered in an individual 
who is witness to a spectacular and extraordinary act – associated with either 
God or his cosmic antagonist – that rendered the person powerless and 
submissive. This form of ‘religious terror’ was felt even after the Devil was 
pushed from the forefront of Western thought with the age of radical 
enlightenment, reason and Enlightenment. From then onwards, without the 
presence of the Devil to attribute inexplicable acts of destruction to, terror 
remains connected to God through the capacity that nature has to astonish and 
awe. Consider for example, this account of ‘religious terror’ narrated by 
Ramond de Carbonnières (1755-1827), ‘who appears to have spent most of his 
life travelling in the Alps’ and set out to 'retrace the feelings' caused by the 
mountains in the accounts of his journey’257:  
 
Nothing distracts or disenchants the mind engaged by these sublime objects. The 
silence of these places where nothing lives, nothing moves, where the noise of the 
inhabited world does not reach ... all combine to make meditations more profound, 
to furnish them with a sombre tint and a sublime nature that the meditations 
acquire, once the soul, taking that flight which makes it contemporary to all 
centuries and coexistent with all beings, hovers over the abyss of time. Now reason 
would try in vain to count the years. It is horrified and its calculations are 
confounded by the solidity of these enormous masses opposed to their 
accumulated ruins. Imagination seizes upon that which reason abandons; in this 
long succession of epochs, imagination foresees an image of eternity that it receives 
in a state of religious terror’258.  
 
During this epoch, when the forces of reason were said to be at war with 
supersititon259, terror was no longer associated with the Devil or the 
supernatural; but returned more fully to its status as an emotion. It is in this 
context that Edmund Burke, the conservative British politician who introduced 
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the word terrorist to the English language in 1795 by applying it to the French 
rebels, first expounded on the concept of terror in his Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful published four decades 
previously in 1757. He wrote: 
 
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, 
whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates 
in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive 
of the strongest emotion the mind is capable. I say the strongest emotion, because I 
am satisfied that the idea of pain are much more powerful than those which enter 
on the part of pleasure260.  
 
‘Terror’, Burke stated, ‘is in all cases whatsoever more openly or latently, the 
ruling principle of the sublime’261. Burke’s understanding of terror is far more 
complex than what the present meaning of the term ‘terrorist’, which he coined, 
allows. The terror, which is the ruling principle, as Burke said, of this 
overwhelming ‘sublime’ was most often aroused by nature and natural 
phenomena such as ‘greatness of dimension’, ‘vastness of extent’, ‘vacuity’ and 
‘solitude’. And the fundamental effect of the sublime is to exclude the power of 
reason: 
 
The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when causes operate most 
powerfully, is Astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which 
all its emotions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case the mind is 
so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by 
consequence reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power 
of the sublime, that far from being produced by them, it anticipates our 
reasoning’s, and hurries us on by an irresistible force262. 
The terror that is the principle of the sublime paralyses our rational capacity 
and destroys the mind’s ability to reason. Years later, in 1790, Burke describes 
the French Revolution as ‘the most astonishing’ event to have occurred in the 
world. There are many parallels in his description of the emotions that he feels 
towards the French Revolution to his descriptions of the beautiful and the 
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sublime. The overwhelming emotions that he says the sublime can induce are 
present in the French Revolution, which is a ‘monstrous tragi-comic scene’, in 
the viewing of which ‘the most opposite passions succeed, and sometimes mix 
with each other in the mind; alternate contempt and indignation; laughter and 
tears; scorn and horror’263. He did not know ‘whether to blame or to applaud’ 
the events264. The specificities of how Burke came to apply the term terrorist, 
however, have now largely disappeared from the discourse of terror. In the 
present understanding of terror, not only is its use entirely evil, the discourse of 
terrorism excludes from it any suggestion that an act of terror could be 
understood as arousing any feeling other than fear, anger and revulsion.  
 
Consider the fate of German composer Karlheinz Stockhausen, regarded a 
musical genius who (re)connected the discourse of terror with its earlier origins 
in the sublime. Five days after Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States on 11 
September 2001, Stockhausen commented: ‘That minds accomplish in one act 
something that we in music can’t dream of, that people rehearse like mad for 
ten years, totally fanatically, for a concert and then die—that’s the greatest work 
of art there is in the entire cosmos’.265 The comments caused worldwide outrage, 
and his scheduled concerts in Hamburg and elsewhere were cancelled along 
with others scheduled for Kürten, the city of his birth. He cut off all contact 
with journalists and retreated from the public sphere. He died six years later, in 
December 2007266. An interesting point in the story—in the context of this 
study—is the comments that Stockhausen made in his own defence. The quote 
had been ‘ripped out of context’, what he had actually said was that the attack 
                                                       
263 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in Certain 
Societies in London (London: Printed for R. and J. Dodsley, 1790), 11. 
264 Edmund Burke in a letter to the earl of Charlemont dated 9 August 1789. Cited in Anne 
Mallroy, “Burke, Boredom and the Theatre of Counterrevolution,” MPLA 118, no.2 (2003): 225. 
265 Karlheinz Stockhausen, quoted in John O’Mahoney, “The sound of discord,” The Guardian, 
September 29, 2001, accessed June 15, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2001/sep/29/arts.highereducation3?INTCMP=SRCH. 
266 “German composer Stockhausen dies,” BBC News, December 7, 2001, accessed June 15, 2011, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/7133571.stm. 
  74 
was ‘the greatest work of art by Lucifer.’267 The present understanding of terror 
as an evil ruled out the possibilities that had existed earlier of it being an 
awesome power that could be exercised by both good and evil. It does, 
however, retain the understanding of terror as awe-inspiring when used by the 
forces of Good against that of Evil. ‘Shock and Awe’ was the name given to the 
United States led military campaign against Iraq in the War on Terror after all.  
Summary 
Intricate power relations have existed between terror, evil and knowledge from 
the beginning of modern Western civilization. With the advent of Christianity, 
the omnipresence of the Devil and God made terror almost exclusively an 
object of religious discourse. Terror was an overpowering emotion of fear and 
awe that individuals felt when they anticipated or witnessed an extraordinary 
act of destruction associated with either God or the Devil. The greatest of such 
terror was engendered by the prospect of being tempted to do evil by the Devil, 
which would lead to the terrifying prospect of Eternal Damnation. Salvation 
from the Devil, who took many different forms and most significantly appeared 
during this period as Mohammed the ‘false prophet of Islam’, lay in repentance 
and doing good. It was the central position of the Church in the process of 
redemption, and its exclusive knowledge of what was true, what was right and 
what was wrong that created the conditions in which the Church attained the 
socio-political powers that it did during this period. The constitution of the 
Devil as the figure who created evil by rebelling against God, and therefore all 
that was good, allowed the ‘divinely ordained’ rulers of the time to enforce 
obedience by evoking the terror of God’s wrath against those who rebelled. The 
figure of the Devil was also instrumental in the formation of early Western 
‘knowledge’ of Mohammed as Satan and the Anti-Christ. Although this 
knowledge arose in the context of the Arab conquests of Christian lands, and as 
a means of discrediting Islam and stopping it from being a threat to strife-
ridden Christianity, it persisted over the centuries such that it became an 
integral part of Anglo-American religious, social, and political discourse.  
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3. The second coming: terror without the Devil 
 
With the disappearance of the Devil from the political discourse with the 
advent of reason and secularism, the idea of rebellion as a sin faded. The 
concept of terror as a legitimate political tool when used for the purposes of 
fighting evil, however, remained; and created the conditions of possibility in 
which the French Revolutionaries felt justified in using it against a system of 
governance which they saw as evil. The discourse of ‘terrorism’ begins with this 
reversal in the use of terror: terror as a form of political power by the governed 
against a system which they believe is unequal, but is held to be good and just 
by those who govern. This understanding of the use of terror as a form of 
political power underpinned the regimes of practices that constituted the 
discourse of terrorism in the twentieth century around three other juridically 
indiscernible figures: the proletarian radical, the universal rebel, and later, the 
Arab/Muslim barbarian as is discussed in detail below.  
 
The period after the Reformation was one of upheaval for Western civilisation. 
Having experienced the Hundred Years’ War, the Black Death, the witch-craze 
and the Reformation:  
 
a general process of rationalisation and secularisation set in which rapidly 
overthrew theology’s age old hegemony in the world of study, slowly but surely 
eradicated magic and belief in the supernatural from Europe’s intellectual culture, 
and led a few openly to challenge everything from the past – not just commonly 
received assumptions about mankind, society, politics and the cosmos but also the 
veracity of the Bible and the Christian faith or indeed any faith268. 
 
It is during this time that the concept of the Devil and the regimes of practices 
that had formed around it began to be re-ordered according to the rubric of 
reason and rational inquiry that now dominated society. It was a time of 
profound change, when man was said to have emerged from his ‘self-incurred 
immaturity’ (Kant 1784), the Rights of Man replaced the Divine Right of Kings, 
the landed aristocrat was usurped by the merchant, and knowledge was 
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acquired through rational inquiry instead of being passed down from scripture, 
sermons or homilies. Within this new epistéme, it was no longer possible to 
think of, understand and know the Devil as He had been known previously.  
 
With the rise of radical thinkers such as Baruch de Spinoza, Meyer, Plockhoy, 
Van Enden, the Koerbagh brothers, Johan and Pieter de la Court, Beverland, 
Bekker, Lucas, Leenhof, Tschirnhaus, Tyssot de Patot, Pierre Bayle, and others 
challenging the existence of God during what Jonathan Israel has called the age 
of ‘radical enlightenment’269 from the mid sixteenth century, it became less easy 
to hold onto the figure of the Devil. The period that followed was both ‘a 
singular event inaugurating European modernity’ as well as ‘the permanent 
process which manifests itself in the history of reason, in the development and 
the establishment of forms of rationality and techniques, the autonomy and the 
authority of knowledge’270. The discursive formation of religious and 
superstitious terror began to be largely excluded from socio-political discourse 
during this time when intellectuals came to believe that reason ‘independent of 
the dictates of tradition and authority’ was the ‘ultimate and legitimate earthly 
judge of truth, beauty, moral goodness and political order’. Reason was now ‘at 
war with ignorance and superstition’271  
 
During such a period what could, during the Middle Ages, have been 
attributed to the Devil could no longer be so done. Just as particularly glorious 
displays of the forces of nature could no longer be explained as a ‘miracle’ of 
God, the Devil could no longer be indicted for their destruction. The concept of 
terror during this period in fact had fewer similarities with its immediate past 
than it did with Plato’s understanding of terror as arising from ignorance. 
Whereas during the High Middle Ages evil could be known as arising from the 
Devil, Buffon’s writings describe the condition of the unknowing early man 
thus:   
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[W]itnesses of the convulsive movements of the earth, still recent and very 
frequent; having only the mountains to shelter them against floods, they were 
often driven from these same refuges by the fire of volcanoes. Trembling on an 
earth that trembled beneath their feet, naked in mind and body, they were exposed 
to the ravages of all elements, victims of the fury of wild animals to which they 
repeatedly fell prey; and all were equally filled with the common feeling of a fatal 
terror [terreur funeste].272  
 
One of the most significant changes that allowed the transformations in what 
caused terror was a re-orientation in thinking about evil. The detailed moral 
map, which had been constituted around the regimes of practices surrounding 
the Devil, almost disappeared during this period of radical enlightenment and 
reason. One of the strongest challenges to the idea of evil came from Rousseau 
who emphatically rejected the doctrine of original sin, the dominant narrative 
of the Middle Ages. Evil, according to Rousseau, results from the historical 
development of social institutions that have led humanity astray and perverted 
the natural goodness of man. For Rousseau there was no evil man, no Devil—
man was naturally good. ‘Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the 
Author of nature; everything degenerates in the hands of men.’273 ‘Everything’ 
included man, as is evident from his discussions of man’s natural goodness in 
Emile (1762) and the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750). Rousseau provides 
a more nuanced explanation of what he meant by man’s natural goodness in 
the Second Discourse (1754): good and evil has no meaning for an individual 
who lives in the state of nature with no moral relationships with, or duties 
towards, another.274  
 
The inequalities Rousseau refers to are not merely those of distributive equities 
but ‘the basic normative status of all human beings as sentient individuals with 
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distinctive hopes and fears, each worthy of respect’275. The social interactions 
that man enters into, however, creates a system of dependency in which some 
people take advantage of others and pursue their own interests at the expense 
of those is a position of lesser advantage. Such impulses can become extreme, 
taking the form of cruelty or oppression, prompting the dependents to react 
violently. Inequality also increases the distance between human beings, making 
it easier to regard the Other as radically different, inferior.  
 
The very acknowledgement of a good and evil power, Rousseau argued, 
requires that evil be regarded as inferior to good, establishing inequalities from 
the very start276. Inequality is not just an occasional accompaniment of evil but 
its primary source and cause, and can arise both naturally—as differences in 
age, health, body strength and qualities of mind and soul—and as moral or 
political inequalities that comprise different privileges and advantages that 
some individuals have over others. These latter forms of inequality such as race, 
religion and sex as well as social status, wealth, and power arise from man’s 
social interactions and the institutions that enable them.277 While human beings 
are naturally independent and self-sufficient with a primitive sense of pity 
being their only connection with each other, social, economic and political 
inequalities that develop when they began to interact produced a system of 
dependence, which in turn, produces vice.278 This view of evil—that even the 
best of people will be governed badly given the inequalities of the institutional 
structure—is in contrast to Kant’s who held that even a nation of Devils could 
be well governed with the proper institutional structures in place. Significantly, 
Rousseau also sought to distance himself from what he saw as Hobbes’ mistake 
in Leviathan of reading back into the state of nature factors that arose only as a 
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result of human beings becoming ‘civilised’.279 In other words, it was the 
processes of civilization – inherently unequal, that created evil.  
 
Reason: no Devil’s advocate 
Combined with the receding idea of divinely ordained monarchs, this concept 
of evil meant that not only was rebellion no longer a sin, but, when targeted 
against a manmade system of inequalities from which evil arose, it was a virtue. 
This view had a profound impact on the French Revolution that followed not 
too long after; and on the concept of terror as well as on the emergence of the 
discourse of terrorism. Indeed, Robespierre’s declaration that, ‘[t]he first thing 
the legislator must know is that people is good’280, is an echo of Rousseau’s view 
that man is naturally good. Rousseau’s explanation of evil, which joined the 
idea of man’s natural goodness with that of systems as a determinant of 
behaviour, was taken a step further in Revolutionary thinking: if people are 
good and evil is systematic, revolutionary change can produce a new world 
purged of evil.281  
 
It is time that this idea of God, employed for so long by flatterers to secure 
monstrous and unlimited powers for the heads of empires, should serve at last to 
remind us of the imprescriptible rights of man. It is time to recognise that the same 
divine authority which orders kings to be just, forbids people to be slaves.282  
 
For Robespierre, and many who sought to free themselves from the injustice of 
oligarchy, rebellion against such a system was a virtue. For those who believed 
in the justice of the system, the rebellion was terrifying, as is evident from 
Burke’s Reflections discussed in the preceding Chapter. The previous Chapter also 
showed that terror as a form of political power was present in Western 
                                                       
279 Nannerl O. Keohane, “Inequality and the problem of evil,” in Naming evil, judging evil, ed. 
Ruth W. Grant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 80. 
280 Maximilien Robespierre, quoted in Ruth W. Grant, “The Rousseauan revolution and the 
problem of evil,” in Naming evil, judging evil, ed. Ruth W. Grant (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2006), 64. 
281 Ruth W. Grant, “The Rousseauan revolution and the problem of evil,” in Naming evil, judging 
evil, ed. Ruth W. Grant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 55. 
282 Norman Hampson, The life and opinions of Maximilien Robespierre (London: Duckworth, 1974), 
22-23. 
  80 
civilization throughout the Middle Ages. As it appeared in scripture, terror was 
a destructive power that could be used both for and against good. God used it 
liberally, and so did his grand cosmic antagonist, the Devil. God, as the 
embodiment of goodness itself, could not use terror for an evil purpose, but a 
monarch, no longer divinely ordained, was more than capable of doing so. To 
use terror against such a system was not only justified, but an obligation and a 
virtue. As Robespierre stated: 
 
Let the despot govern by terror his brutalized subjects; he is right, as a despot. 
Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the 
Republic. The government of the revolution is liberty's despotism against tyranny. 
Is force made only to protect crime?283 
 
The French Revolution, as mentioned at the beginning of this study, is often 
identified in modern discourse as the beginning of terrorism. This is true, if 
terrorism does not refer to the use of terror as a form of political power. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the French Revolution was not where the concept of 
terror as a form of political power emerged from. And by no means was it the 
first time that terror was used in pursuit of political power. It was, however, the 
first time that terror was used on a large scale by the governed rather than 
against the governed.  
 
If terrorism had its genesis in the French Revolution, then terrorism is the use of 
terror as a form of political power by the governed against a system which they 
believe is unequal, but is held to be good and just by those who govern. Viewed 
this way, the difficulties in defining what true terrorism is--the clichéd 
explanation of ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’--and the 
increasing concern of Critical Terrorism Studies and other critics over the 
exclusion of state as a perpetrator of terrorist acts seem neither inexplicable nor 
due to the ‘essentially contested’ nature of the concept. Terrorism, does not 
refer to the use of terror for political, religious, or other causes by any actor, it 
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refers to the use of terror for such purposes by those rebelling against the 
established order. ‘Terrorism’ as a discourse thus emerged from the new 
epistemic spaces created with the separation of terror from religion.  
 
The secular rebel: a bit of the Devil in him 
The secular saviour who emerged from this separation was not, however, 
entirely separated from the figure of the Devil – many of the characteristics that 
he was attributed during the Middle Ages were present in the new rebels, as is 
discussed below. Nor were the concepts of terror and evil entirely separated 
from the Devil. Several of the regimes of practices, including discursive and 
non-discursive patterns and the procedures implemented in the Middle Ages as 
a means of saving people from the Devil and securing their redemption 
continued throughout the next century and beyond. Until the mid twentieth 
century, however, it was not possible for these narratives to be a part of the 
discourse of terrorism, as the Western security apparatus focused on the 
different secular rebels that emerged during particular epochs that followed. 
This study identifies the epochs as the period between the French Revolution 
and the Industrial Revolution, when various revolutionaries were constituted 
as terrorists; the period between the industrial revolution and the mid 1900s 
when the radical proletarian fighting against the perceived injustices of 
industrialisation were known as terrorists; and late 1960s onwards when those 
rebelling against colonialism and perceived injustices of the global system were 
brought into the domain of terrorism. Towards the end of the millennium, as 
Western social and political thought turned towards Armageddon and 
apocalyptic discourses took hold, the foremost rebel became the Arab/Muslim 
barbarian fighting against Israel’s occupation of Palestine. Having dealt with 
the French Revolution in preceding discussions, the following analysis begins 
with the rebels that emerged around the industrial revolution and thereafter. 
The radical proletarian 
When the twentieth century began, the West was once again confronting 
rebellion. The ére des attentats was in full swing and there were rebels 
everywhere – anarchists, semi-anarchists, socialists, socialist revolutionaries, 
communists, Bolsheviks, radicals, anarcho-terrorists, monarchist-revolutionists, 
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Tzarist revolutionaries and ‘dynamite criminals’ – all standing against 
established authority in its various forms.  Whereas the secular rebel had fought 
to establish liberal governments by overthrowing ‘divinely ordained’ 
monarchies and, thus, retained some virtue and admiration for its character, the 
radical proletarian who fought to either abolish government completely 
(anarchists) or change the established order in which liberal democracies 
functioned (socialists and communists) was a different figure. Like the Devil 
who had rebelled against all that was good, the radical proletarian was fighting 
to change liberal governance, believed by the West to be the most fair and 
equal. There was little virtue to such rebellion, as was constituted in and 
validated by the regimes of practices that were constructed around these rebels. 
The Church had anchored its discourse of the Devil in the truth of the word of 
God, and the reasoned findings of theological enquiry seen as independent 
from power.  
 
Similar power/knowledge relations underpinned the regimes of practices that 
emerged around the figure of the radical proletarian. New disciplines in the 
human sciences, instead of the scripture, now provided ‘true’ knowledge of this 
new kind of rebel that threatened the established order. Two of the most 
significant forms of such scientific knowledge to emerge during this period 
were the new discourses of physiognomy and phrenology. Neither of these 
forms of knowledge had moved too far away from the knowledge of the Devil 
and barbarians that was produced during the Middle Ages as becomes obvious 
from the non-human, demonic and monstrous characteristics that both new 
disciplines accorded to the new rebels. ‘They [anarchists] frequently have those 
characteristics of degeneracy which are common to criminals and lunatics, for 
they are anomalies, and bear hereditary taints’, Italian criminologist Cesare 
Lombroso observed of the anarchist’s physiognomic make up.284 Hyppolite 
Taine, meanwhile, found the French Revolution to be an evolutionary 
regression.285 Taine observed that when public order collapses ‘we see all of a 
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sudden spring forth the barbarian, and still worse, the primitive animal, the 
grinning, sanguinary, wanton baboon, who chuckles while he slays, and 
gambols over the ruin he has accomplished’.286  
 
The new ‘science’ of phrenology, based on the hypothesis that personality traits 
of a person can be derived from the shape of the person’s skull, was an 
additional way of ‘knowing’ the rebel during this period. Swiss clergyman J.C. 
Lavater, for example, proposed in his Physiognomische fragmente (1775-78) that 
‘beauty and ugliness have a strict connection with the moral constitution of the 
Man’.287 Lavater’s popular thesis, of which fifteen editions in French and twenty 
in English had been published by 1810, was that ugly faces betrayed ugly 
minds, while beautiful faces displayed virtue. The concept provided profound 
reassurance for those seeking to deal with the many political upheavals that 
Europe was facing during this period, allowing easy identification between 
obedient subject and rebel through their distinctive facial features. Lavater’s 
assertion that ‘the face of revolution, if it came, would predictably be an ugly 
one’288 was later codified into law enforcement practices developed to deal with 
anarchists and other proletarian rebels during this period289. As later analysis 
will show, the disciplines of physiognomy and phrenology (subsequently taken 
over by psychology) through which the radical proletarian was understood 
during this period remained as grids of intelligibility for Western knowledge of 
the terrorist as a deranged barbarian.   
 
These practices adopted by liberal governments to deal with the radical 
proletarian allowed the discourse of terrorism as violence committed by 
individuals or groups against established authority to attain a higher degree of 
positivity than before. In the United States, the use of terror as a weapon 
became firmly associated with working class radicals, and new legislation was 
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passed creating the crime of ‘criminal syndicalism’: the doctrine ‘which 
advocates crime, sabotage (this word as used in this bill meaning the malicious 
damage or injury to the property of an employer by an employee), violence or 
other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
political ends’290. Syndicalism was the crime; terrorism its main tactic291.  
 
Legislation against syndicalism, although formulated to quell proletarian 
rebellions against ruling industrialists, soon became a powerful technology of 
power used to stop not just the ‘menace of organised labour’,292 but all ‘radical’ 
ideas such as socialism, communism, and anarchism293. Accusations of 
syndicalism were levelled against workers’ unions along with allegations of 
communism, socialism and anarchism. Both employers and governments 
resorted to abusing the newly effected syndicalism legislation to suppress the 
proletarian radical with such frequency that it terrorised trade unions and 
suppressed anarchist, socialist and communist thought as evidenced by, for 
example, the original documents relating to the Harlan miners strike in 
Kentucky.294  
 
A significant development during this period was the disputes that occurred 
among the various groups that the radical proletarian belonged to – socialists, 
communists and anarchists and their splinter/sub-groups. With the adoption of 
the policy of ‘propaganda by the deed’ by Russian rebel Mikhail Bakunin, 
divisions appeared among the proletarian rebels who had until then been 
united in their rebellion against exploitation by capitalists. As the radical 
proletarians debated whether or not to follow Bakunin’s doctrine at various 
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meetings in the United States and across Europe in the late 1800s295 under the 
united umbrella of the International Workingmen’s Association (W.I.A), 
Western governments were busy defining what constituted a ‘political crime’.  
 
Discussions in the British Parliament concerning the enactment of the 
Extradition Act of 1870 reveal that defining what constituted a political crime 
proved a difficult issue which, in the end, the British parliamentarians left to the 
courts and the United States left to the discretion of individual judges296. 
Theodore Roosevelt, elected president of the United States after President 
William McKinley was ‘shot by an anarchist’ in September 1901, said in his first 
speech to the US Congress that ‘anarchy is no more an expression of ‘social 
discontent’ than picking pockets or wife-beating’297. Not only was the anarchist 
‘the deadly foe of liberty’, but it was wrong to say that he was either a victim or 
product of social or political injustice Like the sinners of the Middle Ages 
whose inherent weaknesses allowed them to be led astray by the Devil, the 
cause for the anarchist’s criminality was to be found in:  
 
his own evil passions and in the evil conduct of those who urge him on, not in any 
failure by others or by the State to do justice to him or his. He is a malefactor and 
nothing else…It is a travesty upon the great and holy names of liberty and freedom 
to permit them to be invoked in such a cause. (Roosevelt 1901).  
 
Tsarist Russia took advantage of the assassination of President McKinley to 
successfully push the international community to define anarchy as a non-
political crime at the Anti-Anarchist Conference held in Rome in November 
1898. It was agreed at the conference that anarchy had ‘as its aim the 
destruction through violent means of all social organisation’298. The protocol 
adopted Russian proposals to define anarchism as having ‘no relation to politics 
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[…] and cannot under any circumstance be regarded as a political doctrine’.299 
Although Russia’s bomb-throwers were not ‘of the anarchist persuasion’, 
bringing the Russian revolutionaries under the same label allowed the Tsarist 
regime to ‘win sympathy from Western governments that did have an anarchist 
problem’300.  
 
However, despite the anti-anarchist feelings in the United States, the bringing 
together of all proletarian rebels under the label of anarchy, and the equation of 
rebellion with common criminality and evil, not everyone was persuaded that 
every rebel during this period was an anarchist, or that every rebellion was a 
crime.  
The good, the bad, and the rebel 
The secular rebel of the French Revolution, whom modern histories describe as 
the first terrorists--with all the word’s modern connotations thereby rendering 
them devoid of any virtue or justification--still retained the admiration and 
support of many in the West who saw their rebellion as necessary and brave. 
This is clear from newspaper accounts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century United States which report cheering crowds in their thousands 
attending rallies held by both American supporters of Russian revolutionaries 
and visiting revolutionaries themselves, looking for arms and ammunition to 
carry out their ‘propaganda of the deed’.  
 
After such a speech in Boston in 1890 by George Kennan, American journalist 
and author of Siberia and the Exile System (1891), which examined the treatment 
of rebels in Russian prisons, renowned author Mark Twain is reported to have 
risen from his seat tearfully and exclaimed, ‘If such a government cannot be 
overthrown otherwise than by the use of dynamite, then, thank God for 
dynamite’301. It is also clear that despite President McKinley’s assassination in 
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1901, the official relationship established between anarchy--defined as a non-
political crime--and the designation of Russian revolutionaries as ‘anarchists’, 
support for their cause remained high in the United States, and elsewhere in the 
West among those seeking change. The latter shared with Mark Twain the 
conviction that: 
 
Government by falsified promises, by lies, by treachery, and by the butcher-knife, 
for the aggrandizement of a single family of drones and its idle and vicious kin has 
been borne long enough in Russia […] it is to be hoped that the roused nation, now 
rising in its strength, will presently put and end to it and set up the republic in its 
place. Some of us, even the whiteheaded [sic], may live to see the blessed day 
when Czar and Grand Dukes will be as scarce there as they are in heaven302.  
 
Americans who supported the Russian revolutionaries, and Russian 
revolutionaries who travelled to the United States to rally support for their 
cause spoke to cheering crowds, packed lecture halls and evoked emotional 
responses. Similar support for the Russian revolutionaries was also present in 
Britain where the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom was founded in 
London on 31 March 1890, and the Free Russia journal was published in August 
1890 with a circulation that rose to over a thousand within a month. Several 
books by Russian revolutionary Sergei M Kravchinskii (1851-1895), writing 
under the nom de guerre S. Stepniak, were published in various languages to 
great acclaim in both Europe and the United States303. A petition to establish an 
American branch of the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom was signed by 
American humanitarians, cultural leaders and intellectuals304 who ‘certainly 
were not radicals’305.  
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Later analysts argue that the Russian revolutionaries received such support in 
the United States and from other liberal governments because they hid from 
Americans the ‘socialism and terror’ that was part of their revolution, and that 
Americans ‘wholeheartedly supported their case’ because ‘they confidently 
believed that once the revolutionaries overthrew the tsar, Russians would 
establish a constitutional government’ in the liberal form306. While this may 
have been the case, it does not take away from the fact that citizens of liberal 
Western countries were happy to provide finance and other means of support 
for the rebels they viewed as fighting against oppression, even if their methods 
involved the use of terror, dynamite and other tools of violence.  
 
The problem for liberal democracies appeared to be that when terror was used 
as a weapon against oppressive governments elsewhere, it was justified; when 
it was used as a weapon by those rebelling against practices and systems of 
governments within liberal democracies, it was wrong. Furthermore, legislative 
powers in liberal governments were also confronted with the issue of whether 
or not to accord the status of ‘political criminals’ to rebels who were fighting for 
changes that did not agree with their own capitalist systems. Despite the 
definition of anarchy as a non-political crime at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and regardless of President Roosevelt’s unequivocal description of 
anarchy as a common crime, when the time came to define and legislate against 
‘political crimes’ in the mid 1900s in the United States, there was no clarity as to 
what kind of a criminal the revolutionary and the proletarian in his many 
different forms really was.  This is a conflict that permeated all contemporary 
discussion and analysis that sought to define ‘political crime’ in the West, as is 
evident from debates of the time: 
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Probably most of us lawyers would find it difficult to give a sympathetic 
understanding to a German Bolshevik who conspired to establish in Germany a 
government for the democratization of labor and of welfare and which would 
penalize all exploitation of laborers. Most of us give enthusiastic support for the 
general achievement of our own kind of democratic political forms. However, our 
feelings are not yet generally attuned to the calm acceptance of the 
democratization of labor and welfare, even if peaceably accomplished by our own 
accustomed political methods. Is it intelligent to assume that unaided, all of us can 
remain in philosophic calm, when confronted with a live Bolshevik who sought to 
use revolutionary methods to force the democratization of labor and welfare upon 
the former German aristocrats and their sympathizers?307  
 
The conflict over who could and could not be defined as a terrorist is reflected 
in the manner in which the radical proletarians within liberal democracies are 
labelled ‘terrorists’ while other labels such as ‘freedom fighters’ were applied to 
those fighting for liberation from oppression (Irish and Indian rebels for 
example). It is also clear from the references commonly made to terrorism 
against the people by governments that did not follow the liberal system – from 
the government of the Dominican Republic in the 1800s308; Russia in the 
nineteenth century309 and France of the early twentieth century310; to Serbia311; 
German occupied Belgium and France312; Germany313; Turkey314; and Kurdistan 
in the 1800s315.  
                                                       
307 Theodore Schroeder, “Political Crimes Defined,” Michigan Law Review 18, no. 1 (1919): 37. 
308 Jacob H. Hollander, “The Convention of 1907 Between the United States and the Dominican 
Republic,” The American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (1907). 
309 Edward W. Miller, “Some Distinctive Features of Russian Christianity,” The American Journal 
of Theology 11, no. 4 (1907); Charles G. Fenwick, “The Russian Peace Treaties,” The American 
Political Science Review 12, no. 4 (1918); Baron Rosen, “The Menace of Bolshevism,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 84 (1919); Dorsey D. Jones and Sol Meltzer, 
“Colleges Need Russian History,” The Journal of Higher Education 4 no. 7 (1933); Maurice 
Parmelee, “Liberal Democracy, Fascism, and Bolshevism,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 180 (1935). 
310 Maynard Shipley, “Should Capital Punishment Be Abolished? The Problem of the Hour in 
France,” Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology 2, no. 1 (1911). 
311 Edward M. Sait and Lewis Mayers, “Record of Political Events,” Political Science Quarterly 30, 
no. 2 (1915). 
312 Willem R. Bisschop, “German War Legislation in the Occupied Territory of Belgium,” 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 4 (1918); Ira W. Howerth, “The Great War and the Instinct of 
the Herd,” International Journal of Ethics 29, no. 2 (1919). 
  90 
 
This conflict between the need to protect the liberal system of government from 
rebellion within and supporting rebellions against systems of government that 
are seen as illiberal is underpinned by the understanding of terror as a 
legitimate political tool only when used by the ‘good’ established order that 
emerged with the concept of terror as it was understood in the Bible and 
throughout the Middle Ages.  
 
The universal rebel 
By the middle of the twentieth century, rebellion was again in the Western air. 
As the epistemic spaces in which dissent and revolt could be thought of, spoken 
about and acted upon underwent numerous changes, a new figure emerged in 
the genealogy of the present evildoer-terrorist – the freedom fighter. As the 
inherent inequalities of the colonial system were being overthrown by freedom 
fighters and nationalists in various parts of the world colonised by the West, the 
universal rebel sought to change established order on behalf of those they saw as 
suffering from an unjust system of governance. French tactics in Algeria and the 
publication of the Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon (1961), the United 
States’ war in Vietnam and, the Six Day War in the Middle East, provided cause 
for many to rally against established governments and systems of power.  
 
Things came to a head in 1968, an eventful year which saw the assassination of 
civil rights leader Martin Luther King in the United States; the Soviet attack on 
Czechoslovakia; escalation of the United States war in Vietnam; the 
assassination of anti-war presidential candidate Robert Kennedy in the United 
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States and the election of Richard Nixon as the new President of the United 
States. In January of that year, the devastating Tet Offensive was launched in 
Vietnam, and in March of that year over 500 men, women and children were 
massacred in Mi Lai. ‘The Vietnam War had become a universal cause. The very 
heart of London was riven by protests. Students took over universities in 
America and Europe. They clashed with police in Japan, in Delhi, they mobbed 
the US Embassy’ (BBC World Service 2008).  
 
At present, it is commonplace for experts in the field of Terrorism Studies to 
state that 1968 is ‘the year acknowledged as marking the advent of modern 
international terrorism’.316  It started on a specific date – July 22, 1968 – with a 
specific action – the hijacking of El Al Israeli Airlines flight from Rome to Tel 
Aviv by Palestinian rebels: 
 
Modern international terrorism is widely accepted as having been ushered in on 23 
July 1968 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an 
Israeli El Al plane in Rome317.  
 
The beginning of the new era is often identified precisely: July 22, 1968. On that 
date an El Al commercial airliner was hijacked318 
 
None of the analysts explain whom it is that is ‘widely acknowledging’ modern 
‘terrorism’ began in 1968 or who ‘often identifies’ 1968 as the year in which 
terrorism began, or amongst whom the ‘truth’ of the statement is ‘widely 
accepted’. The acceptance of 1968 as the ‘beginning’ of modern terrorism now 
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has a positivity requiring no further explanation. ‘It would be inadequate’ 
however’ to simply accept ‘that one was dealing here with the consequences of 
a discovery’.319 Closer examination is necessary. 
 
What is the basis for the claim that modern terrorism began on 22 July 1968, 
‘when Palestinian terrorists, to avenge Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six Day War’ 
hijacked an El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv’?320 According to the database of 
‘terrorist incidents maintained by the Centre for Defence and International 
Security Studies (CDISS), there were six other aircraft hijackings carried out by 
different individuals motivated by a variety of reasons in the 1960s before the 
Palestinian hijacking of the Israeli aircraft. On 1 May 1961, the data set records 
‘first ever United States air-craft hijacked and forced to fly to Communist Cuba’; 
on 26 September 1966: ‘El Condor nationalists hijack Argentine aircraft from 
Buenos Aires to British occupied Falklands …’; on 22 November 1966: ‘A DC-3 
aircraft blown up in mid-air near Ade, South Arabia, killing all twenty people 
on board…’; on 30 June 1967: ‘Aircraft carrying Katangan rebel leader Moise 
Tshombe hijacked en route to Ibiza, Spain, and forced to land in Algeria…’; on 
12 October 1967: a ‘British European Airways Comet airliner’ was ‘destroyed by 
a bomb that detonated in the passenger cabin over Rhodes, Greece’, killing all 
sixty six people on board; and on 21 February 1968 a Delta Airlines flight was 
forced to fly to Havana Cuba ‘in the first successful hijacking of a US 
commercial airliner since 1961’. All six incidents were recorded prior to the 
Palestinian hijacking of the Israeli aircraft. The CDISS Database of Terrorist 
Incidents, however, recorded the latter incident as:  
 
July 22 [1968] 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine carry out first ever [emphasis added] 
aircraft hijacking, seizing an El Al Boeing 707 in Rome, Italy, and diverting it 
Algeria. Thirty two Jews passengers held hostage for five weeks (CDISS Database 
of Terrorist Incidents 1960-69) 
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How did the Palestinian hijacking, five months after the last of five previous 
similar incidents, come to be described as the ‘first ever’ aircraft hijacking? 
According to the Aviation Safety Network, which distances itself from any 
political affiliation and is not associated with the accruing of or production of 
‘terrorism’ knowledge, between 1948 and 22 July 1968 there were eight-two 
airline hijackings, an average of four hijackings a year. There were five 
hijackings in the same month of July 1968 before the PLF incident. Could it be 
that the hijacking carried out by the PLF was the first airline hijacked on an 
international route? The Aviation Safety database provides information on the 
hijacking of nine aircraft on international routes by various individuals or 
groups during the same period between 1948 and July 1968 including a Dutch 
KLM flight on 16 April 1962 en route to Portugal from Amsterdam; a Pan 
American World Airways flight from Havana to Mexico on 9 August 1961; a 
Cubana de Aviacion flight from Spain to Cuba forced to land in Miami by 
hijackers on 5 July 1960 and a Cubana de Aviacion flight from Cuba to the United 
States forced by hijackers to land in Jamaica on 17 July 1960.  
 
In the common assertion that international terrorism began on 23 July 1968, 
however, these incidents are not taken into consideration. The United 
Kingdom’s Counter-terrorism Strategy (Contest) published in 2009, for 
example, states in a sub-section titled ‘Strategic context’: 
 
The first modern international terrorist incident has been dated back [emphasis 
added] to 1968, when a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
hijacked an Israeli commercial flight in Rome.321 
 
The source it cites for this statement is Bruce Hoffman’s Inside Terrorism. Chapter 
Three of Hoffman’s book titled ‘The internationalisation of terrorism’ begins 
thus:  
 
The advent of what is considered modern, international terrorism occurred on July 
22, 1968. On that day three armed Palestinian terrorists, belonging to the Popular 
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Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), one of the six groups that then 
constituted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), hijacked an Israeli El Al 
commercial flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. 322.  
Hoffman does qualify his statement by saying that ‘commercial aircraft had 
been hijacked before’, but states that ‘the El Al hijacking differed significantly 
from all other previous ones’. ‘This hijacking was a bold political statement’ 
whereas the others were ‘a seemingly endless succession of homesick Cubans 
or sympathetic revolutionaries from other countries commandeering domestic 
American passenger aircraft simply as a means to travel to Cuba.’323  
 
Hoffman not only drastically downplays the high political tensions that existed 
between Cuba and the United States by portraying the Cuban rebels hijacking 
American aeroplanes as simply homesick nationals hitching a ride home, albeit 
in an unorthodox way; but also deliberately excludes from his analysis--among 
others--the violent deaths of the sixty people who were killed on board the 
Argentinean flight that El Condor nationalists hijacked en route to the British 
occupied Falklands; the twenty people who were killed on board the DC-3 
aircraft blown up near Aden; and the sixty six people who were killed when a 
bomb was exploded on board the British European Comet airliner mentioned 
above.  
 
All the acts were politically motivated. Rebels in Aden were fighting against the 
British crown forces, so were the Argentine rebels in the Falklands; and the 
Comet airline bombing was connected to the conflict between Cyprus and 
Greece. Their exclusion from the list of ‘terrorist incidents’ has been subject to 
inter-textual repetition and other forms of control to such an extent that it is 
now accepted as ‘truth’ that it was with the Palestinian hijacking of El Al that 
‘international terrorism’ began. Unquestioned, it is accepted in official Western 
government policy, and by applying a retrospective hypothesis--based on the 
exclusion itself--historians and other analysts have further validated its ‘truth’. 
Acts of political violence using the same methods carried out before this ‘origin’ 
of international terrorism have now been relegated to the archive of subjugated 
knowledges, forgotten and disregarded by historians, analysts and 
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policymakers alike. How was such an exclusion possible? What transformation 
had occurred in the rules of discourse that allowed the subjugation of this 
information? 
 
Return of the Arab/Muslim barbarian 
The Six Day War of 1967, which ended in a decisive victory for Israel, is one of 
the most important occasions in the history of terrorism discourse. In Discipline 
and Punish, having comprehensively analysed the historical, political and 
scientific events that eventually made the modern prison possible, Foucault 
suggests that were he to fix the date of the completion of the carceral system, he 
would choose not the various dates on which relevant laws were passed, but 22 
January 1840, when the Mettray prison opened324. If a date is to be fixed for the 
beginning of international terrorism, this study suggests it is not 22 July 1968 
when Palestinians hijacked the El Al flight, nor any other day when a group of 
rebels crossed state boundaries to perpetrate an act of political violence – it is 10 
June 1967 when Israel won the Six Day War.  
 
It is this victory, and the transformations that it made possible in the rules 
governing the discourse of terrorism that eventually allowed Hoffman, and 
other analysts and policymakers, to point to the Palestinian hijacking of the El 
Al flight as the beginning of international terrorism while excluding from the 
discourse acts of the same motivation, method and degree of destruction 
committed by rebels other than Palestinians. Transformations in the discourse 
of terrorism made possible by this victory are also what created the conditions 
of possibility for the twenty first century terrorist to be a Muslim, albeit one 
who believes in a bastardised version of the religion.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the discourse of terrorism emerged within 
the new epistemic spaces created from the separation of terror from religion. 
The use of terror as a form of political power, although rife in the Middle Ages, 
was not ‘terrorism’ until it was used by the secular rebel. As such, the 
discourses of terrorism and religion remained largely separate from each other 
for most of the first half of the twentieth century. When the Israelis decisively 
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defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six Day War to take control of the Gaza 
Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan 
Heights, it allowed the reactivation of the Arab/barbarian discourse that had 
been rendered ‘true’ by the discursive practices of the Middle Ages and in early 
eighteenth century North America.   
 
Centuries old discourses of Orientalism, colonialism and Zionism, which had 
all been connected to the concept of terror and religion in the Middle Ages were 
now reactivated and reconstituted in relation to the discourse of ‘terrorism’, 
which itself had been constituted by power relations between terror and 
religion. Orientalism had informed the European colonial project since it 
began325. All histories of European imperialism begin with the fifteenth and 
sixteenth and centuries, overlooking the fact that ‘Jerusalem was the aim of the 
first European movement of expansion outside of Europe and the first 
European colony overseas: the Kingdom of Jerusalem’326. Jewish restoration to 
Palestine had been advocated in England since 1585, and Zionism thereafter 
played an important role in Western political relations with Israel from the 
Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century to the Evangelical Revival of 
1790, and beyond. The restoration of Jews to Palestine was significant in the 
founding of America – it was ‘Israel and the New Zion’; their crossing of the 
ocean to settle in the New World an Exodus. The relations between Christian 
Zionists and the political movement of Zionism continued in America, allied 
with millennial metaphor and apocalyptic politics that has never quite 
disappeared from mainstream American society.  
 
The creation of Israel, for many evangelicals and fundamentalists, ‘was 
confirmation of the premillennial doctrine and the imminence of Jesus’ 
return’327. Israel’s victory in the Six Day War of 1967 was all the confirmation 
needed for the validity of the Bible for many American evangelists, and the 
discourses of Zionism mixed with those of Orientalism paved the way for the 
emergence of the uncivilized Arab/Muslim in twentieth century ‘terrorism’. 
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From the Six Day War onwards, Western knowledge of Arabs in general and 
Palestinians in particular was acquired via the more Western, and thus more 
civilized, Israelis:  
 
If during the nineteenth century the expert scholar-Orientalist was looked to for 
knowledge about the Orient, now a Westerner turns first to the Zionist for his 
evidence of and knowledge about the Orient (and Orientals) […] Israel is the norm, 
Israelis are the presence, their ideas and institutions the native ones: Arabs are a 
nuisance, Palestinians a quasi mythical reality. Israeli origins are forgotten: Israel 
simply is a Western democracy now quite gratuitously set upon by anti-Jewish 
Arabs. The reversal is complete328.  
 
Themes of Christian Zionism returned to the front pages in the United States 
following the Six Day War in 1967, along with discourses of Armageddon and 
apocalypse. Politics and apocalyptic scenarios merged as fears grew of a 
nuclear war, with many believing that Judgement Day would arrive with an 
‘all-out Soviet attack’329. The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74 connected the 
apocalyptic discourse with economics as the fear grew ‘that Americans would 
soon be faced with scarcities in other raw materials and, eventually, in food’. 
Others awaited Judgement Day to arrive in the form of a cosmic cataclysm330.  
The Iranian Hostage Crisis, Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982, which is cast by 
American religious figures as ‘the fulfilling of prophecy’331, the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran and the restoration of Jews to Israel were all connected to the 
discourse of Armageddon in various American newspapers by both evangelists 
and political figures during this period332. It was the Middle East that would be 
the epicentre of the impending end. ‘History began in that area of the world 
and the Bible teaches it will end there in a conflagration’333.  
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The relations between national security discourse and the discourse of 
Armageddon was further cemented by revelations in mainstream media that 
President Reagan was among the believers in Armageddon334. Reagan’s belief in 
Armageddon was first reported in 1983, when he was said to have told the 
Director of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee: ‘I find myself 
wondering if – if we’re the generation that is going to see that [Armageddon] 
come about…I don’t know if you’ve noted any of those prophecies lately, but 
believe me, they certainly describe the times we are going through’335. The two 
men were discussing United States marines in Beirut. His Defence Secretary 
Casper Weinberger shared the same belief and theorised that the location of 
Armageddon would be ‘near the Hill of Meggido in northern Palestine, about 
15 miles southeast of Haifa’336. The theme of Armageddon returned to the 
forefront of American consciousness again with the 1990 Gulf Crisis and the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of that year.  
 
Jimmy Carter studied it before meeting Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat at 
Camp David. Ronald Reagan spoke of it in public. President Bush has discussed it 
with a leading clergyman. ABC Nightline has shot a story about it that is awaiting a 
broadcast date. The New York Times reports brisk sales of books on the topic. The 
subject is Armageddon, and whether current events in the Middle East are the 
beginning of the end of the end of the world as forecast in biblical prophecies. 
Millions of Christians and Jews believe that events in the Middle East and 
elsewhere are unfolding according to a divine schedule337.  
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The best-selling book on the subject, Armageddon, Oil and the Middle East 
Crisis: What Bible says about the future of the Middle East and the end of 
Western Civilisation (1976)338--a new edition of which was published in 2007 
and a million copies of which were reprinted during this period--predicted 
according to a reading of the Bible, that the first three steps to Armageddon 
would be as follows: 1) a peace treaty signed by a world leader that guarantees 
Israel’s security; 2) a joint Arab-Russian attack on Israel; 3) the supernatural 
destruction of those who try to destroy Israel.  
 
Israel was central to Western civilisation, and its future. It was central not only 
to the survival of mankind, but to the survival of God himself, as the site where 
Jesus was scheduled to come back. In the ultimate fight between good and evil, 
Arabs/Muslims were on one side and Christianity/the West was on the other. 
The showdown was nigh. It was this fervent merging of feverish apocalyptic 
discourse, war, and tense relations between the United States and the Middle 
East that produced the ‘new religious terrorist’ of the 1990s. By the end of the 
century, terrorism analysts had adopted the apocalyptic discourse into their 
own analyses, asserting that terrorists during this period, unlike their 
predecessors, had become religious, ‘nihilistic’ and ‘apocalyptic’339. Many 
descriptions of terrorists published during this period borrowed from the 
millennial discourse, describe them as possessing ‘as much fanaticism and 
madness as there ever was’ but newly capable of much more disturbing and 
cataclysmic acts340. Their actions would lead the world to the very destination of 
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the millenarian prophecies—Armageddon:  they were prepared to wipe out 
civilisations and humankind itself341.  
 
Furthermore, it was the Armageddon discourse with its central Arab versus 
Israel rhetoric that made it possible for the religion of the newly devout terrorist 
to be predominantly Islam. It became customary for analysts to begin their 
discussions of the ‘new’ terrorist by first stating that ‘Islam is not a violent 
religion per se, but…’; or with the statement that ‘not all terrorists are Muslims, 
but…’ and ‘while common to religious terrorists of all faiths, have nonetheless 
been most closely associated with Islamic terrorist groups in general [...]’342. Or, 
‘while Islam in modern history has not engaged in acts of mass violence on a 
Hitlerian or the Pol Pot scale, it is also true that the missionary, aggressive 
element in radical Islam is stronger than that in other religions [...]’343 Or: 
 
There is, of course, no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious 
fanaticism; it exists and leads to acts of violence in the United States, India, Israel 
and many other countries. But the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired 
terrorism is still striking [...] A discussion of religious inspired terrorism cannot 
possibly confine itself to Islam, but it has to take into account the Muslim 
countries’ preeminent [sic] position in this field.344  
 
As the millennium approached, the language used by the analysts of terrorism 
became as apocalyptic as the potential terrorist actions that were being forecast: 
 
[...] it must be contemplated that we may be on the cusp of a new, and potentially 
more dangerous, era of terrorism as the year 2000—the literal millennium—
approaches. One cannot predict the effect that this pivotal watershed might have 
on religion-inspired terrorist groups who feel impelled either to hasten the 
redemption associated with the millennium through acts of violence [...] or in the 
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event that the year 2000 passes and redemption does not occur, to attempt to 
implement Armageddon by the apocalyptic use of weapons of mass destruction.’345  
It was not that the ‘terrorists’ had become more religious, more dangerous, or 
apocalyptic – it was that the complex groups of relations between the dominant 
discourses of the time had created the conditions of possibility to produce this 
object in terrorism discourse. It is by disregarding those conditions and their 
specificity to that particular era that conventional histories of terrorism are able 
to point to the 1990s as the time when terrorists became more religious, and 
primarily of Arab/Muslim origin.  
 
The power of knowing 
Power/knowledge relations underpinned the constitution of the Arab/Muslim 
barbarian as the terrorist of the late twentieth century. He was rebelling against 
the civilized West, against God’s ‘chosen people’. With the increasing number 
of hijackings and other actions against Israel by Palestinian rebels, Israel during 
this period became a dominant Western voice in the ‘knowledge’ of ‘terrorism’. 
Israeli authors cemented the divide between the Arab/Muslim barbarian and 
the West with publications such as Terrorism: How the West can win (1986)346, 
clearly putting the West, of which Israel is an integral part, in the position of the 
victim despite his own argument that ‘European radical factions’ were one of 
two major contributors to ‘terrorism’ which ‘began its rapid growth in the 
1960s’347. ‘The PLO introduced airline hijacking as an international weapon’ 
[emphasis added], and these ‘Muslim radicals’ collaborated with Marxist ones 
deliberately in an unholy alliance of two anti-Western movements ‘communist 
totalitarianism and Islamic (and Arab) nationalism’: 
 
These forces have given terrorism its ideological impetus and much of its material 
support. Both legitimise unbridled violence in the name of a higher cause, both are 
                                                       
345 Bruce Hoffman, ”Holy terror”: the implications of terrorism motivated by a religious 
imperative (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 13-14. 
346 Binyamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: how the West can win (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 
1986). 
347 Ibid., 11. 
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profoundly hostile to democracy, and both have found in terrorism an ideal 
weapon against it.348  
 
The United Nations’ view that ‘national liberation’ is a justified cause became 
‘perverse’ and the Algerian fight for independence was compared to the 
‘civilized French Resistance against German occupation which did not involve 
‘systematic killing of German women and children’. The differences between 
the civilised West and the brutality of Islamic (Arab) radicals were treated as 
obvious: ‘France, of course, is today a democracy Algeria merely another of 
many despotisms where terrorists have come to power’349. ‘Terrorism’ became 
impossible without the support of ‘the Soviet bloc and the Arab world’, the 
enemies of democracy and the West. The terrorist subject is thus re-constituted 
as the uncivilised Arab/Muslim, an enemy of civilization. Israeli analysts 
continued to repeat this (re)definition of the terrorist in Western discourse 
throughout the twentieth century, contributing to it becoming accepted as a 
‘truth’ and, creating the conditions of possibility for the Evildoer-terrorist to 
emerge in the twenty first century. 
 
It is also during this period, from the 1960s onwards, that links were formed 
between psychiatric discourse and ‘terrorism’ discourse, leading to a 
pathologisation of ‘the terrorist’. This change in the way of knowing ‘the 
terrorist’ is similar to the changes that occurred in Western knowledge of the 
secular rebel and proletarian radical in the nineteenth century when they 
became objects of the discourses of phrenology and physiognomy. In 1969, 
following the student movements that spread across the world in 1968, the 
rebel became an object of psychiatric knowledge. In an attempt to analyse the 
‘character and significance of [the] student movements’ Lewis S Feuer proposed 
the ‘conflict of generations’ theory, hypothesising that the motives for 
‘terrorism’ were deeply rooted in an individual’s dysfunctional early 
childhood350. This theory, based on ‘a Freudian interpretation of terrorism as a 
psychological reaction of sons against fathers, a generational phenomenon 
                                                       
348 Ibid., 11-12. 
349 Ibid., 12-13. 
350 Lewis G. Feuer, The conflict of generations (New York: Basic Books, 1969). 
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rooted in the Oedipus complex and, thus, in maleness’351 rapidly gained 
ground. In the decades that followed, ‘terrorism’ and ‘the terrorist mindset’ 
became favourite objects of analysis and psychological discourse.  
 
Scholars within, or related to, the field of psychology began analysing 
‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorist behaviour’ through the psychoanalytic framework 
with much fervour, publishing their findings in titles as wide-ranging as Mental 
Health and Society352; Legal Medical Quarterly353; Journal of Psychohistory354; Journal 
of Forensic Sciences355; The Police Chief 356; Journal of Behavioural Science and the 
Law357; Psychiatry: The State of the Art358; Journal of Psychology359; International 
Journal of Mental Health360; Medicine, Science and Law361; Forensic Reports362; 
Psychology363; Psychiatric Annals364; Political Psychology365; Cerebrum: The Dana 
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359 Ken Heskin, “The Psychology of Terrorism in Ireland,” in Terrorism in Ireland, ed. Yonah 
Alexander and Alan O’Day (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 88–105. 
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Forum on Brain Science366. Many of the theories advocated in these publications 
were later expanded into books.  
 
This body of knowledge, building on theories that had been developed in the 
1960s, and in the aftermath of the Six Day War, further reified and rendered 
true the knowledge of the terrorist as not only an Arab/Muslim barbarian, but 
a mentally disturbed one at that367.  
 
On 11 September 2001, nineteen members of Al-Qaeda carried out a series of 
coordinated suicide attacks on the United States. They hijacked four passenger 
jets and crashed two of them into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre 
in New York City, causing both towers to collapse within two hours. The third 
                                                                                                                                                                
364 Bruce Hoffman, "The mind of the terrorist: Perspectives from Social psychology," Psychiatric 
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plane was flown into the Pentagon in Virginia, and the fourth jet crashed into a 
field in Pennsylvania before it could reach the intended target in Washington 
D.C. The attacks killed nearly 3,000 people, making it the worst attack of its 
kind on the United States in its history. All the attackers were Muslims.  
 
Within hours, as is discussed in the following Chapter, President George Bush 
had described the attacks as evil and the attackers as Evildoers. The President 
could do so because the conditions of possibility were already present to bring 
under the same system of regularities the figure of the Devil (who rebelled 
against everything good); the secular rebel (who rebelled against divine 
oppression); the radical proletarian (who rebelled against liberal oppression) 
and the uncivilised Arab/Muslim (deranged, apocalyptic and an enemy of the 
West) to form the Evildoer, the ‘new’ enemy of the twenty first century. Chapter 
Four demonstrates how the presence of these early figures, and the Devil in the 
historical a priori of terrorism, allowed President Bush to make such utterances; 
while the subsequent two chapters show how these utterances were rendered 
true through rarefaction and action. 
Summary 
Terrorism as a discourse emerged from the separation of religion and politics, 
and was rendered true in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through 
power/knowledge relations that centred around three other juridically 
indiscernible figures: the proletarian radical, the universal rebel, and later, the 
Arab/Muslim barbarian. It is argued that if a date for the beginning of 
international terrorism were to be fixed, it should be 10 June 1967 when Israel 
won the Six Day War, and not 23 July 1968 when Palestinian rebels hijacked an 
El Al flight from Rome. Israel’s victory in the War, viewed by many American 
leaders as well as fundamentalist Christians elsewhere in the West as a signal 
that Armageddon was nigh, created the conditions of possibility in which 
connections between religion and terror present in the Middle Ages could be 
reactivated. The discourse of the Arab/Muslim barbarian, which emerged with 
the medieval fear of Islam and religious thinkers and rulers’ discursive use of 
Islam as a means of bolstering the ‘truth’ of Christianity, re-emerged during this 
period and was reconstituted as an object of terrorism discourse. Similarly, the 
Barbary captivity narratives, which had been used in seventeenth century 
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medieval Europe as well as eighteenth century North American discourse as a 
means of increasing the strength of belief among Christians, too, were 
reanimated during this period.  
 
The Arab/Muslim barbarian terrorist was both constituted and validated by 
new developments in psychiatric and other forms of ‘scientific’ knowledges 
that emerged during this period. These transformations in the discourse of 
terrorism created the conditions of possibility in which the terrorist of the 
twenty first century would emerge as the Evildoer: an Arab/Muslim barbarian 
motivated by a fanatical belief in a bastardised version of Islam and an 
irrational hatred of liberal freedoms whose aim was to destroy civilization, 
namely the West. The following chapters explore the regimes of practices that 
both constituted and rendered the Evildoer and the evil of terrorism ‘true’. 
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4. (Re)born in the USA: George Bush & the Evildoer 
 
‘You not only have a civil calling, but a divine calling…You are not just a civil 
servant; you are a servant of God called for such a time like this.’ 
‘I accept the responsibility’, Bush said, nodding.368  
 
For three years after 11 September 2001, President Bush referred to ‘terrorism’ 
on average once a day, to ‘terror’ three times a day, and to ‘terrorists’ four 
times a day369. This chapter comprises an analysis of the texts of 1479 
speeches/interviews/public addresses made by President George W Bush in 
the three years following 11 September 2001 (from 11 September 2001 – 11 
September 2004). Seventy percent of all these speeches contained at least one 
mention of ‘terrorism’. As has been alluded to before, an analysis of the 
discourses of any domain requires an examination of the regimes of practices of 
those discourses, that is ‘all that was said in the statements that named it, 
divided it up, described it, traced its developments, indicated its various 
correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its 
name, discourses that were to be taken as its own’370. This chapter attends to 
one part of this task by examining what was officially said about terrorism in 
the United States during the first few years of the War and Terror. 
 
An examination of what President Bush said about the ‘new enemy’ is 
important not for any hidden meanings that his words might contain from 
which the true origin of terrorism could be decoded, but because his is an 
important enunciative position contributing to the formation of the Evildoer. 
                                                      
368 Conversation between President Bush and a Christian religious leader summoned to the 
White House on 20 September 2011 to offer guidance to the President before he addressed the 
Congres later the same day. The group included thirteen evangelical Christians as well as 
members of other faiths including Islam, Buddhism, and Sikhism. Tony Carnes, “Bush's 
Defining Moment”, Christianity Today, 45, no. 14: 38-42.  
369 Figures are based on the analysis of 1479 speeches (including interviews and radio 
addresses) given by President Bush between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2004. The 
speeches were collected from “Presidential news and speeches,” The George Bush Archive, 
The White House, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/. 
370 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock, 1972), 35.
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President Bush’s speeches about terrorism were delivered from the 
institutional site of American Presidency. He spoke as the ‘leader of the Free 
World’371, Commander in Chief of the ‘War on Terror’, and also as a leader for 
whom the Christian religion was vital for the execution of his official duties372. 
During this period, President Bush’s job approval ratings reached an all time 
high of ninety per cent373—the   highest amongst all 11 United States 
Presidents whose popularity was measured by American pollster Gallup 
since the Second World War.374 His speeches to the American public were 
                                                      
371 President Bush himself made it clear that he was speaking as “leader of the free world” in 
several of his speeches made between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2001. See for 
example, “President Bush building worldwide campaign against terrorism,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, September 19, 2001, accessed March 14, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010919-1.html; 
“UK’s Blair pledges solidarity,” The George Bush Archive, The White House, September 20, 
2001, accessed March 14, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-7.html; and “President asks 
global leaders to play anthems on Dec 11,” The George Bush Archive, The White House, 
December 5, 2001, accessed March 14, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011205-11.html. 
372 George W. Bush, ”An American President serves people of every faith, and serves some 
with no faith at all. Yet, I have found my faith helps me in the service to people,” quoted in   
“Bush speaks in annual national prayer breakfast,” CNN Transcripts, CNN, February 1, 2001, 
accessed March 14, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0102/01/se.02.html. Also 
see “Interview excerpts of President Bush and First Lady Laura Bush by Doro Bush Koch for 
StoryCorps,” The George Bush Archive, The White House, November 28, 2008, accessed 
March 14, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081128.html, in which he described 
himself as “a lowly sinner seeking redemption” while cautioning the mixing of politics with 
faith. In summing up his presidency, he expressed his wish to be remembered “first and 
foremost” as a person who “did not sell his soul in order to accommodate the political 
process”. 
373 “President Bush: overall job ratings,” CBS News, accessed March 14, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2006/03/23/in_depth_politics/frameset1433259.shtml
; ”President Bush’s approval ratings: 2001-09,” The Guardian, January 16, 2009, accessed 
March 14, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2009/jan/16/george-bush-
approval-ratings-america.  
374 “Bush job approval at 28%, lowest of his administration,” Gallup, April 11, 2008, accessed, 
March 14, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/106426/bush-job-approval-28-lowest-
administration.aspx.  
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liberally interspersed with the approving audience’s applause, laughter and 
even proclamations of love: ‘I love you George!’375.  
 
President Bush was by no means the only prominent figure in the United 
States government to speak of terrorism as an evil and of terrorists as 
Evildoers. During the same period in which President Bush made the 
speeches analysed in this chapter, it was common for speakers in all major 
political institutions of the country to portray terrorism as an evil. It was a 
theme repeated in the Congress, in the Senate, in the House of 
Representatives376, and on various public forums by individuals within the 
political establishment. Richard Jackson’s Writing the War on Terrorism 
chronicles, for example, various utterances by the American political elite, 
which have contributed to the present understanding of terrorism as an evil 
perpetrated by Muslims. Portraying the War on Terror as a battle between 
Good and Evil was also a common practice in the American media at the 
time377. The decision to focus solely on President Bush’s speeches in this 
Chapter is related to his enunciative status in the discourse of terrorism. Being 
the leader of the world’s only superpower, the First Victim of the 11 
September attacks and the most popular American President in living 
memory all provided him with a unique authority with which to speak of 
terrorism, and made him one of the most important enunciative figures in the 
discourse of terrorism at the time. By taking what President Bush said about 
                                                      
375 Audience member recorded as shouting at a speech given by President Bush at a civic 
centre in Western Virginia. See George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at West Virginia 
Welcome,” The George Bush Archive, The White House, October 31, 2002, accessed February 
20, 2010, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021031-
8.html.  
376 Carolyn B. Maloney, Congresswoman, World bank lending to Iran, Before the Subcommittee on 
Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services (October 29, 2003), 
accessed January 26, 2012, 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba92903.000/hba92903_0f.htm; Tom 
Lantos, Congressman, Intellectual property crimes: Are proceeds from counterfeited goods funding 
terrorism?, Before the committee on International Relations, 108th Cong. (July 16, 2003), accessed 
January 26, 2012, 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa88392.000/hfa88392_0f.htm. 
377 April Eisman, “The media of manipulation: patriotism and propaganda,” Critical Quarterly 
5, no. 1-2 (2003). 
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terrorism and putting it together with what was done about terrorism (as is 
explored in Chapter Six) during the same period, this study shines a light on 
some of the main regimes of practices that made it possible for the ‘terrorist’ 
to transform into an Evildoer and terrorism into an evil during this time.  
 
Evil, as discussed in the earlier two chapters, has been conceived of in a 
variety of different ways in Western thought since Socrates defined it as 
arising from ignorance, the expectation of which causes terror. In the dualist 
view of Manicheans, the world is constituted by two rival forces of good and 
evil that are irreconcilably opposed to each other and exist in a state of 
perpetual conflict. Augustine conceived of evil as the privation of good, and 
singled out Lucifer’s rebellion against God as the original sin that created evil. 
He attributed evil to the ‘wrong choices of free rational beings’378—it was not 
that evil caused sin, but sin caused evil379. Rousseau introduced the concept of 
evil as systematic, that is, arising from the inherent inequalities in the system 
of social interaction that developed as individuals in the state of nature 
emerged to form societies380.  
 
As becomes evident in the following analysis, President Bush’s use of the 
term evil is varied and carries connotations from the many understandings of 
evil dominant during various epochs. In his descriptions of Osama bin Laden 
and of Saddam Hussein, President Bush uses the term evil to describe the 
individuals themselves as inherently evil—people who, like the Devil, turned 
away from good and themselves became evil. However, he also refers to 
extreme ‘acts of evil’ committed by Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, the 
Taliban and other ‘terrorists’. As Renée Jeffery has argued: 
 
Considered together, already we have what is a rather confused understanding 
of evil. Evil is, for Bush, a type of action that, in some circumstances, is extreme 
enough to render the perpetrator of the action evil themselves. However, in 
what appears to be a somewhat circular argument, he also understands evil as 
                                                      
378 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 65. 
379 Joseph F. Kelly, The problem of evil in the Western tradition: from the book of Job to 
modern genetics (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1989), 54. 
380 Ruth W. Grant, “The Rousseauan revolution and the problem of evil,” in Naming evil, 
Judging Evil, ed. Ruth W. Grant (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 53-74. 
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turning away from or corruption of good, which renders the individual evil and 
allows them, in turn, to perpetrate evil actions.381  
 
At times, however, President Bush uses a more Manichean than an 
Augustinian understanding of evil. For example, he said on 11 October 2001, 
paying tribute at the Pentagon Memorial, one of the sites attacked on 11 
September 2001, ‘We cannot fully understand the designs and power of evil. 
It is enough to know that evil, like goodness, exists. And in the terrorists, evil 
has found a willing servant.’382 Evil is inexplicable and exists as a type of 
independent force in the world. President Bush further reiterates this view in 
asserting that evil has nothing to do with religion. America did not ‘share the 
point of view that evil is religious,’383 he said. Evil recognises ‘no holidays; 
doesn’t welcome Thanksgiving or Christmas season’384. Evil is essentially 
irreligious. In his descriptions of the War on Terror as a grand cosmic battle 
between good and evil, he reiterates this view many times, as is discussed in 
detail below. But, in asserting time and again that good will overcome evil, he 
negates the very same understanding—if good can overcome evil, good and 
evil do not co-exist in perpetual conflict as the Manicheans understood it.  
 
At times, President Bush’s use of the term is somewhat Rousseauan, especially 
when he speaks of illiberal regimes such as that of the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq that gave rise to the evildoers. However, his 
speeches provide no room for the understanding of evil proposed by 
Rousseau, and which motivated the French Revolutionaries, the first rebels to 
be described as terrorists: evil arises from inherent inequalities in the systems 
                                                      
381 Renée Jeffery, Evil and International Relations: human suffering in an age of terror (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 138. 
382 George W. Bush, “President Pays Tribute at Pentagon Memorial,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, October 11, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-1.html.  
383 George W. Bush, “Nigerian President Offers Solidarity, Support to U.S.,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, November 2, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011102-5.html. 
384 George W. Bush, “Philippine President Reiterates Support,” The George Bush Archive, The 
White House, November 20, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
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of social interaction and processes of civilisation itself. In the rejection of this 
view, the President is adamant: evil is barbaric, and foreign to civilisation. 
Thus, evil could not arise from inequality in the processes of civilisation. In 
one speech he flatly denies any connection between poverty—where 
inequalities in Rousseau’s concept of evil is most manifest in modern 
society—and evil: ‘I don’t accept that poverty promotes evil. That’s like 
saying poor people are evil’385. The Rousseauan concept of evil, on the other 
hand, is a discourse which Osama bin Laden, like other rebels before him, 
proposes in his many assertions that the inequalities inherent in United States 
foreign policy is what motivated his actions386. This is a view of evil that 
President Bush does not have room for as seen in his outright rejection of any 
such grievances—or a rational motive of any sort for that matter—behind the 
actions of Al Qaeda. They are driven, he says, by ‘pure evil’.387  
 
This study asserts that the predominant concept of evil found in President 
Bush’s discursive output is most closely related to, and made possible by, that 
of medieval Christianity: Good is from God and evil from the Devil, the two 
are locked in perpetual battle with each other and, as Augustine’s insistence 
on redemption being ultimately dependent on God’s grace showed, God 
retains ultimate control over the Devil. It is also the same understanding of 
                                                      
385 George W. Bush, “Nigerian president offers solidarity, support to U.S.,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, November 2, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
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386 Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, “In video message, bin Laden issues warning to U.S.,” 
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evil, as seen in Chapter Two, that underpinned the concept of terror as a 
destructive form of political power that is legitimate and justified when used 
by God (good) against evil, and can only ever be used against good when 
deployed by the Devil.  
 
As the analysis below shows, it is these medieval concepts of evil and terror, 
that are reactivated in President Bush’s speeches, and which create the 
conditions of possibility for terrorists of the twenty first century to emerge as 
evildoers and terrorism as evil. 
The reunion of evil and terror 
Even before the sun set on 11 September 2001, and long before the dust 
settled on Ground Zero, relations between the discourses of evil, God and 
terrorism began to be formed in ways that had not been possible since the 
French Revolution. America had witnessed and experienced evil that day, 
and God was where comfort and solace could be found, President Bush told 
the nation. At the end of the day he told America to remember these words 
from scripture: ‘Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of 
death, I fear no evil for You are with me’388. By the end of 2001, President Bush 
had described the attacks of 11 September 2001 as evil over 300 times, 
repeating the message on average three times a day over a period of just over 
100 days389. The attacks were ‘evil’ of a kind the United States had never 
before seen390, ‘evil in the extreme’391 ‘absolute evil’392, ‘flat evil’393, and ‘a 
                                                      
388 George W. Bush, “Statement by the President in his address to the nation,” The George 
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brand of evil, the likes of which we haven’t seen in a long time in the 
world’394.  In the three years that followed, President Bush used the word 
‘evil’ to describe terrorism equally as much as he used the word ‘terrorism’ 
itself (evil 1196 times and terrorism 1105 times). The terms terrorism and evil 
had became interchangeable in American discourse, creating the conditions in 
which terrorism could become evil, and evil terrorism. 
 
Similarly, within two days of the attacks, President Bush had begun referring 
to the terrorists as Evildoers,395 a juridically indiscernible entity with a vast 
array of clearly discernible characters that were identified by President Bush 
in the months that followed. He was ‘an enemy so evil that those […] in 
America’ could not possibly comprehend him396. First and foremost, the 
Evildoer is a ‘terrorist’, for terrorism is evil - there being ‘one universal law, 
[…] that is, terrorism is evil’397. Evil is at the heart of terrorism, terrorists are 
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‘the most evil criminals of our age’398, and on 11 September 2001, the United 
States ‘fell into the hands of Evildoers’399.  
 
The hijackers were instruments of evil who died in vain.  Behind them is a cult of 
evil which seeks to harm the innocent and thrives on human suffering.  Theirs is 
the worst kind of cruelty, the cruelty that is fed, not weakened, by tears.  Theirs 
is the worst kind of violence, pure malice, while daring to claim the authority of 
God.  We cannot fully understand the designs and power of evil.  It is enough to 
know that evil, like goodness, exists.  And in the terrorists, evil has found a 
willing servant.400 
 
The Evildoer can think of nothing but evil401, is motivated by nothing but evil 
and has ‘no justification for their actions’ except evil itself402; ‘hate [s] freedom 
and legitimate government’403  ‘would like to rid the world of freedom as we 
know it’404, ‘ha[s] no regard for human life’, does not ‘believe in religious 
freedom’405 is ‘ruthless’ and has ‘no conscience…no mercy’406. Al-Qaeda, the 
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organisation responsible for the attacks was ‘an evil organisation …based 
upon hate and evil’407; and its teachings were similarly ‘based upon evil and 
hate and destruction’408, just as its message was ‘one of evil and hate’409. Just as 
the ‘Evildoers’ of the Bible who ‘are full of boasting’410 so was the ‘new’ 
enemy who ‘boast they want to kill—kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill 
all Christians’.411  
 
Cleansing Iraq of evil 
A year and a half later, when the United States and its Coalition of the Willing 
invaded Iraq, it was again in the pursuit of an Evildoer, this time seen in the 
person of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. ‘The War on Terror involves Saddam 
Hussein because of the nature of Saddam Hussein’—if  the word Evil could 
not be used to describe his actions then, President Bush let it be known, ‘Evil 
has no meaning’412. He harboured ‘a deep hatred of America’ in his heart, 
weapons of mass destruction in his armouries, and terrorists ‘including 
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operatives of al Qaeda’ in his land413. With the help of this Evil man, ‘the 
terrorists could fulfil their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of 
thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.’414  
 
To render his discourse ‘true’, President Bush sought validation in comments 
made by ‘Nobel Laureate and Holocaust survivor’ Elie Wiesel: ‘We have a 
moral obligation to intervene where evil is in control. Today that place is 
Iraq’415. Using Wiesel’s opinion to support his own views not only increased 
President Bush’s credibility in judging President Saddam as Evil, but also 
allowed connections to be made between the powerful discourses of the 
Holocaust, Evil, ‘new terrorism’ and Iraq. President Hussein had left 
‘thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or disfigured’ by chemical 
weapons. In ‘the torture chambers of Iraq’ are used the methods of ‘electric 
shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with 
electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape’416. There was no earthly cure for 
a man possessed by such Evil, after all, as President Bush pointed out with 
derision that delighted his fellow good Americans, it was not as if ‘therapy 
would change his evil mind (laughter)’417.  
The union of Mahomet and bin Laden 
One of the most often repeated and dominant narratives in President Bush’s 
speeches is that of Osama bin Laden as the bringer and leader of a false Islam.  
 
                                                      
413 George W. Bush, “President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, March 17, 2003, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html. 
414 Ibid. 
415 George W. Bush, “President Discusses Iraq in Radio Address,” The George Bush Archive, 
The White House, March 15, 2003, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030315.html. 
416 George W. Bush, “President Delivers "State of the Union," The George Bush Archive, The 
White House, 28 January 2003, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html. 
417 George W. Bush, “President Calls for Strengthened and Reformed Medicare Program,”  
The George Bush Archive, The White House, January 29, 2003, accessed February 20, 2010,  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030129-4.html. 
 118 
I consider bin Laden an evil man.  And I don't think there's any religious 
justification for what he has in mind.  Islam is a religion of love, not hate.  This is 
a man who hates.  This is a man who's declared war on innocent people.  This is 
a man who doesn't mind destroying women and children.  This is man who 
hates freedom.  This is an evil man418.  
 
‘The Al Qaeda people’ he said, do not represent Islam ‘as far as America is 
concerned’ and being ‘evil people’, they are not of  ‘the Muslim faith that I 
know and understand.’419 The idea of a false Islam, represented foremost by 
bin Laden and his followers, is a dominant and oft repeated narrative in 
President Bush’s speeches. ‘The face of terror’, represented by Osama bin 
Laden, ‘is not the true faith of Islam’, nor is it ‘what Islam is all about’.420 The 
terrorists’ Islam was ‘a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings 
of Islam’.421 ‘The Islam that we [Americans] know’ as was ‘revealed through 
The Holy Qur’an’ was not the false Islam that the evildoers knew.422And the 
evildoers could not be Muslims because ‘Islam is peace’ and ‘these terrorists 
don't represent peace.  They represent evil and war’423. The Evildoers are thus 
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ersatz-Muslims who had ‘betrayed’424 or ‘hijacked’ (or ‘tried to hijack’425) a 
great religion in order to justify their evil deeds’426. They had proceeded ‘to 
commit evil in the name of Allah, blaspheme the name of Allah’427. Al-Qaeda 
falsely claimed Islam to be their motivation and its members attested to being 
devout Muslims, but ‘as far as America is concerned’, Muslims they ‘are 
not’428. Muslims were the ‘doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the 
military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads’429 who were American 
citizens and paid their taxes. Evildoers could not be true Muslims. 
 
President Bush’s repeated accusations that Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda 
followers practised a fake Islam allowed him to reiterate continuously that the 
War on Terror was not against Islam per se, but against the false Islam that the 
Evildoers practised. ‘This is not a campaign against Islam; this is not a 
campaign against Arab people’, he said a week after he declared the War on 
Terror430. Bush again repeated the same message two days later saying, ‘the 
enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab 
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friends’431 but those who had hijacked Islam.432 Again, speaking to the King of 
Jordon a few days later, he repeated the message that America’s ‘war is 
against evil, not against Islam’ whose teachings were the exact opposite of 
Islam, which they falsely professed to believe in433. 
 
These continuous denials of the ‘Muslimness’ of the Evildoer Osama bin 
Laden, and any links between Islam and the War on Terror made Islam one of 
the most significant objects of the discourses of both terrorism and evil. In 
eight percent of the speeches President Bush gave during the three-year 
period following the 11 September 2001 attacks, Islam (and/or Muslims) 
appeared together with terrorism. This discursive prominence given to the 
non-Muslimness of the ‘new’ enemy meant that terrorism always had 
something to do with Islam: be it a lack of faith, too much of it, or a fraudulent 
claim to it. The reconfiguration of terrorism as an object of religious discourse, 
and the placement of Islam and Evil alongside each other at the centre of 
twenty first century terrorism discourse created the conditions in which the 
historical a priori of Western conceptions of Islam could return to the 
foreground of Western thought in the twenty first century.  
 
Particularly significant in this respect are the accusations against Osama bin 
Laden of spreading a ‘false Islam’ that preached violence and hatred and 
destruction. As was discussed in Chapter Two, Islam first entered Western 
consciousness as a heresy, spread by the violence and hatred of the ‘false 
prophet’ Mahomet. In twenty first century discourse it was not possible for 
the President of the self-proclaimed ‘most liberal nation in the world’ to single 
out Islam itself as a heresy. He, therefore, created a division between a true 
Islam and a false Islam in which the ‘false Islam’ comprised the same 
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characteristics as the false religion, which early Christianity regarded Islam 
itself to be.  
 
At the centre of the ‘false Islam’ discourse was Osama bin Laden, who like 
Mahomet, believed in the power of the sword to acquire followers, and killed 
indiscriminately. Like Mahomet, Osama was out to ‘kill Christians and Jews’ 
wherever he could find them. As will be seen, like Mahomet, Osama bin 
Laden was also a barbarian, an Arab barbarian like the Barbary pirates of the 
captivity narratives from the seventeenth and eighteenth century. These 
discursive practices also allowed the reanimation of the discourses of the 
Arab Anti-Christ, which had already become part of the terrorism discourse 
in the late twentieth century as was discussed in Chapter Two. A fleeting sign 
of how these subjugated discourses had been reanimated in Western thought 
came in the form of an unscripted remark made by President Bush. Speaking 
on 16 September 2001, a Sunday, which he described as ‘the Lord’s Day’, 
President Bush said: ‘This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a 
while.’434  
Evil, evil everywhere 
These Evildoers soon came to occupy as omnipotent and ominous a place in 
American discourse as the Devil did in Western discourses of the Middle 
Ages. In the three years following 11 September 2001, it was not just the 
nation’s attention in general that President Bush drew to the Evil of terrorism, 
but he alerted almost every sector of society to its threat, addressing them 
individually from children at elementary school435 to high school graduates436; 
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from parents437 to grandparents438; from factory workers439 to crop farmers440 
and cattle farmers441; from artisans442 and labourers to labour leaders443; from 
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airline workers444 to fire fighters445; from athletes446 to baseball and football 
champions447; from Jews on Yom Kippur448 to Muslims at Ramadan449 and 
Christians at Christmas450; from Churchgoers to charity workers451; from Chief 
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Executives to corporate managers452; and from teachers453 to manufacturers454 
and coalminers455. By forming relations between terrorism and every aspect of 
American life, the Presidential rhetoric helped facilitate the existence of the 
‘new’ Evil enemy not just within the domains customarily related to the 
‘terrorist’ (security, politics, crime, for example) and the domain of religion, 
but in almost every conceivable domain of American life. The Evildoer 
‘terrorist’ was now found in sports456, education457, retirement458 and social 
                                                                                                                                                            
“President Bush Previews Historic NATO Summit in Prague Speech,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, November 20, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010,  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021120-4.html. 
452 George W. Bush, “President Outlines Plan to Improve Corporate Responsibility,” The 
George Bush Archive, March 7, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020307-3.html. 
453 George W. Bush, “President Launches Quality Teacher Initiative,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, March 4, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020304-8.html. 
454 George W. Bush, “President Discusses Economic Stimulus with National Association of 
Manufacturers,” The George Bush Archive, The White House, October 31, 2001, accessed 
February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011031-1.html; George W. Bush, 
“President Participates in Roundtable with Small Business Owners and Employees,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, March 18, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010,  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020318-1.html. 
455 George W. Bush, “President Bush Meets with Pennsylvania Coal Miners,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, August 5, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020805-1.html. 
456 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President to the NCAA Sports Champions,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, March 12, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-12.html; 
George W. Bush, “President Urges Responsibility in Speech Congratulating Lakers,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, January 28, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020128-1.html. 
457 George W. Bush, “President Stresses Volunteerism at Atlanta High School,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, January 31, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020131-7.html; 
George W. Bush, “President's Remarks to Press After Meeting with Educators,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, March 4, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020304-9.html; 
George W. Bush, “President Launches Quality Teacher Initiative,” The George Bush Archive, 
The White House, March 4, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020304-8.html; George W. Bush, 
 125 
welfare459, civic affairs460, economy461, medicine and healthcare462, childcare463, 
finance464, labour, business465, agriculture466, women’s entrepreneurship467, 
taxation468, and even in the nation’s biodiversity469.  
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President Bush told airline employers to ‘get on board’ and athletes to ‘roll’470 
with him on the War on Terror. He alerted Hispanics471 African Americans472, 
Italian Americans473, Irish Americans474 and Asian Pacific Americans475, each 
ethnic group separately, to the presence of the Evildoer and the threat he 
posed to their existence. Just as the Devil shadowed the European of the 
Middle Ages from birth to death, so was the Evildoer present in every stage 
of the average American life—childhood476, youth477, parenthood478, old age479; 
and, of course, death.  
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The ‘new’ enemy’s place in Western discourse is not only as omnipresent as 
that of the Devil’s was in the Middle Ages, it is also as potent. In the Middle 
Ages, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Devil was: 
 
[A]n omnipresent force, ever ready to prey on man’s weaker instincts and to 
tempt him away into the paths of evil. He was also an instrument of God’s 
judgement, for the sinners of this world constituted the member’s of Satan’s 
kingdom after their death. In Hell they were subjected to undying torments over 
which he presided. To help him in his task he had any army of demons and evil 
spirits, as numerous and pervasive as the saints and angels of Christ. He was 
both one and many480.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001, as Evil became as 
omnipresent as the Devil had been in Western discourses of the Middle Ages, 
it was possible to see the work of his human agents, the Evildoers, in every 
unusual or inexplicable occurrence in American society.  
 
On 18 September 2001, a week after the Evildoers struck, letters laced with the 
deadly poison anthrax were mailed to several media outlets and two US 
Senators. Five people were killed and seventeen others were infected481. 
Asked if the anthrax attacks had ‘any connection to bin Laden's organization’, 
President Bush replied, ‘There may be some possible links’. ‘We have no hard 
data yet.  But it's clear that Mr. bin Laden is a man who is an evil man’. 482 
‘These are evil people and the deeds that have been conducted on the 
American people are evil deeds’483 and, ‘whoever has done it shares that same 
value of evil that we saw on September the 11th.  And we'll find them and 
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bring them to justice, as well’484. Almost ten years, new legislation, ‘billions of 
dollars in government and private spending aimed at defending the country 
against biological attacks’ and ‘an expensive, eight-year FBI probe that 
spanned six continents and included multiple, highly publicized mishaps’ 
later, the FBI ‘sealed the envelope’485 on the anthrax case in February 2010. 
They concluded that an irate American scientist was solely responsible for the 
attacks. He committed suicide in July 2008 while files were being prepared to 
prosecute him486.  
 
In the Europe of the Middle Ages, when the Devil was similarly omnipresent, 
his presence was often detected even in natural disasters that befell society. 
When the intended bride of sixteenth century King James IV of Scotland, 
Danish Princess Anna, was prevented by spectacular storms from travelling 
to Scotland, for example, the King personally led an investigation into the 
courses of the storms, and ‘uncovered a story of a gathering at North Berwick 
parish kirk the previous Hallowe’en (31 October 1589) over which the Devil 
himself had presided, with the agenda of planning the King’s destruction, 
principally through the manipulation of the weather.’487 In the years following 
11 September 2001 the presence of the Evildoer was equally prominent in 
American discourse for the nation to see the Evildoer’s hand in all disasters 
the befell the country, natural or otherwise. When Hurricane Katrina hit the 
city of New Orleans in 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), established in 1979 to deal with disasters too overwhelming for local 
and state authorities, viewed the disaster through the lens of terrorism. While 
the Evildoers were not suspected of ‘manipulation of the weather’ as the 
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Devil of the Middle Ages had been, they were suspected of manipulating the 
consequences of the weather.  
 
As Hurricane Katrina bore down on the Gulf Coast the Department of 
Homeland Security alerted law enforcement agencies in the region to the vast 
array of opportunities available to any terrorist seeking to exploit the 
disaster.488 With the title How terrorists might exploit a hurricane, the document 
was compiled in 2003 by a ‘Red Cell’ of thirty five experts from ‘intelligence, 
industry, military and academia’ who were asked by the Department of 
Homeland Security to ‘speculate on possible terrorist exploitation of a high 
category hurricane’489. While the four page document starts with the caveat, 
‘Terrorists are unlikely to exploit a hurricane’, it says, ‘if terrorists were to do 
so, they would have several opportunities’. A ‘group like Al-Qaida’ could 
‘capitalise on the hurricane’ and ‘launch an attack elsewhere’. Moreover, 
organized groups, splinter cells, or lone wolf terrorists might observe security 
measures to help planning for a future event, target evacuation routes and 
emergency shelters, or even impersonate emergency responders to attempt to 
gain access and cause destruction.490  
 
In other words, the ‘terrorist’ or Evildoer as he was otherwise known during 
this period, could be everywhere, and could be anyone. The Devil had a 
similar ability to impersonate anyone or anything having been known to have 
appeared, among other things, as adder, ape or monkey, asp, basilisk, bat, 
bear, bull, camel, cat, centaur, chimaera, crocodile, crow, deer, dog, dragon, 
eagle, fish, fly, fox, gnat, goat, goose, griffin, gull, hare, hawk, horse, hyena, 
leopard, lion, serpent, sheep, sparrow, spider, stag, swallow, tiger, toad, 
tortoise, vulture, wasp, whale, wolf, and worm through the ages491. 
Consequently, the ‘red cell’ experts recommended increased security at 
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shelters, ‘vigilance at evacuation checkpoints (tunnels, bridges), and reporting 
of unfamiliar vehicles and personnel’492 to spot the Evildoer in disguise. 
 
Valuable resources were thus spent on arresting potential Evildoers rather 
than assisting the needy. And, while President Bush differentiated between 
the evil of 11 September 2001 attacks, saying that the devastation from the 
hurricane ‘resulted not from the malice of evil men’, as had been the case on 
11 September 2001, ‘but from the fury of water and wind’493, the Evildoer’s 
presence was nevertheless suspected. Illustrative of this preoccupation with 
Evildoers is the story of Syrian immigrant Abdulrahman Zeitoun, an 
American citizen who was arrested and held at a maximum-security prison 
without charge and without any rights for twenty days, suspected of being 
‘Al-Qaeda’ or ‘Taliban’ for no reason other than his Middle Eastern 
appearance494. Zeitoun, a Syrian Muslim married to Kathy, an American who 
converted to Islam before meeting Zeitoun, lived in Kathy’s native New 
Orleans with their three children and ran a successful painting and decorating 
business together. When Hurricane Katrina hit, Zeitoun stayed at home while 
his wife and children evacuated to Fort Brag. Zeitoun, a former sailor, spent 
his time paddling a canoe across the flooded streets of the city, rescuing 
various people trapped in their homes. On 6 September 2005, five men and 
one woman in ‘mismatched military police and military uniform’ armed with 
M-16s arrested Zeitoun at his own property along with three acquaintances, 
one of whom was another Syrian immigrant. In reply to the bewildered 
Zeitoun’s queries as to why he had been arrested he was told, ‘You guys are 
al Qaeda’495. Throughout his captivity, he was referred to as ‘terrorists’, or the 
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‘Taliban’, and subjected to similar degrading and humiliating treatment as 
prisoners of the War on Terror held in Guàntanamo Bay and elsewhere.496 
Goodness, gracious 
One of the multiple ways in which Bush conceived of evil was as the absolute 
opposite of good. That the United States was fighting evil he was in no doubt, 
as he made clear in many different speeches. ‘We're not fighting a nation; 
we're not fighting a religion; we're fighting evil.  And we have no choice but 
to prevail’497. There were ‘not many shades of gray in this war’, he said, ‘you 
are either Evil or you are Good’498, ‘there is no in between’.499  Concomitant 
with this view is the claim that the United States, and therefore the War on 
Terror, is inherently good. As he explained in detail: 
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We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it.  We value education; the 
terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care, 
or should leave their homes.  We value the right to speak our minds; for the 
terrorists, free expression can be grounds for execution.  We respect people of all 
faiths and welcome the free practice of religion; our enemy wants to dictate how 
to think and how to worship even to their fellow Muslims500.  
 
Al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden was ‘The Evil One’501. He is ‘an evil 
man’502, ‘an incredibly evil man’503 ‘who hates freedom…an evil man’, who 
‘has got evil goals’504. Just as it was hard to think of the Devil in rational terms, 
so it was ‘hard to think in conventional terms’ about bin Laden ‘a man so 
dominated by evil’505. Just as God had seen how great ‘man’s wickedness on 
the earth had become’ and ‘that every inclination of the thoughts of his heart 
was only evil all the time’506, the United States saw that the evil bin Laden’s 
‘heart has been so corrupted that he’s willing to take innocent life’507. His 
thoughts were so evil that Americans could not even begin to comprehend 
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their destructiveness, and so low was his regard for human life508. ‘He is so 
evil that he is willing to send young men to commit suicide while he hides in 
caves’509, and he was more than capable of developing ‘evil weapons to try to 
harm civilization as we know it’510. Before the United States and its allies 
invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, President Bush warned the Taliban 
government that if it did not hand over the Evildoers hiding in Afghanistan, 
‘they will share in their [the Evildoers’] fate’511.  
 
To be on the side of Good, one had to be on the side of America for the nation 
was Good personified. ‘Our nation’, America, ‘is the greatest force for good in 
the world history’512, President Bush repeatedly told the people of America in 
the years following 11 September 2001. It ‘is a nation with a good and 
generous heart’513 and Americans are ‘good. […] good-hearted people’514 full 
of ‘goodness and generosity’515. America remained ‘the hope of the oppressed, 
                                                      
508 George W. Bush, “President Bush Calls for Action on the Economy and Energy,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, October 26, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010,  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011026-9.html. 
509 George W. Bush, “President's Remarks at White House Lighting of Menorah,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, December 10, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010,  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011210-7.html. 
510 George W. Bush, “President Welcomes President Chirac to White House,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, November 6, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-4.html. 
511 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, September 20, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.  
512 George W. Bush, “President Asks American Children to Help Afghan Children,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, October 12, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011012-4.html. 
513 George W. Bush, “Radio Address by the President To the Nation,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, November 24, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011124.html. 
514 George W. Bush, “America's Youth Respond to Afghan Children's Fund,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, October 16, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011016-4.html. 
515 George W. Bush, “President Shares Thanksgiving Meal with Troops,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, November 21, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011121-3.html. 
 136 
and the greatest force for good on this earth’.516 On several occasions, he 
thanked the people of the United States for the opportunity to be ‘the 
President of the greatest nation on the face of the earth’.517 When he travelled 
abroad, it was to carry out the honourable duty of ‘represent[ing] the greatest 
nation on the face of the earth in capitals around Europe’ and elsewhere518. 
President Bush’ wife, Laura, was ‘the First Lady of the greatest country on the 
face of the Earth’519. He reminded students they were ‘going to college in the 
greatest land, the greatest nation on the face of the earth’520; teachers were 
commended for their commitment ‘to the greatest nation on the face of the 
earth’521; sports champions were told the President recognised them not just as 
great athletes, but ‘as great people who are a part of the greatest nation on the 
face of the Earth’522; American ‘youngsters’ were told to take voting seriously 
as they lived ‘in the greatest land in [sic] face of the earth’523; and members of 
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the American military were men and women in uniform who ‘are willing to 
sacrifice for the greatest nation on the face of the Earth’524.  
 
In The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George W Bush, Peter Singer 
describes this dualist understanding of evil held by President Bush as 
fundamentally Manichean.525 As mentioned earlier and discussed in Chapter 
Two, however, the concept of evil as understood by Manicheans was that 
good and evil co-existed in perpetual conflict with each other. In Bush’s 
speeches evil emerges—among other things—as something that can be 
overcome by good. Richard Bernstein has argued that Bush’s frequent 
reiteration that good will triumph over evil makes his concept of evil ‘quasi-
Manichean’ rather than out-right Manichean.526 In terms of portraying the 
War on Terror as a battle between good and evil, this study asserts that Bush’s 
understanding of evil is most similar to the dominant understanding of the 
concept in the Middle Ages, which rejected Manichaeism.  
 
‘Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good’527, was the old 
battle plan against the Devil. ‘One way to fight evil is to fight with kindness 
and love and compassion’ for each other, Bush told Americans of the twenty 
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first century. ‘We can overcome evil. We're good.’528 It was said in the ‘original 
battle’ plan that ‘Evil men will bow down in the presence of the good, and the 
wicked at the gates of the righteous’529. President Bush provided detailed 
plans for righteousness among those within the gates of the Homeland—the 
government ‘will find something for every American to do’530.  
 
Lobstermen were thus told to keep their eyes peeled for Evildoers ‘when 
they're out there pulling their pots to get the lobsters’ along the coast of 
Maine, just as Neighbourhood Watch programmes and truckers were to keep 
their eyes similarly peeled for Evil lurking in the shadows531; the population 
in general was told, ‘in order to fight the evil ones and not let their way of life 
stand, one thing Americans can do is to love a neighbor’532; parents were told 
they were doing good by saying ‘I love you’ to their children on a daily 
basis533; and every American who mentored a child or walked ‘across the 
street to a shut-neighbor and says, how can I brighten your day, what can I do 
to love you?’ is a ‘soldier in the War on Terror’534.  
                                                      
528 George W. Bush, “America's Youth Respond to Afghan Children's Fund,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, October 16, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011016-4.html. 
529 Proverbs 14:19. 
530 George W. Bush, “Gov. Ridge Sworn-In to Lead Homeland Security,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, October 8, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-3.html. 
531 George W. Bush, “President Promotes Citizen Corps for Safer Communities,” The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, April 8, 2002 accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020408-4.html. 
532 George W. Bush, “President Talks Trade in New Orleans,” The George Bush Archive, The 
White House, January 15, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020115.html. 
533 George W. Bush, “President Calls on Congress to Pass Economic Security Package,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, January 22, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020122-8.html. 
534 George W. Bush, “President talks trade in New Orleans,” The George Bush Archive, The 
White House, January 15, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020115.html; George W. Bush, 
“President discusses energy, economy in West Virginia,” The George Bush Archive, The 
White House, January 22, 2002, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020122-2.html.  
 139 
 
These ‘soldiers in the War on Terror’ could be distinguished as ’somebody 
who wants to fight evil with goodness’; as somebody who ‘wants to get 
involved in their school system and praises the teacher, or helps the 
education’; or, as ‘somebody who goes to a church or a synagogue or 
mosques and says, how can we form a faith-based program to help change 
people's lives by changing their hearts?’535 It was the ‘good inherent in the 
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soul and character of the American people’536 brought forward in defence of 
the Homeland ‘by millions of acts of kindness that take place every day that 
defined America’ that will ensure ‘no evil will ever be able to diminish’ that 
goodness537 and ensure that Good ‘will overshadow the evil of those who take 
innocent life’538. The details of America’s plan of righteousness echoed the 
battle plan for the ancient war on Evil waged during the early years of 
Western civilisation:  
 
Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles 
of the Devil.  
For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against 
powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual 
wickedness in high places.  
Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to 
withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand.  
Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the 
breastplate of righteousness 539 
 
In the ancient battle plan, those on the side of Good were instructed to ‘Go 
after these men at once, and when you catch up with them, say to them, ‘Why 
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have you repaid good with evil?’540. President Bush articulated a similar plan 
for the American Homeland’s battle against Evil, to the admiration and 
delight of the good American people:   
 
We're going to figure out who's coming into our country and who's leaving our 
country, to make sure that people—(applause.)  Listen, we're a great nation.  We 
welcome people in.  We just want to know why you're here.  (Laughter.)  And if 
you're not supposed to be here more than a period of time, then maybe you 
ought to just go on home.541 
 
Official efforts alone, however, could not attain the goals of excluding the 
Evildoers from the Homeland entirely. Such a task could only be carried out if 
every good citizen joined in the fight to ferret out the Evil from their midst by 
being extra vigilant to its presence542. ‘This nation’s got to be alert’543, and any 
good American citizen, if they saw ‘something unusual’ should ‘tell the local 
police.  They're on alert’544.  To this end, the President urged Americans to join 
the Citizens on Patrol program, the participants in which ‘help serve as eyes 
and ears of local law enforcement’545.  
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Within the Homeland, this meant the soldiers of Goodness must be able to 
recognise the enemy that dwelled in their midst. The inherent goodness of 
Americans had made them inevitably welcoming to the outsider, and Evil 
persons were bound to have taken advantage of this American generosity. 
‘Our country has been an incredibly generous country, the most generous 
country in the world. We're generous with our universities, we're generous 
with our job opportunities, we're generous with the beautiful system that is, 
that if you come here and you work hard, you can achieve a dream.’546 The 
enemy had taken advantage of this inherent American generosity, teaching 
America a valuable lesson. Not all foreigners come into America to live the 
American Dream, some ‘evil ones’ creep in too. The Department of Homeland 
Security would ensure this foreign evil who ‘might be burrowed in this 
country, trying to hurt any American’ is found and thrown out547. To ensure 
‘the Land of the Free is as safe as possible from people who might come to our 
country to hurt people’548, Department of Homeland Security would ensure 
that ‘what we don't welcome are people who come to hurt the American 
people’549.  
 
The Department would remain ‘very vigilant’ about who gets permission to 
come to the Homeland, and would remain ‘observant with the behavior of 
people who come to this country’550. As God instructed, the evil within must 
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be purged551. Homeland Security was ‘running  down every single lead, we're 
hardening assets, we're on the hunt. We're going to chase them down’552. And 
it was reviewing its  ‘visa policies’, ‘immigration policies’ and ‘border 
policies’553 to ensure that the foreign enemy could not penetrate the gates of 
the Homeland. If people were found in the country who had ‘no intention to 
fulfil their purpose [as stated in the visa]’, Homeland Security would have 
them ‘escorted out of the United States’554.  
 
The Immigration and Naturalisation Services (INS), President Bush 
announced, had been given additional finance to ensure it ‘knows exactly 
who is coming into our country and who is leaving our country to make sure 
[…] our homeland is as secure as possible’555. Foreigners who had outstayed 
the generous welcome the good people of the land extended to them were 
going to be hunted down to make sure ‘they're not part of some al Qaeda 
network that wants to hit the United States’556. They should know that the 
homeland security apparatus was ‘looking’ and that it was ‘listening’557.  
 
Just as the Goodness of God was the ‘battle axe and weapons of war’ in the 
Biblical battle of Good versus Evil558, the Goodness of America would be the 
battle axe and the chief weapon in the United States’ War on Terror. Being the 
president of ‘the greatest nation on the face of the Earth’, President Bush said, 
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he was able to predict with ‘absolute certainty’559 that ‘out of the Evil done to 
America will come great good’560.  
Crusading for Good 
 
‘Listen, all you distant lands. Prepare for battle, and be shattered!’  - Isaiah 8:9 
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Part of the good that was to come out of the evil that was done to America, 
President Bush said he was certain, was to ‘make sure this American 
experience [of goodness] is available for all’.561 This meant without a question 
in his mind, he said, ‘that this great country will lead the world to peace.562 
For not only did Americans ‘represent the greatest nation on the face of the 
earth’, but they ‘represent a spirit that is much bigger than evil and terror: 
[they] represent peace’563. It allowed him, he said, ‘to boldly predict that the 
evil done to America is going to yield a more peaceful world and a more 
hopeful country’564. ‘Thanks to the strength and the compassion of our 
country, the world will be more peaceful’,565 as the United States fulfilled ‘the 
great purpose of our great land […] to rid this world of evil and terror’566. It 
was the nation’s ‘calling as a blessed country […] to make the world better’567, 
and, henceforth, the United States said unto the rest of world, ‘This is good 
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versus evil’568, ‘come with us, stand by our side to defeat The Evildoers…’569, 
come to ‘our side … join the folks who are fighting evil’570 and together, 
‘across the world and across the years, we will fight these Evil Ones, and we 
will win’571. Those who heeded the call should find comfort in knowing theirs 
is ‘a noble cause’572 that the United States ‘will stand strong on the side of 
good’573, and it will ‘defeat the forces of evil wherever they are’574, for 
ultimately, ‘Good will overcome evil’575.  
 
President Bush also repeated in his many speeches the claim that even though 
‘[t]he attack took place on American soil, […] it was an attack on the heart and 
soul of the civilized world’576. ‘The great threat to civilisation is that a few evil 
men will multiply their murders, and gain the means to kill on a scale equal 
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to their hatred,’ he warned577. For the sake of civilisation itself, it was essential 
that the eternal battle between Good versus Evil be resumed and won by 
Good once and for all, and for this purpose, the United States will ‘fight evil 
with good’ ‘for as long as it takes’578. As the year 2001 drew to a close, 
President Bush prayed with the nation at Christmas that ‘may the glorious 
light of God's goodness and love shine forth from our land579.  
 
Let there be goodness in Afghanistan 
Shining down on Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 were explosions from United 
States’ bombs and shells. The Taliban, the leaders of Afghanistan, which 
President Bush had described as the very manifestation of ‘al Qaeda’s vision 
for the world’, had refused to give in to the demands made of it by the United 
States to handover the Evildoers hiding in the country580. The United States 
was ‘very upset’, President Bush said, but the mission was clear:  
 
to rout terrorists, to find them and to bring them to justice. Or […] in Western 
terms, to smoke them out of their caves, to get them running so we can get them. 
[…] and at the same time send out a clear message that says if you harbour a 
terrorist, if you aid a terrorist, if you hide terrorists, you are as guilty as the 
terrorists.581 
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As the United States continued its military actions in Afghanistan, paving ‘the 
way for friendly troops to defeat the Taliban and root out the al Qaeda 
parasites that the Taliban hosts and protects’ it was also enforcing a ‘new’ 
doctrine ‘that says this:  If you harbor the terrorists, you are guilty of 
terror.  And like the terrorists, you will be held responsible582. This ‘new’ 
strategy in the United States’ ‘new kind of response’ against the ‘new 
terrorist’ is once again familiar—‘if that nation I warned repents of its evil, 
then I will relent and not inflict on it the disaster I had planned’583. If not, 
those on the side of Good, such as the United States in the War on Terror, 
were left with no choice but to rise up against the evil that dwells there. 
 
While the bombing and shelling of Afghanistan continued, President Bush 
told his fellow good Americans that Afghanistan was ‘hearing from a 
compassionate nation’, ‘a nation that sends food and medicine to starving 
people of Afghanistan’584. It was hearing from the kind of nation ‘whose 
children are sending their dollars to save the children of Afghanistan.’585  
Helping ‘the poor souls in Afghanistan’ ensured that the goodness of America 
and its people ‘shone forth’586. Those watching should see and note that 
America will ensure that along with the bombs and guns, ‘the oppressed 
people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies.  As 
we strike military targets, we'll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the 
starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan’587. Only 
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Evildoers, and their helpers, were excluded from America’s otherwise 
limitless compassion588.  
 
Throughout the attacks President Bush portrayed the War on Terror as a 
responsibility that had been thrust upon the United States as the Good that 
was obliged to fight Evil. 
 
If war is forced upon us, we will fight in a just cause and by just means—
sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And if war is forced upon us, we 
will fight with the full force and might of the United States military—and we 
will prevail.589 
 
As the most compassionate nation on the face of the earth, Americans exercise 
power without conquest’ and make ‘sacrifice[s] for the liberty of strangers’. 
America was fighting for a cause greater than its own—‘the liberty we prize is 
not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity.’590  
 
When the United States and its ‘Coalition of the Willing’ invaded Iraq in 2003, 
he repeated the same message. It was America’s ‘duty to history’ and 
humanity to facilitate the delivery of God’s gift of liberty to the Iraqi people, 
and liberate them from the Evil of President Saddam Hussein. While bombing 
Iraq in the pursuit of this lofty aim, America would also ‘make sure that those 
who are hungry are fed, those who need health care will have health care, 
those youngsters who need education will get education.’591 Speaking directly 
to the American and Iraqi people simultaneously (the latter through a live 
translation of his address), three days before the invasion on 21 March 2003, 
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President Bush reassured the Iraqi people they were ‘deserving and capable 
of human liberty unlike’ their leader592.  
Commeth the barbarian 
This division between humans who deserve rights such as liberty and the 
Evildoers who do not is a common theme that emerged in the speeches of 
President Bush during this period. In addition to the ‘inhuman’ qualities that 
he attributed to the evildoers as per the discussions above, President Bush 
had another instrument with which to delineate the Human Being from the 
Evildoer: barbarism. Only days after 11 September 2001, President Bush 
began providing details on what made the evildoer a barbarian. ‘Flying 
airplanes into buildings full of innocent people were ‘barbaric’ acts593. For 
these barbarians, ‘there are no rules […] They slit throats of women on 
airplanes in order to achieve an objective that is beyond comprehension.  And 
they like to hit, and then they like to hide out’594. The evildoers are ‘barbaric in 
their indefensible meting of justice’595.  On many occasions, President Bush 
made clear that the Barbarian and the terrorist Evildoer were one and the 
same. The 11 September 2001 attacks were a declaration of war against 
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America by ‘a group of barbarians’596. President Bush connected the evil of 
terrorism with ‘barbarism’/’barbarian’/barbaric’ in nine per cent of the 1479 
speeches he made during the three year period analysed in this Chapter (11 
September 2001 – 11 September 2004)—roughly the same degree to which 
links were made between Islam/Muslims and the Evildoers. This is not to 
claim a direct or intended correlation between these two discursive practices 
employed by President Bush, but to suggest that they created the conditions 
of possibility in which old relations between the discourses of barbarism and 
Islam could be reactivated. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, relations between Islam and barbarism has a 
long history in Western discourse that date back to the early Middle Ages. 
North African native Augustine himself used the word ‘barbarians’ to 
describe his fellow countrymen who followed Islam and refused Christianity. 
And it was through these narratives that Islam and Mohammed first entered 
the general consciousness of North Americans in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The twenty first century barbarian, the evildoer-
terrorist, was not a true Muslim, but he was still a Muslim of sorts. Moreover, 
it was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which described itself as practising 
pure Islam that President Bush singled out as the very embodiment of 
‘barbarism’, further increasing the conditions of possibility in which the early 
discourses could be reanimated. 
 
President Bush alternatively described the ‘evil’ and ‘barbaric’ Taliban 
government as a regime with ‘a value system that's hard for many in 
America’ to fathom597. They murdered teenage girls who laughed; 
incarcerated and tortured children; forbade their women to talk too loudly 
and killed them for suspected adultery. The civilised world, led by the United 
States, had no choice but to defend itself from the threat of such barbarians; 
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the civilised nations of the world ‘strongly reject the Taliban way’598, the 
barbaric way. By invading Afghanistan and attacking the Taliban regime, the 
Coalition of the Civilised ‘liberated, literally liberated’599 Afghanistan ‘village 
after village’ and ‘city after city’ from ‘incredible barbaric behaviour’600. This, 
President Bush said, was ‘one of the joyous parts of war—if there is such a 
thing as a joyous part of war’601—seeing human beings liberated from 
barbarism.  
 
The War on Terror, President Bush said, was as much a fight between the 
barbarian and civilisation as it was between good and evil: 
 
There is a great divide in our time—not between religions or cultures, but 
between civilization and barbarism.  People of all cultures wish to live in safety 
and dignity.  The hope of justice and mercy and better lives are common to all 
humanity.  Our enemies reject these values—and by doing so, they set 
themselves not against the West, but against the entire world.602 
 
On 20 March 2003 when the United States embarked on another such mission 
to deliver liberation from barbarism and deliverance from Evil to another 
country in need—Iraq, President Bush recalled to American minds the joyous 
scenes in Afghanistan and reminded them of the true purpose of American 
military intervention in the country: ‘We didn't go into Afghanistan as 
conquerors, we went in as liberators. (Applause.) We liberated people from 
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the clutches of one of the most barbaric regimes imaginable.’603 The regime of 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was similarly barbaric, and there were 
millions of Iraqis crying out for liberation from barbaric behaviour. Not only 
was President Hussein evil by nature, his progeny were ‘brutal, brutal people. 
They are barbaric in nature’604.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the word barbarian has its origins in the Greek 
description of foreigners whose speech was incomprehensible. In the Middle 
Ages, it came to refer to the followers of Islam. In the Anglo-American 
discourses of the time, the barbarian was a powerful discursive device that 
strengthened Christianity in comparison with the perceived violence and 
depravity of the followers of Mahomet. The barbarian re-emerged in 
Enlightenment politico-historical discourses as the antithesis of the savage, a 
figure that had played a powerful role in eighteenth century juridical 
theory605. As Foucault asserts in his genealogy of the barbarian, whereas the 
savage was redeemable, the barbarian can only be defined ‘in relation to a 
civilisation, and by the fact that he exists outside of it. There can be no 
barbarian unless an island of civilisation exists somewhere, unless he lives 
outside it, and unless he fights it’; and he despises the existing civilisation, 
and his relationship with it is ‘one of hostility and permanent warfare.’606 The 
barbarian has to be: 
 
[B]ad and wicked, even if we have to admit that he does have certain 
qualities. He has to be full of arrogance and has to be inhuman, precisely 
because he is not the man of nature and exchange [as was the savage]; he is 
the man of history, the man of pillage and fires, he is the man of 
domination607. 
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The figure of the barbarian has since been a powerful trope in Western 
discourse present in cultural, political and ideological discursive structures, 
and has generally been applied ‘in a negative way to individuals and societies 
whose actions and mores do not accord with Europe’s’608. Barbarians are 
‘most often the locus of anxiety’, as is reflected in the application of the term 
to an ever-shifting number of groups from new races that needed to be 
civilised as part of the colonisation project, the ‘East in the nineteenth century 
to the new European peasant underclass of the industrial revolution to 
Freud’s Id as the barbarian existing internally.’609  
 
The barbarian that emerged in the writings of Enlightenment authors such as 
Mably and Bonneville were adventurers who ‘lived only for war […] the 
sword was their right and they exercised it without remorse.’ They were 
‘brutal people, without a homeland, and without laws’ who engaged in 
‘atrocious acts of violence because they are regarded as being publicly 
acceptable’610. In Buat-Nançay’s succinct description, the relationship between 
civilisation and barbarism is: ‘the relationship between the sun and the mud it 
dries, between the thistle and the donkey that feeds on it’.611  
 
In the words of President Bush, the Evildoers, embodied the very same 
characteristics as the early barbarian. They have no fixed abode, no homeland; 
they dwell in caves, and they kill indiscriminately. America loves human 
freedom, they hate it; America values human life612 and never target civilians 
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in war613 and holds dear values of respect, dignity and human worth614. The 
barbaric enemy, however, does not possess the values that ‘regard[s] life as 
precious’615. The divisions between civilisation, represented by the United 
States and the evildoer were so vastly different, ‘they did not want America to 
exist’616:   
 
The terrorists despise creative societies and individual choice—and thus they 
bear a special hatred for America.  They desire to concentrate power in the 
hands of a few, and to force every life into grim and joyless conformity.  They 
celebrate death, making a mission of murder and a sacrament of suicide617.  
 
The civilised world shared the American values of ‘human rights, freedom, 
the dignity of man’ and they formed a ‘coalition of freedom-loving people,’ 
representing civilisation. Those who loved freedom were with America, and 
the side of civilisation, those who were not—they were ‘with the enemy’618 
and barbarism.  
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White House, November 8, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
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614 George W. Bush, “'Islam is Peace' Says President,” The George Bush Archive, The White 
House, September 17, 2001, accessed February 20, 2010, http://georgewbush-
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George Bush Archive, The White House, October 26  2001, accessed February 20, 2010, 
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618 George W. Bush, “President Discusses Taking Action to Strengthen Small Businesses,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, January 22, 2003, accessed February 20, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030122-4.html. 
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Summary 
The ‘new terrorist’ of the twenty first century that emerges from the 
discursive practices of President George W Bush is an evil, ersatz-Muslim 
barbarian who is motivated by a fanatical belief in a bastardised form of Islam 
that wants to kill as many Christians and Jews as possible and annihilate 
civilisation itself. The discourse of terrorism as evil is constructed around this 
figure, whom President Bush referred to as the Evildoer. Osama bin Laden is 
the personification of evil; a deceptive figure who perverts the peaceful 
teachings of ‘true Islam’. The civilisation that Osama and his fellow 
barbarians seek to annihilate is the liberal regimes of the West, the values of 
which neither Osama nor other evil barbarians like him, such as the Taliban 
and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, do not share.  
 
This figure of the Evildoer, around whom the domain of evil-terrorism is 
constructed, does not resemble the secular rebel who emerged with 
‘terrorism’ discourse in the French Revolution. Nor is he a more dangerous 
version of the radical proletarian that emerged during the Industrial 
Revolution or any of the other rebels who emerged in the twentieth century. 
The Evildoer most closely resembles the figure of the Devil in the Middle 
Ages and, as became clear in the above discussion, many of the discursive 
practices of President Bush during this period were reanimations of the 
discourses and discursive practices of that period.  
 
While President Bush’s speeches show that his understanding of evil was 
varied and at times even contradictory, the dominant understanding of the 
concept that emerges is the one held ‘true’ during medieval Christianity and 
found in scripture. His portrayal of the War on Terror as a continuation of the 
eternal battle between Good versus Evil, too, is a reanimation of Biblical 
narratives: seeking to overcome evil with good; purging evil from amongst 
good; and seeking peace by annihilating evil wherever it is found, whether at 
home or in distant lands. In President Bush’s understanding of evil there is no 
room for the secular coneptualisation of evil as arising from inequalities 
inherent in civilisational processes, for evil is committed by barbarians 
external to Western civilisation.  
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The trope of the barbarian, too, is a reanimation of early Western discourses 
where he stands in direct opposition to civilisation. In this understanding of 
the barbarian, he is inhuman, violent, and incapable of being civilised, unlike 
the savage. The discourse of terrorism as evil, committed by the barbaric, 
false-Muslim Evildoer created the conditions of possibility in which the 
United States was inherently good, and the evil terrorists inherently bad. As 
will be seen in the next Chapter, President Bush was not alone in engaging in 
these discursive practices—they constituted, and were constituted by, the 
epistéme in which terrorism and the terrorist could not be thought of any other 
way. To demonstrate this, this study now turns to an analysis of the ‘general 
knowledge’ about terrorism that was produced during this period in the 
United States.         
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5. Where there is a will to knowledge 
 
In the War on Terror knowledge is power - George W Bush619 
 
Twenty first century terrorism, as it emerged from the words of President 
George W Bush, is an evil that threatens civilisation itself. Such acts of 
terrorism are committed by Evildoers: barbaric false-Muslims who 
practise a bastardised version of Islam, who hate the liberalism of the 
West, and who aim to kill as many Jews, Christians and other civilised 
people as possible.  
 
What President Bush alone said, however, does not constitute the entire 
discourse of terrorism, of course; nor did his words and thoughts appear 
in a vacuum. What President Bush said and what most Americans said 
and thought during this period matched in words and sentiment. Gallup, 
US based pollster and provider of ‘data driven news’ based on opinion 
polls, has shown, for instance, that following President Bush’s State of the 
Union Address in 2002 where he described Iran, Iraq and North Korea as 
an Axis of Evil, eighty-eight percent of Americans held a negative view of 
Iraq and eighty-four percent had a similarly negative opinion of Iran620. 
North Korea, which received less attention from President Bush, was 
viewed negatively by fifty-nine percent of Americans. Prior to President 
Bush’s speech, and before 11 September 2001, a much smaller number of 
Americans (thirty-eight percent), viewed Iraq as the country’s ‘greatest 
enemy’, only eight percent mentioned Iran and just four percent 
mentioned North Korea621. 
                                                      
619 George W. Bush, “Gov. Ridge sworn-in to lead Homeland Security”, The George 
Bush Archive, The White House, October 8, 2001, accessed February 20, 2011, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-3.html. 
620 Frank Newport and Joseph Carroll, “North Korea below Iran and Iraq on Americans’ 
‘Evil’ list,” February 19, 2002, Gallup News Service, accessed July 1, 2011, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5356/north-korea-below-iran-iraq-americans-evil-
list.aspx. 
621 David W. Moore, ”’Axis of Evil’ countries seen as America’s greatest enemies,” Gallup 
News Service, February 23, 2005, accessed July 1, 2011, 
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When asked if they ‘would describe the governments of various nations 
as ‘evil’ or ‘not evil’’622, Gallup reported, ‘not surprisingly’ that eighty-
two percent of Americans thought the government of Iraq was evil, 
followed by Iran’s government at sixty-nine percent. Those who 
perceived the North Korean government as ‘evil’ was much lower with 
only a small majority thinking so. Eleven percent of the people said ‘they 
do not know enough about North Korea to have an opinion on its 
evilness’623 [emphasis added]. Knowledge, according to the poll, is what 
Americans based their opinions on; but where did their knowledge of 
evil governments and terrorism come from? 
 
In 2008, it emerged that the Bush Administration had put together a team 
of seventy-five retired military generals to appear on television as 
independent analysts providing information to the general public on the 
War on Terror. A Pulitzer Prize winning investigation by The New York 
Times journalist David Barstow revealed that the team of analysts was 
hand-picked by the Pentagon, and were wooed by Defence Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld and his public relations staff with lavish parties and 
access to Pentagon inner circles. In return, the generals appeared on 
various twenty-four-hour news channels in the United States including 
Fox News, NBC, CNN, CBS and ABC to explain the War on Terror to the 
American public as the White House wanted them to624. According to 
Barstow’s report, the success of the strategy was such that Pentagon 
officers ‘marvelled at the way the analysts seamlessly incorporated 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.gallup.com/poll/15022/Axis-Evil-Countries-Seen-Americas-Greatest-
Enemies.aspx. 
622 Frank Newport and Joseph Carroll, “North Korea below Iran and Iraq on Americans’ 
‘Evil’ list,” February 19, 2002, Gallup News Service, accessed July 1, 2011, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5356/north-korea-below-iran-iraq-americans-evil-
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623 Ibid. 
624 David Barstow, “Message Machine: behind TV analysts, Pentagon’s hidden hand,” 
The New York Times, April 20, 2008, accessed July 1, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html?pagewanted=all. 
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material from talking points and briefings as if it was their own.’625 
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), found that in American 
media coverage of the invasion of Iraq, of 840 current or former 
government or military officials who appeared on the news channels, 
only four held opinions that contradicted the official discourse of the 
Bush administration.626  
 
Without a doubt then President Bush’s statement—‘In the War on Terror, 
knowledge is power’—was put into practise by his administration with a 
great degree of seriousness in the years following 11 September 2001. 
While exposés such as Barstow’s are important and shine much-needed 
light on abuses of political power, they also obfuscate an important issue: 
by implying that there is a ‘true’ knowledge to be acquired that is wholly 
independent of such power. If the production of terrorism knowledge is 
analysed at a scale different from the journalistic endeavours and other 
such investigations into the overt manipulations of information by 
political power, underneath is to be found another layer of control—a will 
to truth—that has imposed itself for so long and to such an extent on 
discourse that ‘the truth it wants cannot fail to mask it.’627  
 
As discussed in Chapter One, Western thought since Classical Greece has 
been dominated by what Foucault described as ‘the great myth’—that 
knowledge and power are independent of each other. It is this myth that 
allows the division between true and false, when viewed from inside of a 
                                                      
625 Ibid. 
626 The FAIR report also showed that over sixty percent of the all the sources that 
major American television news networks used (from a three week sample 
starting from the day after the invasion of Iraq), were Seventy sixty percent of overall 
sources were from the United States itself, and when sources were used, they were 
mostly officials from the UK, the United States’ chief ally in the War on terror. When US 
sources were analysed separately, military officials out-numbered civilian officials two 
to one. Steve Rendall and Tara Broughe, “Amplifying Officials, Squelching Dissent,” 
Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), May/June 2003, accessed June 15, 2011, 
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1145. 
627 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the text: a poststructuralist 
reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 56. 
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discourse, to be seen as ‘neither arbitrary nor modifiable nor institutional 
nor violent.’628 When the myth is cast aside, it is possible to see that what 
is accepted as true is the result of a system of exclusion, ‘a historical, 
modifiable, and institutionally constraining system’, that which Foucault 
called the will to truth.629 Unmasking the will to truth that orders, 
categorises, determines and constitutes ‘true’ knowledge of terrorism in 
the twenty first century is the purpose of this Chapter. To do so, it focuses 
on popular literature produced in the United States during the first few 
years of the War on Terror, as is explained in more detail shortly. 
 
Nothing but the truth 
The will to truth, although the most influential, is one of many forms of 
control to which the production of knowledge is subjected. In The Order of 
Discourse630, Foucault outlines three distinctive categories of such control: 
external, internal and enunciative. Along with the will to truth, which 
excludes certain speeches on the basis of a spurious division between 
false and true, exist two other systems of exclusion of which prohibition 
is the most obvious. Quite clearly, not everyone can speak about 
everything under whatever circumstances. Taboos are placed on certain 
objects of speech, certain rituals have to be followed according to 
circumstance, and there are certain privileges or rights the speaking 
subject must possess before being permitted to speak. The third system of 
exclusion imposed on discourse externally is the division between 
madness and folly: the rejection of certain discourses from being allowed 
within its limits on grounds that it is devoid of reason while, at the same 
time, accepting other speeches as composed of reason. These three types 
of prohibition work together, reinforcing and compensating for each 
other; and form a complex, constantly changing grid. The will to truth 
dominates the other two forms of external control, invades and 
                                                      
628 Ibid., 54. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Ibid., 48-78.  
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assimilates them while itself growing ‘stronger, deeper, and more 
impeccable.’631 
 
Apart from the external controls, Foucault identifies two other types of 
procedures that limit and organise discourse and constrain what can be 
produced as true knowledge: internal and enunciative. Internal controls 
organise, classify and distribute through commentary, the establishment 
of disciplines, and through the role of the author. Enunciative controls 
refer to the qualification to speak—the subjection of discourse or 
rarefaction among speaking subjects. Foucault asserts that according to 
the enunciative controls, ‘none shall enter the order of discourse if he 
does not satisfy certain requirements or if he is not, from the outset, 
qualified to do so’632.  
 
The will to truth, and these other systems of exclusion, division and 
rejection, relies on institutional support for its existence and functioning. 
They are ‘both reinforced and renewed by whole strata of practices, such 
as pedagogy, of course; and the system of books; publishing; libraries; 
learned societies in the past and laboratories now’633. It is this system of 
support that underpinned President Bush’s speeches, analysed in the 
preceding Chapter, which this study now focuses on uncovering. The 
most profound renewal of this will to truth comes from how the 
knowledge thus produced is put to work, celebrated, distributed and 
attributed in society. The processes themselves are explored in Chapter Six 
and Seven, but the focus in this chapter is on finding out how the controls 
discussed above contributed towards rendering as true the present 
knowledge of terrorism as an evil that threatens civilisation, committed 
by false-Muslim barbarians who emerged in the discursive practices of 
President Bush. 
 
                                                      
631 Ibid., 56. 
632 Ibid., 62. 
633 Inid., 54. 
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Judging literature: how serious is serious? 
Research has shown that most of the existing literature on ‘terrorism’ in 
the English language was published after 11 September 2001. Between 
1995 and June 2008 a total of 2,281 non-fiction books were published with 
the word ‘terrorism’ in the title. Of the total, 1,151 of the books were 
published after 11 September 2001. In comparison, only 1,310 such books 
had been published in total before 11 September 2001, meaning that most 
of the published work in terrorism has been created since the War on 
Terror began.634 A similarly exponential increase—of 300 percent—was 
recorded in the number of journal articles published on the subject of 
‘terrorism’ in the same period.635  
 
This Chapter focuses on books published on the subject of terrorism that 
were most popular in the United States since the War on Terror began. 
The reasons for choosing these books for an academic study over the 
more serious literature are manifold, and are almost all related to the 
rules of discourse themselves. For one thing, knowledge (savoir), as 
Foucault said, is found not just within the covers of books judged as 
‘academic’ but also in ‘fiction, reflexion, narrative accounts, institutional 
regulations, and political decisions’636. Another reason for choosing these 
texts instead of the more ‘serious’ literature are the external controls to 
which the production of terrorism knowledge has been subject of late in 
various disciplines of the human sciences. One of the stated aims of the 
                                                      
634 Andrew Silke, “Contemporary terrorism studies: issues in research,” in Research in 
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Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Richard Jackson et al (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009), 34; Peter Lentini, “Understanding and Combating Terrorism: 
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636 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock, 1972), 202. 
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recently established subfield of ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’ is, for 
instance, to analyse controls exerted on the production of academic 
terrorism knowledge since the late twentieth century637. To this affect, 
Magnus Ranstorp638, Andrew Silke639, John Horgan640, Richard Jackson641 
and Avishag Gordon642 have analysed how a core group of experts have, 
for decades, produced and re-produced a limited set of narratives that 
collectively comprise a widely accepted ‘knowledge’ of terrorism643. The 
role of embedded expertise within academic terrorism literature in the 
production of ‘new terrorism’ has also been examined in other disciplines 
of the human sciences such as media and conflict studies.644 There are also 
valuable studies on the subject that predate 11 September 2001, that once 
little known, are now receiving renewed attention among critical 
researchers. Notable among such earlier works is Joseba Zulaika and 
William Douglass’s 1996 Terror and taboo: the follies, fables and faces of 
terrorism which analyses the existing knowledge of terrorism using 
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Foucault’s methods.645 Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman’s 1988, Political 
terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, databases, theories, and 
literature,646 updated and reprinted in 2005, and the related 2009 Handbook 
of terrorism research: research theories and concepts647; Richard Rubenstein’s 
Alchemists of Revolution648 (1987) and Alexander George’s Western State 
Terrorism649 (1991) as well as Stohl and Lopez’s The State as Terrorist650 
(1984), also show the various forms of external and internal controls that 
have been exerted on the production of terrorism knowledge.  
 
The various publications of Noam Chomsky on the War on Terror and 
United States foreign policy also provide valuable evidence and insight 
into the various forms of external control exerted on the production of 
terrorism knowledge651. The manner in which Chomsky’s work has 
largely been excluded from the present terrorism discourse, is in itself an 
example of how the various mechanisms of external control are exercised 
in the production of ‘true’ knowledge. By choosing to focus on what the 
‘serious academic studies’ banished to the periphery this study broadens 
the scope of the Critical Terrorism Studies project by adding to the 
existing critical discourse analysis.  
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Excluding books written on the subject of terrorism by authors that do 
not have a formal institutional affiliation would be to partake in at least 
one of the three forms of external controls referred to above. It would also 
mean leaving out a substantial portion of the texts that were produced 
during this period as well as excluding from the discussion some of the 
texts that were read by the most number of Americans during this period. 
Inclusion of these texts in the analysis is also important for another 
reason: it demonstrates the drastic changes that took place in the 
enunciative forms of control exercised on the production of terrorism 
knowledge in American society during the War on Terror that would not 
be possible to demonstrate in an analysis that limits itself to ‘serious’ 
literature.   
 
Furthermore, both academic and non-academic discourses are 
underwritten by the same will to truth. This author sees no reason why 
these two groupings should remain rigidly distinct categories. It therefore 
treats popular literature as an integral a part of the prodigious machinery 
that produces the ‘true’ knowledge of terrorism as the 
academic/scientific literature that has been shown to serve the same 
purpose. 
Only in America 
Each society has its own major narratives ‘which are recounted, repeated 
and varied; formulae texts, and ritualised sets of discourses which are 
recited in well defined circumstances; things said once and preserved 
because it is suspected that behind them there is a secret or a treasure.’652 
Commentary, through repetition of the old in an endless number of ‘new’ 
ways, imposes on the narratives an identity and sameness, making the 
discourse finite, while at the same time providing the opportunity for 
infinite variation and repetition. ‘By a paradox which it always displaces 
but never escapes, the commentary must say for the first time what had, 
                                                      
652 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the text: a poststructuralist 
reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 56. 
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nonetheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what had, 
however, never been said.’653 
 
The terrorism literature published in the United States during the first 
decade of the twenty-first century—although focusing on what was said 
to be the ‘new Islamic terrorism’ of the Evildoer—was old. It repeated in 
new ways centuries old major American narratives of its Exceptionalism, 
Orientalism and manifest destiny, as well as the early medieval European 
narratives on Islam, terror, and evil present in the historical a priori of 
terrorism discussed in Chapter Two and Three. Exceptionalism, which 
holds that the United States occupies a unique place in history that is 
fundamentally different from all other countries and thus a  ‘God-given 
destiny’ to guide the rest of the world according to its own political, 
social and economic values,654 is a foundational narrative of America. 
Along with the belief in its ‘manifest destiny’655, it has remained 
prominent in political and social discourses ever since. The role of these 
narratives in American foreign policy and identity formation has been 
made clear in many analyses.656 
 
For the first three years following 11 September 2001 ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
was the focus of over half the research published in the English language 
                                                      
653 Ibid., 58. 
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on the subject of terrorism657. Within seven years enough knowledge 
existed on ‘Islamic terrorism’ to warrant an anthology of its theories and 
practice.658 In these ‘new’ texts, on the subject of ‘new terrorism’, the new 
‘lies not in what is said but in the event of its turn.’659 Recall the discursive 
practices of Medieval Europe and North American puritans in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries discussed in Chapter Two, when 
Islam was used to bolster the piety of Christian populations through the 
portrayal of the religion as a heresy and Mohammed as a false-prophet. 
Also bring to mind the Barbary captivity narratives in which Europeans 
and North Americans taken as slaves by North African Muslims told 
their stories of extreme cruelty suffered at the hands of the ‘barbaric’ 
followers of Mahomet.  
 
The discussions in Chapter Two showed how these narratives were used 
as a powerful rhetorical device to discredit the perceived enemies of 
Christianity and ‘Western civilisation’. As Thomas Kidd has argued, and 
whose arguments were presented at some length in Chapter Two, these 
rhetorical uses of Islam became increasingly secularised over time:  
 
Early in the [eighteenth] century, Islam was typically used for religious 
purposes in religious debates while later commentators often took 
knowledge “derived” from observations of despotic Islamic states to 
support political points. Although one should hesitate to describe early 
Americans as conversant with Islam, they certainly conversed about Islam 
regularly660.  
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The same can be said about American discourse in the early twenty-first 
century. Americans certainly conversed about Islam a lot during the first 
decade of the century, as the above discussions show. An overwhelming 
majority of the conversations were in the context of terrorism. This 
linking of Islam and terrorism had the effect of not just reinvigorating the 
use of Islam as a rhetorical device in political discourse, but also allowed 
the domain of terrorism—equated with Islam—to become a part of 
religious discourse. As discussed in Chapter Three, ‘terrorism’ as a 
discourse emerged from the separation of religion from terror and 
rebellion. The discursive practices of the twenty-first century, however, 
reversed this separation by allowing Christian religious leaders the 
authority and position to once again speak of ‘Islamic terrorism,’ which 
reanimated the old politico-religious discourses of evil, terror and 
religion in the context of ‘terrorism’. 
 
‘New’ Christian discourses on Islam 
Terrorism, Jihad, and The Bible by preacher John F MacArthur was one of 
the first books published in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 
2001 to reactivate the practise of using Islam as a rhetorical device for 
strengthening Christianity, and using portrayals of Islam as a violent 
religion in order to do so. MacArthur reanimates the discussion of evil 
and the Devil in connection with Islam, and argues that ‘powers of evil 
were working through Mohammed’ to invent the religion of Islam and 
states: ‘If any religion qualifies as a ‘doctrine of demons’, Islam does.’661 
What was seen in the 11 September 2001 attacks was the ‘sinister effects’ 
of the false religion of Islam: ‘Once the consciences of evil people have 
been freed to do evil, they will do it’662, he says. ‘Obviously’, MacArthur 
concedes, all followers of Islam have not remained as militant as the early 
Islamic armies: 
 
[B]ut Mohammed himself was an aggressive, deadly militant, who boasted 
of killing and robbery and other evil acts in the name of Allah. So there is 
                                                      
661 John MacArthur, Terrorism, Jihad and the Bible (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, Inc., 2001). 
662 Ibid. 
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plenty of warrant in the Islamic belief system for justifying violence and 
jihad in the name of Allah. And the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is 
simply a return to the militant “missionary” efforts advocated by 
Mohammed himself663. 
 
In MacArthur’s portrayal, Islam is a ‘perverse and evil lie that invariably 
produces perverted and diabolical deeds’ and it was the religion—
satanic, demented and inexorably violent—that caused the terrorist 
attacks. These claims are a repetition of the very same claims made in 
Humphrey Prideaux’s highly influential The true nature of imposture, fully 
displayed in the life of Mahomet published in 1808 in which Muhammad’s 
‘lustful’ nature and the inherent falsity and violence of the religion he 
brought, as was discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  
 
MacArthur’s enunciative authority is considerable in the United States. In 
addition to being an award-winning author who has written bestselling 
books that have sold millions664, he also hosts the Grace to You radio 
programme, which airs more than 800 times daily, reaching all major 
population centres in the United States as well as Canada, the United 
                                                      
663 Ibid. 
664 The MacArthur Study Bible, first published in 1997, won the Gold Medallion Book 
Award in 1998 (see Evangelical Christian Publishers Association, “1998 Gold Medallion 
Book Awards Winners,” accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://ecpanews.org/christianbookawards/gm1998.php), and the 
Gold/Platinum/Diamond Book Award in 2007. His other bestselling books include The 
MacArthur New Testament Commentary series which has sold more than a million copies 
and won the ECPA Platinum Award in 2005 for sales figures over a million (see 
Evangelical Christian Publishers Association, “Gold / Platinum / Diamond Book 
Awards Winners,” accessed July 11, 2011, http://ecpanews.org/gold_past.php), and 
also Twelve Ordinary Men which sold more than half a million copies and won the ECPA 
Gold Award in 2008 (see “Gold / Platinum / Diamond Book Awards Winners,” Ibid). 
His children’s book, A Faith to Grow On, won another Evangelical Christian Publishers 
Association (ECPA) Book Award in 2001 and 2005 (see Evangelical Christian Publishers 
Association, “2005 Christian Book Awards Winners,” accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://ecpanews.org/christianbookawards/cba2005.php). 
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Kingdom, Australia, India, New Zealand, the Philippines and 
Singapore665.  
 
Similar contributions to that of MacArthur’s were made by award-
winning666 evangelical Christian author Ravi Zacharias whose 2002 Light 
in the Shadow of Jihad: the struggle for truth addresses the question of 
whether the attacks of 11 September 2001 represented ‘true Islam’ or a 
‘fanatical counterfeit,’ and uses the attacks to propose the strengthening 
of relations between Church and state, as well as to promote the need for 
increased prayer and piety among Christians.667 Zacharias’ book made it 
to number fifteen on the Christian Bestsellers List668 in August 2002, and 
was reprinted in 2006.  
 
Among other notable early publications postulating an ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
emerging from the domain of evangelical Christianity is Unveiling Islam: 
an insider’s look at Muslim life and beliefs (2002) by brothers Emir and Ergun 
Caner. The Caner brothers, who had been Muslims but converted to 
Christianity in their teens, became leading figures in the American 
religious sphere after the book’s publication and travelled the country as 
leading enunciative personalities, repeating their narratives to receptive 
audiences across America. In Unveiling Islam they dismiss the non-violent 
meaning of jihad in Islamic teachings as nothing more than a ‘politically 
correct notion’ and disparage those who stress this form of jihad over the 
violent one as ‘talking heads on television.’669 The brothers devote a 
                                                      
665 Introduction to Grace to You, KCBI Radio 90.9, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.kcbi.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=program&scheduleid=7. 
666 Frederick Zacharias, Can man live without God? won the 1995 Gold Medallion Award 
(now known as the Christian Book Award) in the Theology/Doctrine category. See 
Christian Book Publishers Association, “1995 Gold Medallion Book Awards Winners,” 
accessed July 11, 2011, http://ecpanews.org/christianbookawards/gm1995.php. 
667 Ravi Zacharias, Light in the shadow of Jihad: the struggle for truth (Colorado Springs: 
Multnomah, 2002). 
668 “Christian Bestsellers List,” Evangelical Christian Publishers Association, August 
2002, accessed July 11, 2011, http://ecpanews.org/bestseller/bestseller0802.php. 
669 Ergun M. Caner and Emir F. Caner, Unveiling Islam: an insider’s look at Muslim life and 
beliefs, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 2009), 35. 
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whole chapter to repeating the narrative of ‘Muhammad: the militant 
messenger’670, attribute the Qur’an to the demon and expend considerable 
effort on explaining the alleged interference that Satan ran during Allah’s 
revelations to Muhammad.671 The book sold well over 200,000 copies, and 
won the Christian Book Award672 in 2003. The popular publication’s 
authority was doubly strengthened by the ‘insider’s look’ into Islam that 
it alleges to provide, and was the first in a ‘new’ genre of ex-Muslim 
narratives that flourished in the United States during this period to 
become the most widespread sources of ‘knowledge’ about Islam673.  
                                                      
670 Ibid., 38. 
671 Ibid., 40-45. 
672 Award for Missions/Evangelism. See Evangelical Christian Publishers Association, 
“2003 Gold Medallion Book Awards Winners,” accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://ecpanews.org/christianbookawards/gm2003.php.  
673 Recent developments in the brothers’ story are worth noting here as they provide 
testimony to the strength of the will to knowledge that underpinned American 
discourse during this period. Since publication of the book, Emir became the founding 
Dean of the College at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and Ergun was 
appointed the Dean of Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary at the time of the book’s 
publication. Ergun Caner’s appointment was popular amongst students; enrolment at 
the seminary tripled under his leadership. In 2010 it emerged that Ergun Caner had 
included ‘factual statements that are self-contradictory’ in his biographical details. The 
contradictions are significant: Caner claimed to have been raised as a radical Sunni 
Muslim in Turkey, in ‘a climate of Jihad’, hence the ‘insider’s look’ at Islam that he was 
able to provide. As reported in the Washington Post in June 2010 (see William Wan and 
Michelle Boorstein, ”Liberty U. removing Ergun Caner as seminary dean over 
contradictory statements,” The Washington Post, June 30, 2010, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/29/AR2010062905331.html). In recorded sermons, he 
talked about coming to the United States as a teenager and converting to Christianity. 
‘In one sermon, he put it more bluntly, saying he was trained to do what the Sept. 11 
terrorists had done’ as the Post noted. Although it is true that he converted to 
Christianity as a teenager, he was not brought up in ‘jihadist Turkey’.  Despite the 
collapse of the edifice on which his ‘expertise on Islam’ was based, Liberty University 
retained him as a Professor, although they decided not to renew his contract as Dean 
when it expired on 30 June 2010. In May 2011, Arlington Baptists College, Texas, 
appointed him Professor of Theology and Church History as well as Provost and Vice 
President of Academics (see Arlington press release at Caner’s website: Brett Shipp, 
“Controversy follows Baptist theologian to North Texas,” WFAA, June 21, 2011, 
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Islam is what Islam was 
The main leitmotif in this literature is the concept of Muslims waging a 
Holy War against the West674. This is a concept made possible by the 
combined reanimation of two old narratives: that of a barbaric Islam 
clashing with the civilised West, and the inherently violent nature of 
Islam. The old narrative of Islam versus the West had been strongly 
reactivated before 11 September 2001 with Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilisations’ thesis675 published in 1993, around the same time that the 
‘new religious terrorism’ discussed in Chapter Three began to emerge. 
Despite its many critics,676 Huntington’s thesis of ‘civilisational 
realism’677—which predicted that in the post-Cold War world, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
accessed July 11, 2011, http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/Controversy-follows-
Baptist-theologian-to-north-Texas-124318149.html).  
674 David Bukay and Merkaz Ariʼel le-meḥḳere mediniyut, Total terrorism in the name of 
Allah: the emergence of the new Islamic fundamentalists (Shaarei Tikva, Israel: Ariel Center 
for Policy Research, 2002); Mark A. Gabriel, Journey Inside The Mind Of an Islamic 
Terrorist: Why They Hate Us and How We Can Change Their Minds (Lake Mary, Florida: 
FrontLine, 2006); David Selbourne, The losing battle with Islam (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 2005); Dimitry A. Kapustyan and Matt Nelson, The Soul of Terror: The Worldwide 
Conflict Between Islamic Terrorism and the Modern World (Washington, DC: International 
Affairs Press, 2007); Thomas A. Johnson, The War on Terrorism: A Collision of Values, 
Strategies, and Societies (New York: CRC Press, 2008); L. Ali Khan, A theory of international 
terrorism: understanding Islamic militancy (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006); 
Pierre-André Taguieff, Rising from the muck: the new anti-semitism in Europe, trans. Patrick 
Camiller (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004); Patrick Sookhdeo, Understanding Islamic terrorism: 
the Islamic doctrine of war (Wiltshire: Isaac Publishing, 2004); Timothy J. Keppler and 
Army War College (U.S.), Center of gravity determination and implications for the war against 
radical Islamic terrorism (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2005); Bernard 
Lewis, The crisis of Islam: holy war and unholy terror (New York: Random House Trade 
Paperbacks, 2004); Jean B. Elshtain, Just war against terror: the burden of American power in 
a violent world (New York: Basic Books, 2004). 
675 Samuel Huntington, “The clash of civilisations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993). 
676 Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, October 22, 2001, accessed July 3, 
2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance; Jacinta O’Hagan, 
“Civilisational Conflict? Looking for cultural enemies,” Third World Quarterly 16, no. 1 
(1995); Errol A. Henderson, “Huntington’s Dilemmas: not letting evidence get in the 
way of assumption,” International Politics 42 (2005). 
677 Mark B. Salter, Barbarism and civilisation in International Relations (London: Pluto 
Press, 2002). 
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primary source of conflict would be cultural and religious identities—
resonated strongly with many American intellectuals and policymakers. 
The divisions that appeared in the War on Terror, were taken by many 
such figures as ‘infallible proof’ of Huntington’s claim that ‘Islam has 
bloody borders’, and as a manifestation of his predicted clash between 
Islam and the West678. Much of the literature examined in this chapter 
builds on this thesis, which was itself built on existing narratives of 
Orientalism,  barbarism and American Exceptionalism.  
 
One author, Raphael Israeli has written six books on the subject of Islamic 
terrorism679, each explaining a different way in which it poses an 
existential threat to Western civilisation. In 2003 he warned of an 
impending new threat: ‘Islamic martyrology’ or ‘Islamikaze’680. Five years 
later he expounded on his own thesis, and warned that this new form of 
Islamic warfare could be used to launch a ‘third Islamic invasion of 
Europe’681. The same year, 2008, he also published The Islamic Challenge in 
Europe, again warning the West to beware of the growing threat of 
Islamic extremism ‘in the heartland of the European world’.682 In 2009 he 
warned of a possibly apocalyptic coupling between Muslim immigrants 
and ‘local, traditional anti-Semites of the xenophobic fascist and racist 
                                                      
678 Meghana V. Nayak and Christopher Malone, “American Orientalism and American 
Exceptionalism: a critical rethinking of US hegemony,” International Studies Review, no.  
11 (2009).  
679 Raphael Israeli and Merkaz Ariʼel le-meḥḳere mediniyut, Asia: the emerging hub of 
world Muslim terrorism (ACPR Publications, 2003); Raphael Israeli, War, peace and terror in 
the Middle East (London: Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 2003); Raphael Israeli, The spread of 
Islamikaze terrorism in Europe: the third Islamic invasion (Portland, Oregon: Vallentine 
Mitchell, 2008); Raphael Israeli, The Islamic challenge in Europe (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2008); Raphael Israeli, Islamic radicalism and political 
violence: the Templars of Islam and Sheikh Ra'id Salah (Portland, Oregon: Vallentine 
Mitchell, 2008); Raphael Israeli, Muslim minorities in modern states: the challenge of 
assimilation (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009). 
680 Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrlogy (London: Frank 
Cass, 2003). 
681 Raphael Israeli, The spread of Islamikaze terrorism in Europe: the third Islamic 
invasion (Portland, Oregon: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008). 
682 Raphael Israeli, The Islamic challenge in Europe (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 2008). 
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Right along with the avowedly anti-Zionist Left’ in Western ‘host 
societies’.683  
 
Israeli is Professor of Islamic, Middle Eastern and Chinese History at the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. As Foucault explained in The Orders of 
Discourse, universities are important institutions in the machinery of 
knowledge production, their academic output being widely accepted as 
grounded in rational enquiry independent of power, and therefore 
widely accepted as ‘true’. The validity of this narrative of an Islamic Holy 
War against the West would not have been possible without its 
connections to the discourse of the inherent violence of Islam. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, early Christian discursive practices rarefied the 
discourse of Islam as being violent from its very origin. In the present 
discourse of terrorism, this congenital savagery of Islam is drawn from a 
selective inclusion of a particular meaning of the concept of jihad in the 
discourse of terrorism while excluding others.  
 
Jihad, in Islamic teachings, is of two types: internal and external. Internal 
jihad or itjihad refers to individual spiritual striving while the external 
jihad takes the form of a just war waged against enemies of Islam. 
Whereas a majority of Muslims agree that itjihad is superior to violent 
jihad, Osama bin Laden and his followers emphasised violent jihad as 
incumbent upon Muslims in fighting the perceived wrongs and injustices 
committed against Islam by the United States and other Western powers. 
With only a few exceptions684, the texts examined in this analysis focused 
only on the violent jihad, or ‘Holy War’ as it came to be known.685  
                                                      
683 Raphael Israeli, Muslim anti-Semitism in Christian Europe: elemental and residual anti-
semitism (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009). 
684 Javaid Rehman, Islamic state practices, international law and the threat from 
terrorism: a critique of the “clash of civilizations” in the new world order (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2005); M. J. Akbar, The shade of swords: jihad and the conflict between 
Islam and Christianity (New York: Routledge, 2003); Abdul Gafoor Abdul Majeed 
Noorani, Islam & Jihad: prejudice versus reality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); 
David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Noah 
Feldman, After Jihad: America and the struggle for Islamic democracy (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Girou, 2004); Gabriele Marranci, Jihad beyond Islam (New York: 
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Such was the singularity of focus on the violent form of jihad alone that 
no other interpretations of the concept could be included in Western 
discourse. Jihad, during this period, could only be known in Western 
                                                                                                                                                   
Berg, 2006); Zahid Aziz, Islam, peace and tolerance (Wembley, UK: Ahmadiyya 
Anjuman Lahore Publications, 2007), Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South 
Asia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
685 Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us (New York: The Free 
Press, 2003); Matthias Küntzel, Jihad and Jew-hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the roots of 9/11, 
trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007); Walid Phares, Future Jihad: 
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The war of ideas: Jihad against democracy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Walid 
Phares, The confrontation: winning the war against future jihad (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); Ronald R. Cooke, Oil, Jihad and Destiny: Will Declining Oil Production 
Plunge Our Planet Into a Depression? (Opportunity Analysis, 2004); Laurent Murawiec, 
The Mind of Jihad (New York: Cambridge Universty Press, 2008); Sushant Sareen, The 
jihad factory: Pakistan's Islamic revolution in the making (New Delhi: Har-Anand 
Publications, 2005); Tamra Orr, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (New York: The Rosen Publishing 
Group, 2003); Hal Lindsey, The everlasting hatred: the roots of jihad (Murrieta, California: 
Oracle House Publishing, 2002); Adam Frederic Dorin, Jihad and American medicine: 
thinking like a terrorist to anticipate attacks via our health system (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger Security International, 2007); Ravi Zacharias, Light in the Shadow of Jihad: The 
Struggle for Truth (Multnomah Publishers, 2006); Andrew G. Bostom and Ibn Warraq, 
The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims (Amherst, New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2008); Robert Spencer, Stealth jihad: how radical Islam is subverting 
America without guns or bombs (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2008); Serge 
Trifkovic and Srdja Trifkovic, Defeating Jihad: How the War on Terror May Yet Be Won, in 
Spite of Ourselves (Boston, Massachusetts: Regina Orthodox Press, 2006); Devin R. 
Springer, James L. Regens and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009); Monte Palmer and Princess 
Palmer, At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadists, and America's War on Terrorism (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007); Gary R. Bunt, Islam in the digital age: 
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discourse as ‘Islamic fundamentalist terrorism’ and no more, no less. 
With titles such as Islamic terrorism: is there a Christian response?; Jihad: 
Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism; Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia; 
Terror in the mind of God: the global rise of religious violence; The Crisis of 
Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror; The historical roots of Islamic terrorism; 
The Justifications for Jihad, War and Revolution in Islam; The Legacy of Jihad: 
Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims; The shade of swords: jihad and 
the conflict between Islam and Christianity; Total terrorism in the name of 
Allah: the emergence of the new Islamic fundamentalists; Understanding Islamic 
terrorism: the Islamic doctrine of war; and Muhammad’s Monsters: A 
Comprehensive Guide to Radical Islam for Western Audiences, the rarefaction 
of the discourses of Islam as violence, terrorism as the new form of this 
old violence, and Islam as a Christian heresy began even before readers 
got to the first word of the text itself. 
 
As with the literature repeating the narrative of Islam versus the West, 
the output focusing on violent jihad was prolific; sometimes whole 
bodies of work contributed by one author over a short period of time. The 
work of American author Robert Spencer, stands out in this regard. 
Spencer began writing on the subject of ‘Islamic terrorism’ after the 11 
September 2001 attacks, and between then and 2009, published nine 
books, eleven monographs, and over three hundred articles on the 
subject.686 His Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades), which 
became a New York Times bestseller in 2005 recasts the War on Terror as 
                                                      
686 Robert Spencer, Islam unveiled: disturbing questions about the world's fastest-growing faith 
(San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002); Robert Spencer and Daniel Ali, Inside Islam: A 
Guide for Catholics (West Chester, Pennsylvania: Ascension Press, 2003); Robert Spencer, 
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D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2006); Robert Spencer, Religion of peace?: why Christianity is and 
Islam isn't (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2007); Robert Spencer, Stealth jihad: 
how radical Islam is subverting America without guns or bombs (Washington, D.C.: Regnery 
Publishing, 2008); Robert Spencer, The Complete Infidel's Guide to the Koran (Washington, 
D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2009). See “About Robert Spencer,” Jihad Watch, accessed 
August 12, 2009, http://www.jihadwatch.org/spencer. 
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‘the Crusade [the West] must fight’ and (re)introduces Mohammed as a 
‘Prophet of War’ while describing the Qur’an, as a ‘Book of War’687.  
Spencer followed this enormously successful publication with The Truth 
about Muhammad: Founder of the world’s most intolerant religion.688 This book 
too, made it to The New York Times bestseller list the following year.  
 
All Spencer’s books reiterated the idea of Islam as a religion of war, and 
mirrored the early Christian discourses of the religion as a heresy. His 
commentary was rarefied and validated through repetition across 
various media platforms in both the United States and abroad. By 2009 he 
had repeated the same narratives on broadcast television—appearing on 
CNN, FoxNews, PBS, MSNBC, CNBC, C-Span, France24 and Croatia 
National Televison (HTV)—and national and international radio 
programmes, including Bill O'Reilly's Radio Factor, The Laura Ingraham 
Show, Bill Bennett's Morning in America, Michael Savage's Savage Nation, 
The Sean Hannity Show, The Alan Colmes Show, The G. Gordon Liddy Show, 
The Neal Boortz Show, The Michael Medved Show, The Michael Reagan Show, 
The Rusty Humphries Show, The Larry Elder Show, The Barbara Simpson 
Show. He even spoke on Vatican Radio.689 Spencer’s print media 
contributions include weekly columns for conservative US publications 
Human Events and FrontPage Magazine.  
 
Spencer has also repeated these narratives in documentary form as Islam: 
what the West needs to know (2006), which uses passages from a variety of 
religious texts to prove the inherent violence of Islam and its ambitions to 
dominate the West. Spencer repeats the same narratives on a website, 
Jihad Watch690, dedicated to ‘correcting popular misconceptions’ about the 
Holy War against non-believers that he alleges Islam and the Qur’an calls 
                                                      
687 Robert Spencer, The politically incorrect guide to Islam (and the Crusades) (Washington, 
D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2005). 
688 Robert Spencer, The truth about Muhammad: founder of the world's most intolerant 
religion (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2006). 
689 Biographical details of Robert Spencer, listed on his website JihadWatch, accessed 
August 12, 2009, http://www.jihadwatch.org/spencer. 
690 Available at Jihad Watch, http://www.jihadwatch.org, accessed July 3, 2011. 
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for691. Spencer’s online contributions also include a weekly Qur’an 
commentary at the website, Blogging the Qur'an, which has been 
translated into Czech, Danish, German and Italian692. In addition to the 
rarefaction of Spencer’s narratives on these platforms, it was further 
rendered ‘true’ by being adopted into the official political discourse. 
Spencer has, for example, given seminars on Islam and Jihad for the 
United States Central Command, United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, the U.S. Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group, the 
FBI, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the U.S. intelligence 
community.693 
 
A further measure of the degree of positivity the term jihad achieved as 
‘Islamic suicidal terrorism’ can also be seen in many works of highly 
popular fiction published in the United States during this period694. Some 
of the most notable contributions to this collection of ‘jihadi fiction’ was 
made by novelist Joel Rosenberg who wrote a ‘political thriller’, The Last 
Jihad695, which begins in the cockpit of an aeroplane hijacked by Muslim 
terrorists about to attack an American city. As the story unfolds, the 
United States goes to war against Iraq over weapons of mass destruction. 
The story was written nine months before 11 September 2001 and 
published four months before the United States invaded Iraq in March 
2003. Hailed as a modern Nostradamus and latter-day prophet for his 
‘uncanny intuition’, Rosenberg spent most of the last six years on the The 
New York Times bestseller list producing four more books in ‘the Jihad 
                                                      
691 See “Why Jihad Watch?,” Jihad Watch, accessed August 12, 2009, 
http://www.jihadwatch.org/why-jihad-watch.html. 
692 For the blogs, see “Qur’an Commentary,” Jihad Watch, accessed August 12, 2009, 
http://www.jihadwatch.org/articles/bloggingtheq.php. 
693 Ibid 
694 Bruce Herschensohn, Above Empyrean: A Novel of the Final Days of the War on Islamic 
Terrorism (New York: Beaufort Books, 2008); Warren A. White, All Knights of the 
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695 Joel C. Rosenberg, The Last Jihad (New York: Forge, 2002). 
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series.’696 Based on the ‘expertise’ Rosenberg had acquired as a writer of 
‘jihad fiction’, he has since worked as a communications advisor to 
political leaders in the United States and Israel. He has also branched into 
writing non-fiction works on the subject of jihad, which are accompanied 
by study aids and are clearly intended to increase the knowledge of 
‘Islamic jihad’ among readers697.  
 
Return of the Barbary captivity narratives 
Within the literature published on the subject of terrorism during this 
period is a specific genre—biographical narratives of apostate Muslims 
who had renounced their faith in the religion and lived to tell the tale of 
its many inherent savageries. Like the Barbary captivity narratives of the 
eighteenth century, they provide anecdotal accounts of life lived under 
the cruelty of Islam. And, as the Barbary narratives grounded the 
discourse of Islam as a Christian heresy in ‘truth’, these ex-Muslim 
narratives put the politico-religious discourse of Islamic terrorism ‘in the 
true’. 
 
One of the most prolific contributors to ‘Islamic terrorism’ literature 
whose publications are promoted as being endowed with rare insight due 
to the author’s status as an apostate Muslim is Mark A Gabriel. A 
doctoral graduate of Egypt’s Al-Azhar University, the author began his 
contributions just a few months after 11 September 2001 by asking ‘Why 
do Islamic terrorists do what they do?’698 He has since analysed the 
                                                      
696 Joel C. Rosenberg, The Ezekiel Option (Carol Stream, Illinois: Tyndale House 
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‘unfinished battle’ between ‘Islam and the Jews’699; compared ‘profound 
differences and surprising similarities’ between Muhammad and Jesus700; 
made a ‘journey into the mind of an Islamic terrorist’ to find out why 
they hate the West701; and shed light on the ‘mysterious attitudes of the 
Muslim world’ which makes it reject noble western/American ideals of 
equality and freedom702.  
 
What is most emphatically stressed in the material promoting his work, is 
his ‘unique background’ of being an ‘ex-Muslim’, which is said to allow 
him access to the mindset of the Islamic terrorist in ways that ‘most 
westerners are unable to understand’703. He ‘spent his entire childhood in 
Muslim schools’, but ‘after his conversion to Christianity, his family 
disowned him, and tried several times to kill him. He escaped his Muslim 
homeland and eventually settled in the United States, where he chose a 
Christian name to reflect his new life in Christ’.704 The cruelty that Islam 
inflicted on him is what gave him such unfettered entry into the United 
                                                      
699 Mark A. Gabriel, Islam and the Jews: the unfinished battle (Lake Mary, Florida: Charisma 
House, 2003). 
700 Mark A. Gabriel, Jesus and Muhammad: profound differences and surprising 
similarities (Lake Mary, Florida: Charisma House, 2004). 
701 Mark A. Gabriel, Journey into the mind of an Islamic terrorist: Why They Hate Us 
and How We Can Change Their Minds (Lake Mary, Florida: Charisma House, 2006). 
702 Mark A. Gabriel, Culture Clash, (Lake Mary, Florida: Charisma House, 2007).  
703 These introductions to the work by Mark A. Gabriel, Journey into the Mind of an Islamic 
Terrorist: Why They Hate Us and How We Can Change Their Minds (Lake Mary, Florida: 
Charisma House, 2006), are publicity material provided by the publisher and 
booksellers. See online bookstore Flipkart.com, accessed July 31, 2009, 
http://www.flipkart.com/journey-into-mind-islamic-terrorist/1591857139-5sx3fe92db. 
It is also interesting to note here that in the year 2008, with the dexterity of authorship 
not uncommon among such experts in ‘Islamic terrorism’ and Jihad, Dr Gabriel took to 
writing fiction where an increasingly disillusioned Muslim has coffee with the Muslim 
prophet Muhammad in Mecca. See Mark A. Gabriel, Coffee with the Prophet: A 21st 
Century Encounter with the Prophet of Islam (Casselberry, Florida: Gabriel Publishing, 
2008).  
704 From the introduction to Gabriel provided by specialised Christian book review 
website, Christian Book Previews. For the biography of Dr Gabriel see “Mark A. 
Gabriel,” Christian Book Previews, accessed July 31, 2009, 
http://www.christianbookpreviews.com/christian-book-author.php?isbn=1591852919. 
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States terrorism discourse more than his education at Al-Azhar. This is 
evident from ex-Muslims who have found themselves welcomed into the 
discourse as ‘experts’ with no other qualifications to speak Islam or 
terrorism apart from having once been a follower/victim/perpetrator of 
the violence that is Islam. 
 
Another prominent example of this type of author is Walid Shoebat, a 
software engineer by profession who has contributed three popular 
books so far to United States terrorism knowledge since 11 September 
2001. One of them, a memoir, Why I left Jihad: The Root of Terrorism and the 
Return of Radical Islam was a bestseller in the United States. The cover of 
the book proclaims in bold writing: ‘By Ex-Muslim Terrorist Walid 
Shoebat’705. According to his biographical narrative, he had been a 
‘radicalised Muslim willing to die for the cause of Jihad until [he] 
converted to Christianity in 1994’706. He was involved in ‘terror activity’ 
with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, and had even planted ‘a 
bomb in Bethlehem […] which for the grace of God, did not injure 
anyone’. After chronicling further ‘terror activities’ with Muslims in the 
United States itself where he had emigrated in 1978, he concludes his 
introduction thus:  
 
I state the above so you know […] my background and firsthand 
knowledge of the issue. I speak to the American people to warn and educate 
them about the very great dangers which are very underplayed both by our 
media and our political leaders. [emphasis added] 
Now that you have brief details of my background, I would like to offer my 
expert opinion, if you can call me an expert - but perhaps an experienced 
former terrorist would be more appropriate. 
 
                                                      
705 Walid Shoebat, Why I left Jihad: the root of terrorism and the rise of Islam (Lafayette, 
Indiana: Top Executive Media, 2005). 
706 “Biography of Walid Shoebat,” Walid Shoebat’s Official Website, accessed July 15, 
2011, http://www.shoebat.com/bio.php. 
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Among the universities that have sought the ‘expert opinion’ of Shoebat 
are Harvard Law School707, Columbia University708, Concordia 
University, University of California, University of Southern California, 
University of Georgia, and Washington University. He has also spoken at 
various state institutions including Capitol Hill, and has made multiple 
appearances in the media in the United States and abroad as an expert on 
Islamic terrorism709. The authenticity of the personal narrative, upon 
which Shoebat’s ‘expert opinion’ is based has since been called into 
question by many sources710, but he continues to be among the experts 
favoured by US government institutions to provide terrorism education 
to law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials in the United States711.  
 
                                                      
707 For a video of Wald Shoebat’s lecture at Harvard in May 2009, see “Walid Shoebat 
presentation at UCLA Royce Hall,” MeFeedia, May 2009, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.mefeedia.com/watch/29481448. 
708 Shoebat’s lecture at Columbia University in October 2006 attracted controversy when 
the University changed it from a lecture open to the public to an invite-only event 
shortly before the lecture was due to begin. There is no record of the lecture on the 
Columbia University website, but a video of the lecture is available on YouTube. His 
own experience as a ‘jihadi’ forms the nucleus of his ‘expert opinion’. “Walid Shoebat, 
Ex Jihadi Columbia University,” YouTube video, 9:53, posted by “Atlasshrugs2000,” 
October 11, 2006, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CoMq5HYMpZQ. 
709 Shoebat has appeared on, amongst others, CNN, CNN International, FOX News, ITN, 
RTE, NBC, CBS, and ABC. He has also been featured on BBC Radio 4 and 5. See 
Shoebat’s biography: “Biography of Walid Shoebat,” Walid Shoebat’s Official Website, 
accessed July 15, 2011, http://www.shoebat.com/bio.php. 
710 Omar Sacirbey, “Skeptics challenge life stories offered by high-profile Muslim 
converts to Christianity,” The Washington Post, June 26, 2010, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062504435.html; See full report: Thomas 
Cincotta, “Manufacturing the Muslim menace: private firms, public servants, and the 
threat to rights and security,” Political Research Associates, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.publiceye.org/liberty/training/Muslim_Menace_Complete.pdf. 
711 In October 2010, for example, he was the key speaker at a counter-terrorism training 
programme in Las Vegas, and was hired for the job despite various reports having been 
published at the time that questioned the authenticity of his ‘personal narrative’ (see 
note above).  
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Christians in cruel Muslim hands 
In addition to the enunciative value accorded to apostate Muslims who 
also claim to be ex-terrorists such as Ergun Carner and Walid Shoebat, 
the United States terrorism discourse of this epoch also regarded as high-
value knowledge stories told by Christians who—like the white slaves 
taken captive by North Africans in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries—suffered at the hands of cruel Muslims. The discursive 
practices of Brigitte Gabriel, a Christian from Lebanon, stand out in this 
particular stream of the present day Barbary narratives. The cover of her 
first book, Because they hate: a survivor of Islamic terror warns America 
(2005), introduces her to potential readers thus: 
 
Brigitte Gabriel lost her childhood to militant Islam. In 1975 she was ten 
years old and living in Southern Lebanon when militant Muslims from 
throughout the Middle East poured into her country and declared jihad 
against the Lebanese Christians. Lebanon was the only Christian influenced 
country in the Middle East, and the Lebanese Civil War was the first front 
in what has become the worldwide jihad of fundamentalist Islam against 
non-Muslim peoples. For seven years, Brigitte and her parents lived in an 
underground bomb shelter. They had no running water or electricity and 
very little food; at times they were reduced to boiling grass to survive712. 
 
Gabriel’s book, which publisher St Martin asks readers to interpret not 
simply as a memoir but also as a ‘political wake-up call’, made it on to the 
New York Times bestseller list713 and, according to the second edition 
published in 2008, was required reading for Navy SEALS dispatched to 
the Middle East, and was also put on the official reading list at the FBI 
Academy.714  
 
                                                      
712 Back Cover of Brigitte Gabriel, Because they hate: a survivor of Islamic terror warns 
America (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2005). 
713 "Number 12: Because They Hate,” The New York Times Hardcover Bestseller List, 
The New York Times, November 17, 2006, accessed July 31, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/17/books/16blog-
polibooks.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
714 Brigitte Gabriel, Because They Hate: A survivor of Islamic Terror warns America, 2nd ed. 
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 2008). 
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Like Shoebat, Gabriel had no prior knowledge of Islamic teachings except 
for personal experiences with ‘Islamic terrorists’, the former as a terrorist 
and the latter as a victim of terrorists. Like Shoebat’s personal narrative, 
Gabriel’s story too has been called into question. She has claimed that the 
seven years she spent in the bomb shelter, between 1975-1982, was due to 
terror by the Hizbullah group. The Hizbullah group, which is listed as a 
terrorist organisation in the United States, was formed in 1982, as pointed 
out by Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly715. Despite the factual 
inaccuracies, Gabriel’s enunciative role and authority in grounding the 
United States terrorism discourse in truth has increased with time. In 
2008 she published a second book, They Must be stopped: why we must 
defeat radical Islam and how we can do it716, graduating from personal 
narrative—on the basis of the personal narrative—to become a policy 
advisor on counter-terrorism.  
 
The discursive practices of Gabriel, too, repeat narratives that already 
exist in American society around Orientalism and American 
Exceptionalism. In Because they hate, for example, she speaks of the United 
States in the same terms as President Bush, praising its ‘greatness’ as a 
nation and repeats Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a clash of 
civilisations717. Her lectures are commentaries on what has already been 
said not just by her, but by many over the years. While she too repeated 
the ‘Mohammed is a terrorist’ narrative, she paid more attention to the 
Arab-barbarian narrative. In a lecture at Duke University on 14 October 
2004, for example, she said: 
 
                                                      
715 Franklin Lamb, “Lost from Lebanon,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/887/focus.htm. 
716 Brigette Gabriel, They must be stopped: why we must defeat radical Islam and How 
we can do it (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2008). 
717 Brigitte Gabriel, Because they hate: a survivor of Islamic terror warns America (New York: 
St Martin’s Press, 2005), 186. 
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The difference between the Arabic world and Israel is a difference in values 
and character. It's barbarism versus civilization. It's democracy versus 
dictatorship. It's goodness versus evil718. 
 
Like other members of this group of authors, Gabriel, too, appears often 
on American media, and has founded an organisation called ACT! For 
America,719a nationwide network that aims to ‘more effectively inform, 
educate and mobilise Americans regarding the multiple threats of radical 
Islam’ and ‘arm activists with the information to get involved and take 
effective action.’720 That is to say, provide the truth: ‘true’ knowledge of 
‘Islamic terrorism’, according to which action can be taken against the 
threat. Its vision is a ‘citizen action network’ that: ‘aggressively promotes 
and implements educational programs that teach and enable citizen 
participation in the defense of America on the community, city, state, and 
national level’721 [own emphasis]. The ultimate goal of the organisation is 
not only to bend the truth of ‘Islamic terrorism’ to the will to knowledge 
with the support of pedagogical institutions, but to become such an 
institution spread nationwide that not just produces but also performs 
the veridicative and judicative functions of the discourse.   
 
The most celebrated ex-Muslim authors allowed into terrorism discourse 
is Ayaan Hirsi Ali, whose 2007 memoir, Infidel, was a New York Times 
Bestseller722. Hirsi Ali’s apostate narrative is different from others 
discussed above in that her entry was not solely based on a conversion to 
                                                      
718 Brigitte Gabriel, Speech delivered at Duke University, October 14, 2004. The co-
ordinators of the concert, Freeman Centre for Jewish Life, later apologised for her 
speech in the University Newspaper. See “Rally conveyed anti-terror message,” The 
Chronicle, October 18, 2008, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.chronicle.duke.edu/article/rally-conveyed-anti-terror-message. 
719 ACT stands for American Congress for Truth. 
720 Act! For America, “About ACT! for America,” accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.actforamerica.org/index.php/learn/about-act-for-america. 
721 Ibid. 
722 “The New York Times Bestseller List,” The New York Times, accessed July 14, 2011, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904EEDA133EF937A35750C0A9619
C8B63&scp=12&sq=Hirsi+Ali&st=nyt. Infidel was first published in Dutch as Mijn 
Vrijheid (My Freedom) in 2006. 
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Christianity in the distant past nor founded on claims of either having 
suffered at the hands of ‘Muslim terrorists’ or on having been a past 
perpetrator of such terror. As a Somali who successfully sought asylum 
in the Netherlands, neither did Hirsi Ali have the prior connection to the 
‘Arab world’ that most other apostate Muslim narrators with enunciative 
authority in present terrorism discourse do. She did not flee the 
Arab/Muslim barbarian but a ‘backward’ and barbaric religion that 
treated all its women with inhuman cruelty. 
 
Furthermore, unlike the others, Ali renounced Islam after 11 September 
2001, as a result of doubts, she has said, that arose directly from 
discovering the close connections between Osama bin Laden’s words and 
that of the Qur’an. One of the crucial differences in Hirsi Ali’s personal 
narrative and that of other apostate Muslims is that the terrorism she 
knew at firsthand, having been forced to live under the threat of murder 
issued by Evildoers in 2004, was that of the ‘new’ evil variety and not that 
practised by the ordinary, relatively decent, terrorists of past epochs723. 
Hirsi Ali’s narrative is also different in that she did not renounce Islam 
for Christianity as the other narrators discussed in this Chapter, but for 
atheism.  
 
Like all the others, however, Ali has been a vocal critic of Islam and has 
repeated the same narratives of Islam’s inherent violence, the perversity 
and brutality of Mohammed, and also the difference between the 
‘backward’ culture of Islamic states when compared with those of the 
West. She is a particularly outspoken champion of ‘Enlightenment 
values’, and was described by right-wing Danish magazine Sappho as ‘a 
genuinely European intellectual of the kind that is becoming increasingly 
                                                      
723 In August 2004, a movie written by Hirsi Ali and created by Dutch filmmaker 
Theodore Van Gogh, Submission, a movie detailing violence against women is some 
Islamic societies. A new terrorist, an Evildoer – an Arab/Muslim ‘fanatic’ from Morocco 
- killed Van Gogh on November 2, 2004, and threatened to do the same to Hirsi Ali. 
When her memoir, Infidel, was first published in Holland as Mijn Vrijheid (My Freedom) 
in 2006, she was a member of the Dutch Parliament. The first print of the book sold out 
in two days. 
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rare as our home-grown cultural personalities and leaders are busily 
discarding our intellectual heritage.’724 The transformation in the orders 
of terrorism discourse in the twenty-first century has been such that Hirsi 
Ali has been described as a ‘freedom fighter’725 without any apparent 
irony or even recognition of how this had once been how political rebels 
who used violence in pursuit of their goals referred to themselves. 
‘Terrorists’ was the label used to describe the very same ‘freedom 
fighters’ by the political power they were fighting against.  
 
In Western discourse, there has been very little criticism of Hirsi Ali’s 
statements equating Islam and barbarism, or any other old Western 
narratives about Islam she has reanimated as ‘new’ in the context of the 
present terrorism discourse726. The accolades for ‘freedom fighter’ Hirsi 
Ali, however, have appeared freely and plentifully. She has received 
twelve awards from various European and American societies and 
institutions since 2004 in various categories ranging from awards for 
freedom of expression, emancipation and tolerance, to democracy. One 
award, received in Germany, was specifically for her courage in 
criticising Islam727.  
 
Infidel, her ghost-written memoir, received the Ansifield-Wolf Book 
Award in America on 11 September 2008, the seventh anniversary of Al-
Qaeda’s attacks on the United States. Anisfield-Wolf also commended her 
                                                      
724 Helle Merete Brix and Lars Hedegaard, “Interview with Ayaan Hirsi Ali,” Sappho, 
November 23, 2005, accessed July 28, 2011, 
http://www.sappho.dk/Den%20loebende/hirsi_english.htm. 
725 Patt Morrison, “Feminism’s freedom fighter,” Los Angeles Times, October 17, 2009, 
accessed July 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/opinion/oe-
morrison17. 
726 Nicholas D. Kristoff, “The Gadfly,” The New York Times, May 28, 2010, accessed 
October 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/books/review/Kristof-
t.html?ref=review&pagewanted=all; Cristina Odone, “Ayaan Hirsi Ali reminds me of 
Richard Dawkins – obsessive and simplistic,” The Telegraph, June 6, 2010, accessed July 7, 
2011, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/cristinaodone/100042349/ayaan-hirsi-ali-
reminds-me-of-richard-dawkins-–-obsessive-and-simplistic.  
727 “Literatur: Auszeichnung für Islamkritikerin Ali,” Zeit Online, October 10, 2006, 
accessed July 14, 2011, http://www.zeit.de/news/artikel/2006/10/01/75756.xml. 
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as ‘a leader in the campaign to reform Islam.’728 She was also named  one 
of the 100 Most Influential Persons of the World in 2005 by Time 
Magazine729. All these institutional honours bestowed on Hirsi Ali as an 
apostate Muslim who spoke out against the ‘truth’ of Islam’s cruelty, 
provided her with a high level of enunciative authority in contemporary 
terrorism discourse. They also form part of the prodigious machinery of 
the will to truth that produced the ‘true’ knowledge of terrorism as an 
evil committed by barbaric Muslims waging a Holy War against the 
Western civilisation. 
 
In all the ex-Muslim narratives the authors are portrayed as being held 
captive by Islam—they  are trapped in a life of barbarism or fear; they are 
forced to follow ‘backward traditions’ such as female genital mutilation, 
arranged marriages, or live in fear of losing of their lives to an ‘honour 
killing’. Hirsi Ali said that ‘to submit to the book [Qur’an] is to exist in 
their [Muslims’] hell’730 and asserted that she stopped being a Muslim 
when she lost her ‘fear of the Holy Book’. Or they grow up within the 
confines of a community of fear, a ‘jihadi environment’ in Turkey or a 
bomb shelter in South Lebanon trapped underground, groomed, 
recruited and watched over by Islamic terrorists.  
 
The telling of these narratives is, in fact, a re-telling of the centuries old 
Barbary captivity narratives where evil, demonic Arab Muslims caught 
the civilised man of superior Christian beliefs and intellectual abilities in 
their traps and treated them with barbaric and inhumane cruelty. Islam, 
in these narratives of the old and the new, enslaves its followers; 
followers of Islam hate freedom. Renouncing Islam is seen as a form of 
                                                      
728 “Ayaan Hirsi Ali: Infidel,” Anisfield-Wold Book Awards, accessed July 14, 2011, 
http://www.anisfield-wolf.org/Winners/Biography.aspx?id=958. 
729 “The 2005 Time 100: the lives and ideas of the world’s most influential people,” Time, 
accessed July 15, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,1972656,00.html. 
730 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “To submit to the book is to exist in their hell,” The Sydney Morning 
Herald, June 4, 2007, accessed July 14, 2011, 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/to-submit-to-the-book-is-to-exist-in-their-
hell/2007/06/03/1180809336515.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1. 
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liberation and waging war against ‘Islamic governments’ is seen as 
delivering liberation for the people. Hirsi Ali’s second book to be 
published in the English Language, Caged Virgin: A Muslim Woman’s Cry 
for Reason (also published as The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation 
proclamation for Women and Islam)731, embodies both this captivity 
narrative as well as the unreason of Islam. This division between Islam 
and reason is another characteristic in Hirsi Ali’s narrative that provided 
her with the enunciative authority to enter into the present terrorism 
discourse. Hirsi Ali has often spoken of her renouncement of Islam for 
atheism as a departure from unreason to the enlightenment of reason. She 
describes the ‘journey’ as taking her ‘from the world of faith to the world 
of reason’732 In this narrative, Islam itself is unreason. This perceived 
incompatibility between Islam and reason is a strong presence in present-
day terrorism discourse, and is one of the main ways in which the 
knowledge of terrorism as an evil committed by fanatical Muslims has 
been validated as true. 
The madness of Osama bin Laden 
The division between reason and folly is one of the most prominent 
forms of external control imposed on discourse. This division and 
rejection work to control and shape the production of discourse by 
excluding what is accepted as reason and rejecting that seen as unreason.  
 
Since the depths of the Middle Ages, the madman has been the one whose 
discourse cannot have the same currency as others. His words maybe 
considered null and void, having neither truth nor importance, worthless 
as evidence in law, inadmissible in the authentification of deeds or 
contracts, incapable even of bringing about the trans-substantiation of 
bread into body at Mass.733 
                                                      
731 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, The Caged Virgin: A Muslim Woman’s Cry for Reason (Simon and 
Schuster, 2006). 
732 Ayaan Hirsi Ali, quoted in Wlliam Grimes, “No rest for a feminist fighting radical 
Islam,” The New York Times, February 14, 2007, accessed July 14, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/books/14grim.html. 
733 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the text: a poststructuralist 
reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 53. 
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The madness of the terrorist has been a crucial aspect of terrorism 
discourse since before it emerged with the French Revolution. It was 
present in the historical a priori of the terrorist, in the Devil who was 
unreason personified. While it must be kept in mind that the discourse of 
terrorism emerged from reason, the separation of religion from politics, 
and from the washing away of sin from the discourse of rebellion, it must 
also be recalled that the pathologisation of the secular rebel began shortly 
after his emergence with the French Revolution. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, it began with the new knowledges of physiognomy and 
phrenology in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and 
continued in new ways with the psychiatric analyses of the rebel which 
began in earnest in the 1960s. The presence of unreason as a characteristic 
of the rebel has meant that the discourses of terrorists themselves have 
been rarely included in the ‘true’ knowledge of discourse, and is rarely 
analysed within the field of Terrorism Studies.734 This continued to be the 
case in the present terrorism discourse despite the fact that Osama bin 
Laden’s textual and vocal output was greater in volume than any other 
terrorist figures that have appeared in Western terrorism discourse to 
date. 
 
Bin Laden and his group, al Qaeda, had systematically communicated 
their messages to a worldwide audience since 1994, condemning United 
States military presence in Saudi Arabia, the international sanctions 
                                                      
734 Norman Hampson, The life and opinions of Maximilien Robespierre (London: Duckworth, 
1974); Mikhail A. Bakunin, God and the State (New York: Modern Publishers, 1946); 
Mikhail A. Bakunin and Sam Dolgoff, Bakunin on Anarchism, ed. Sam Dolgoff (New 
York: A. A. Knopf, 1972); Mikhail A. Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, ed. Marshall Shatz 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mikhail A. Bakunin, The basic 
Bakunin: writings, 1869-1871, ed. Robert M. Cutler, trans. Robert M. Cutler (New York: 
Prometheus, 1992); Norman Hampson, The life and opinions of Maximilien Robespierre 
(London: Duckworth, 1974). 
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regime on Iraq in the 1990s, and United States support for Israel.735 Only a 
month before the 11 September 2001 attacks, bin Laden proclaimed: 
 
I swear by Almighty God who raised the heavens without pillars that 
neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy 
security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the 
infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad.736  
 
Yet, President Bush’s speeches in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, and 
other publications speaking for bin Laden, continued to deny him a 
rational motive either political or religious: ‘There's no religious 
justification, there's no political justification.  The only motivation is 
evil’737. When the United States attacked Afghanistan, Bush described it 
as ‘paying the price’ for the Taliban’s unreason in not meeting the 
‘reasonable demands’ made of it by the United States738. 
 
Bin Laden’s frequent and strong protestations of his faith in Islam, for 
example, were mostly disregarded in contemporary ‘terrorism’ discourse. 
Bin Laden was a false-Muslim, the progeny of the false-prophet 
Mohammed. His beliefs were only allowed into terrorism discourse to 
emphasise the extremities of his belief, its fanatic nature, and therefore, 
the madness that lay behind his proclaimed rationale for his actions. This 
prohibition or method of controlling the discursive formation of the 
‘Evildoer’ was not restricted to the official political discourse, but 
                                                      
735 Christopher M. Blanchard, “CRS Report for Congress, Al Qaeda: Statements and 
evolving ideology,” Library of Congress, January 26, 2006, accessed June 12, 2011, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf, 6. 
736 Osama Bin Laden, “Bin Laden’s warning: full text,” BBC News, October 7, 2001, 
accessed July 14, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1585636.stm. 
737 George W. Bush, “International campaign against terror grows,” The George Bush 
Archive, The White House, September 25, 2001, accessed February 24, 2010, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-
4.html. 
738 George W. Bush, “President Bush calls for action on the economy and energy,” The 
George Bush Archive, The White House, October 26, 2001, accessed July 14, 2011, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011026-
9.html. 
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extended to all sites from which terrorism was spoken, and is prominent 
in the literature included in this analysis.  
 
Before the end of the year 2010, close to a hundred books were published 
in the English language with Osama bin Laden’s name in the title739. They 
comprise biographies, psychological studies, and oral histories that make 
claims to knowing the man, and to revealing the ‘truth’ about him. 
Psychiatrist Peter Olsson, for example, provides an analysis of Bin Laden 
and his magnetism for Muslim youths in The Cult of Osama: 
psychoanalysing Bin Laden and his magnetism for Muslim Youth. Without 
ever having met the ‘patient’, Olsson diagnoses Osama with narcissism, 
traces the roots of his narcissistic rage to his childhood, and identifies a 
‘peculiar and profoundly important synchrony of shared trauma between 
bin Laden and the youths’ that he motivates to engage in suicide 
missions.740  
 
Olsson describes Osama as having ‘dark epiphanies’ and the power to 
lead young men like the Pied Piper did rats. On these occasions, when 
Osama’s words are accepted into discourse, it is in a highly selective 
manner, not dissimilar to the way in which the words of madmen were 
treated in the Europe of the Middle Ages. On the one hand it fell on deaf 
ears or was wholly rejected as folly,  
 
[o]n the other hand, strange powers not held by any other maybe attributed 
to the madman’s speech: the power of uttering a hidden truth, of telling the 
future, of seeing in all naivety what others’ wisdom cannot perceive. It is 
curious to note that for centuries in Europe the speech of the madman was 
either not heard or else taken for the word of truth. It either fell into the 
void, being rejected as soon as it was proffered, or else people deciphered 
                                                      
739 Based on a search of books with ‘Osama bin Laden’ in the title, written in English, 
and published after September 11, 2001 in the catalogue of Internet bookstore, Amazon. 
The search yielded a total of 83 books. Accessed at http://www.amazon.com on June 
16, 2010.  
740 Peter A. Olsson, The Cult of Osama: psychoanalysing bin Laden and his magnetism 
for Muslim youths (Michigan: Praeger Security International, 2008). 
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in it a rationality, naïve or crafty, which they regarded as more rational 
than that of the sane741. 
 
And, like the madman of the Middle Ages who was only symbolically 
allowed to speak in the theatre where he played the role of ‘the truth in a 
mask’742, on occasions when Osama’s words are included in the 
discourse, more often than not, others speak for him. In Growing up Bin 
Laden, penned by Western journalist Jean Sasson, one of Osama’s wives, 
Najwa, and their fourth son, Omar, tells the ‘astonishing story of the man 
they knew—or thought they knew’ and reveals the ‘closely guarded 
secrets’ of his private life ‘in their own words’743.  
 
On the rare occasions when Osama’s words do get included in the 
discourse as a voice of reason rather than that of unreason, it still needs to 
conform to machinery of the will to truth. The texts need introductions, 
editorial stances and annotations. A collection of Osama bin Laden’s 
Messages to the world744, for instance, highlights that bin Laden’s ‘own 
writings have been curiously absent from analysis of the “war on terror”’, 
and provides a collection of them from 1994 onwards. Editorial 
commentary and extensive annotation relating the texts to the Qur’an 
and other material by ‘Islamic scholar Bruce Lawrence’ then places bin 
Laden’s words ‘in their religious, historical and political context’745. The 
book is promoted to potential audiences as supplying ‘evidence crucial to 
an understanding of the bizarre mix of Quranic scholarship, CIA training, 
punctual interventions in Gulf politics and messianic anti-imperialism 
                                                      
741 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the text: a poststructuralist 
reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 53. 
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744 Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the world: the statements of Osama bin Laden 
(London: Verso Books, 2005). 
745 Publicity material for book by publisher. See: Verso Books, “Messages to the World: 
The Statements of Osama Bin Laden,” accessed July 14, 2011, 
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that has formed the programmatic core of Al Qaeda.’746 A later text, 
Through our enemies’ eyes747, written by Michael Scheuer a former director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Bin Laden Unit treats Bin Laden’s 
words as rational. His purpose is to warn of the greater danger that lies in 
not seeing the rationality behind Bin Laden’s Islamic terrorism. The book 
is promoted by Potomac Books, the publisher, as ‘the one book to read in 
order to truly understand the reasons why Osama bin Laden and 
followers have declared war on America and the West.’748 [own 
emphasis] 
 
The twenty-first century disputatio 
Starting from the test found in Homer’s Iliad, Western civilisation has had 
several methods of establishing the truth that belonged to particular 
epochs749. The current system of establishing the truth through enquiry 
emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, replacing Homer’s test. 
The above analysis shows that the production of ‘true’ knowledge about 
the Evildoer reanimated major narratives and discursive practices that 
were constructed around, and constituted, the discourse of the Devil in 
the Middle Ages. In many ways, establishing the truth about the Evildoer 
involved reactivation of not just these discursive practices, but also older 
methods of establishing the truth, such as the disputatio. The disputatio 
was a confrontation between two adversaries in which both used the 
verbal weapon, rhetorical procedures and demonstrations based on the 
appeal to authority for establishing the truth of their statements. In the 
disputatio, ‘the more authors one of the participants had on their side, the 
                                                      
746 Ibid. 
747 Michael Scheuer, Through our enemies’ eyes: Osama bin Laden, radical Islam and the 
future of America (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2005). 
748 Publisher’s description of the book on website Potomac Books, “Through Our 
Enemies' Eyes,” accessed July 14, 2011, 
http://www.potomacbooksinc.com/Books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=123914. 
749 Michel Foucault, Power: Essential works of Michel Foucault, ed. James D. Faubion, vol. 3, 
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more evidence of authority, strength and gravity he could invoke, the 
greater were his chances of winning.’750  
 
As mentioned previously, more books with the word ‘terrorism’ in the 
title have been published in the twenty-first century than the combined 
total of all such books prior to that. Over half of these were on the subject 
of ‘Islamic terrorism’. The sheer volume of such texts published, without 
even taking into consideration their contents, contributed to rendering as 
‘true’ the existence of the phenomenon they publicised. Such an increase 
in the literature on the subject of Islamic terrorism was made possible not 
just by the inclusion of personal narratives from various people attesting 
to the ‘truth’ of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in the discourse, but also by an overall 
relaxation of usually strict enunciative rules and regulations governing 
discursive production.  
 
Rules governing discourses mean that none shall generally contribute to a 
particular discourse if they do not satisfy certain requirements or if they 
are not, from the outset, in some way qualified to do so. That is, ‘not all 
regions of discourse are equally open and penetrable; some of them are 
largely forbidden (they are differentiated and differentiating), while 
others seem to be almost open to all winds and put at the disposal of 
every speaking subject without prior restrictions.’751 Whereas previously 
the field of terrorism studies, as well as theology and Islamic studies 
appear to have been closed discourses where only specialists were 
allowed in, in the decade following 11 September 2001, it appears to have 
taken on the form of a discourse ‘open to all winds.’752 This becomes clear 
from the eclectic mix of authors allowed into American terrorism 
discourse during this period. 
 
Andrew Bostom, a Professor of Medicine at Brown University, for 
instance, examines ‘the fate of non-Muslims’ faced with ‘the legacy of 
                                                      
750 Ibid., 51. 
751 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Untying the text: a poststructuralist 
reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 61-62. 
752 Ibid. 
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Jihad’ by analysing Islamic literature on Jihad translated previously by 
others753. Adam Dorin, an ex-army anaesthesiologist, prepared the 
American public for a possible attack on the United States through its 
health system by advising them on how to anticipate such an attack by 
‘thinking like a terrorist’754. Furthermore, a ‘comprehensive history of the 
terrorist organisations waging war in the twenty-first century’ is 
provided by Tamara Orr, a ‘children’s author’ and ‘homeschooling 
expert’. Islamic Jihad in Egypt (2003), which promises ‘an invaluable 
glimpse into the inner workings of the world’s most shadowy armies’755 is 
only one in Orr’s oeuvre of over 200 books covering many fields of 
expertise including liver cancer756, Greek mythology757, Avian flu758  and 
date rape759 to name but a few. Another children’s author who provided 
insight into the new enemy is  Patricia D Netzley, ‘a freelance writer who 
has published nonfiction for children, young adults, and adults’760, who 
turned her highly adaptable expertise to the subject of ‘terrorism’ a few 
years after 11 September 2001, and published an encyclopaedia on the 
subject761. Previously her expertise had included witchcraft762, UFOs763, 
unicorns764 and alien abductions765. 
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Contributions were also made to the terrorism literature by physicist 
David Jonsson who first explores the ‘clash of ideologies’ between Islam 
and Christianity766 and later warns of an Islamist strategy for ‘achieving 
world domination’ and ‘Islamisation of the West’ by ‘controlling 
currency, oil resources, free trade zones, transportation media and 
financial markets’767. Jonsson had learnt ‘the basic tenants of Islam as a 
political, economic and religious system’ through work that ‘brought him 
to more that fifteen countries with significant or majority populations 
who are Muslim’. He also became ‘proficient in Islamic law (Shariah) 
through contract negotiation and personal encounter’768. Marketing and 
business development professional Ronald Cooke, on the other hand, 
suggested that ‘Islamic terrorism’ would be best understood through the 
connections between oil, Jihad and destiny.769  
 
The relaxation of the usually strict rules regarding the qualifications of 
the speaking subject which exclude them from entry into the discourse 
added hugely to the number of people speaking the ‘truth’ about 
terrorism. Added to this was the fact that in the aftermath of 11 
September 2001, the American public gained a substantial part of their 
knowledge of the Terrorist Barbarian from a media770 that was highly 
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patriotic, strongly propagandist and largely biased.771As the discussion 
above shows, the most popular authors in the United States during this 
period were those who repeated the same ‘truth’, and they were also the 
figures who spoke this ‘truth’ to large audiences across almost every 
media platform from television to print and radio to the Internet.  
Summary 
The ‘true’ knowledge of terrorism that emerged in twenty-first century 
America in which terrorism is an evil committed by Muslim/Arab 
barbarians who are waging a Holy War against the West is a ‘truth’ 
produced by a system of ordering the discourse according to the will to 
truth that permeated American society during this particular epoch. The 
descriptions of the terrorist as an Evildoer, and the representation of the 
War on Terror as a continuation of the eternal battle between Good and 
Evil made it possible—and were made possible by—the reactivation of 
old discursive practices that portrayed Islam as a Christian heresy and a 
false religion led by a false Prophet. American foundational narratives 
such as exceptionalism and the concept of manifest destiny connected 
with the discourses of Orientalism and medieval concepts of the Devil to 
rarefy the discourse of contemporary terrorism as an evil in the form of 
an Islamic Holy War against Western civilisation.  
 
Texts and knowledges that were not re-telling these narratives in new 
ways were excluded from the discourse according to arbitrary and 
historically contingent divisions created between true/false and 
reason/unreason. The mechanisms for establishing the truth about 
terrorism during this period also closely resembled the early medieval 
disputatio in which two sides purporting to speak the truth, using words 
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and rhetorical weapons, appealed not to evidence or rational enquiry to 
establish the truth, but to authority. The side that had the greatest chance 
of winning was the side that had the largest number of authors and could 
thus invoke the most evidence of authority, strength, and gravity. 
 
These ancient methods and practices of truth/knowledge production 
received tremendous support from American institutions of pedagogy 
that were thoroughly modern. In the context of the literature examined in 
this chapter, this is especially true for the publishing industry that not 
just welcomed, but aggressively promoted as the ‘real truth’ about 
‘Islamic terrorism’, authors with no connections to Islam other than once 
having been followers of the faith, members of an ‘Islamic terrorist 
organisation’ or victims of either or both. As discussed in this chapter, 
these publications recycled old narratives as ‘new’, and these old-new 
narratives were in turn remediated across television, radio and the 
Internet, further rarefying the discourse.  
 
An analysis of how a discourse is formed and rendered ‘true’ cannot, 
when employing the methods of Foucault, however, be reduced to texts 
and textuality alone. Indeed, Foucault warned against such a limitation 
urging that analysts throw off the sovereignty of the signifier and widen 
their scope of enquiry to fix text and rhetoric in the materiality of its 
practices. How the discourse of terrorism as an evil committed by false-
Muslim/Arab barbarians came to be regarded as the truth therefore also 
requires an examination of ‘the tactics whereby, on the basis of the 
descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which 
were thus released would be brought into play.’772 It is to this task that 
this study now turns. 
 
                                                      
772 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writing, 1972-1977, ed. 
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6. Inhuman, all too inhuman 
 
I convince myself each day that you guys are subhuman – agents of the Devil, so 
that I can do my job   
- US military guard to prisoner at Guàntanamo Bay773 
 
Twenty men, dressed in turquoise blue facemasks, orange ski caps and 
fluorescent orange jumpsuits stepped off a United States military plane at 
Guàntanamo Bay on 11 January 2002. Their feet were shackled and their 
hands were in manacles. Forty United States marines, Navy medical officers 
and security personnel all wearing facemasks and bulletproof vests met the 
men. American troops carrying grenade launchers and machine guns formed 
a security perimeter around the area. Each man was frisked by military 
personnel. Some resisted, fell to their knees, and were picked up by their 
necks. They were loaded onto a bus and then a ferry, which took them to 
Camp X-Ray where they were put into six by eight feet outdoor cages774. In 
the cage, every prisoner would be:  
 
constantly reminded of his low level of self-worth; unable to laugh and only be 
laughed at; unable to write or receive letters; unable to read; unable to choose 
when he sleeps, drinks or go to the bathroom; unable to move around freely; 
unable to practice his religion when he wants to; unable to feel like a human 
being; the only feeling he knows at camp x-ray is the hate he brought with 
him.775  
                                                      
773 A Guard at the Guàntanamo Bay prison in Cuba where ‘enemy combatants’ in the War on 
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In the first three years of the War on Terror a cumulative total of 50,000 
suspected ‘new terrorists’ were taken into United States custody. While a vast 
majority were captured and held in detention centres in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
many captives were held across the world in East Africa, Egypt, Gambia, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, South Africa, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
At different times, the United States had seventeen detention centres in Iraq 
and twenty-five in Afghanistan. At the biggest detention centre in Iraq, Abu 
Ghraib, the prison population amounted to 7000 in October 2003776. The 
‘worst of the worst’ of these prisoners were transported to Guàntanamo 
Bay777.  
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the ‘true’ knowledge of terrorism that 
emerged in the United States is that it is an evil committed by Muslim/Arab 
barbarians waging a Holy War against the West. The knowledge, as was seen 
in Chapter Five, was made possible by a system of rigorous exclusions that 
disqualified certain speech on the basis of various divisions and rejections 
while permitting others to be included. It was also made possible by 
reanimation and repetition in a myriad different ways of foundational 
narratives of early Christian and related American discursive practices in 
relation to Islam. The analysis also demonstrated how the figure of the Devil, 
to which this analysis traces the beginning of the history of the concept of 
contemporary terrorism, enabled the reanimation of not just these old 
narratives, but also old mechanisms for establishing the truth. If methods for 
establishing the truth and the exercise of power are constitutive of each other, 
                                                                                                                                                            
June 5, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1071284,00.html. For full 
text of the log, also published by Time, see “Interrogation log detainee 063,” Time, March 3, 
2006, accessed July 9, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf. 
776 James R. Schlesinger et. al, “Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, 
Department of Defense, United States,” Global Security, August 24, 2004, accessed June 5, 
2010, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/militar
y/library/report/2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf|||. 
777 Newspaper reports have often quoted high ranking government United States government 
officials as describing the prisoners as the ‘worst of the worst’. See for example, Sue Ann 
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as is argued herein, then the reanimation of medieval methods of truth 
establishment should bring about methods of exercising power that also 
belong to that particular epoch. This resurgence of medieval methods of 
exercising power is, indeed, what is found in the United States treatment of 
the Evildoer.  
 
Consider, first, the re-categorisation of terrorism as an evil, and how this 
moves the act of terrorism from the domain of crime to the domain of 
religion. It was in the High Middle Ages, when the Devil was the most 
prominent in European societies, and when the Church was the only coherent 
economic-political body, that the concept of infraction is introduced into 
mechanisms for establishing right and wrong. Until then, when one 
individual wronged another, it was regarded as a tort, a dispute that occurred 
between two people that did not involve the wider society. Once the concept 
of transgression or infraction was introduced, ‘when one individual wronged 
another, there was always, a fortiori, a wrong done against sovereignty, 
against the law, against power.’778  
 
This conjoining of lawbreaking and religious transgression, as was seen in 
Chapter Two, was prominent in the understanding during this period of 
rebellion as a sin and helped consolidate divinely ordained sovereignty as the 
main form of exercising power. During the eighteenth century, when the 
domains of religion and politics were separated from each other, when 
rebellion was no longer a sin, and when great reforms took place in the 
judicial and penal systems across Europe, the concept of sin was once again 
separated from that of crime. This separation was, in fact, the basic principle 
on which the reforms proposed by theorists such as Jeremy Bentham was 
based. 
 
[T]he crime, in the penal sense of the term (or, more technically, the infraction), 
must not have any relation with moral or religious transgression. The 
transgression is a violation of natural law, of religious law, of moral law. The 
crime, or the penal infraction, is a breach of civil law, explicitly established 
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within a society by the legislative function of political power. For there to be an 
infraction there must be a political authority and a law, and that law must have 
been actually formulated. There cannot be any infraction before the law exists779. 
 
A further basic principle laid out by the reformists included the stipulation 
that in order to be good laws, they should not be simple transcriptions of 
natural, religious, or moral law. A third principle, deduced from the first two, 
is that there must be a clear and simple definition of crime—it cannot be 
something related to sin and transgression. It is on the basis of these laws that 
the criminal emerges as a social enemy. And, if crime is a disturbance for 
society, ‘if a crime no longer has any connection with transgression, with 
natural, divine or religious law, it is clear that penal law cannot prescribe a 
revenge, the redemption of transgression.’780  
 
The knowledge produced of terrorism as evil in the United States in the 
immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001, however, re-connected judicial 
and penal practices to the concept of sin and transgression. Most importantly, 
it allowed sovereign power to punish sin, the very practice that the eighteenth 
century judicial and penal reforms had intended to obliterate. The fanatical 
false-Muslim who was waging a Holy War against Western civilisation was 
seen not simply as having broken the social contract; but also as having 
transgressed divine, religious and, as a barbarian, also natural laws. That the 
United States regarded the Evildoer as a sinner and not just a criminal 
becomes clear from the discussion below, which shows that he was taken 
captive and held in prison for actions that were not defined in law as a crime. 
All existing laws were deemed inapplicable or inadequate for punishment 
and discipline of the Evildoer. He was a Holy Warrior, fighting on the side of 
evil in the eternal battle between Good and Evil. He was a sinner who had 
transgressed all divine, religious and natural laws on a global scale. As such, 
no ordinary laws and norms applied to the Evildoer. 
 
This Chapter exposes the relations between truth, right and power at work in 
the construction of the Evildoer by examining the methods of punishment 
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and discipline that he was subjected to in the United States captivity. It 
analyses official documents of the United States government, relevant 
legislation old and new, testimony of some Evildoers who were released after 
being detained without charge, and reports investigating said treatment. 
These investigative reports include official United States government reports 
as well as reports of investigations conducted by academics and civil society 
organisations. Included in the analysis are also interrogation logs compiled by 
the guards who manned the cages in which the Evildoers were kept, as well 
as reports from United States security personnel who witnessed the treatment 
to which Evildoers were subjected, and disagreed with the methods being 
used.  
 
The focus on analysing official documents as well as judicial acts and 
instruments, allows this Chapter to examine the extent to which sovereign 
power was revitalised in the United States during this period through ‘new’ 
mechanisms introduced for dealing with the Evildoer. The investigative 
reports from governmental and non-governmental sources, as well as the 
interrogation logs and reports, meanwhile, allows this chapter to also 
investigate the very points of enchaînment where what was said about 
terrorism and what was done about terrorism meet, forging the triangular 
links between power, right and truth that constitute not just the Evildoer, but 
also forms of exercising power. 
 
Legislating evil 
Evil is not a crime defined in law. What then was to be done with the Evildoer 
in a society, which until then had largely separated sin and crime? How was 
he to be defined? What sort of power could punish a crime that did not exist 
in law?  
 
Two weeks after the 11 September 2001 attacks, legal advisors to the US 
President had already opined that the Congress could not place any limits on 
when, how,
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terrorist threats. These decisions were ‘for the President alone to make.’781  
Once the United States began taking prisoners, the same advisors counseled 
that ‘customary international law of armed conflict in no way binds the 
President or the US Armed Forces concerning the detention or trial of 
members of al Qaeda or Taliban’.782 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
advised the President that the War on Terror rendered ‘obsolete Geneva’s 
strict limitation on questioning of enemy prisoners’ and made some of its 
provisions ‘quaint’783.The US President concurred, dismissing such 
international norms as ‘legalisms’.784 Just as the US President was deemed to 
have the sole power to decide when and how the United States would 
respond to the War on Terror, he had the ultimate authority to decide how 
enemy combatants would be treated, disciplined and interrogated in United 
States custody. The United States Assistant Attorney General Jay S Bybee 
provided legal counsel to the President saying, ‘Congress can no more 
interfere with the President’s conduct of the interrogation of enemy 
combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the 
battlefield.’785 
 
With the assumption of judicial power by the executive, and the investing in 
the President of the unilateral and final power to decide when and how the 
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Evildoers should be judged and punished, the United States appears to have 
‘returned to a historical time in which sovereignty was indivisible.’786 As 
Judith Butler has argued, it is as if ‘the historical time that we thought was past 
turns out to structure the contemporary field with a persistence that gives the lie to 
history as a chronology’ [emphasis in original].787 This study asserts that there is 
more to the reanimation of this anachronism than has been explored by 
Butler.  
 
Apparent in the assumption of judicial power by the United States executive 
and its subsequent attempts to legislate evil is not just a resurgence of 
sovereignty, but a resurgence of the type of divinely ordained medieval sovereign 
power that retained for itself not just the power to punish crimes, but also sin 
and transgression. As mentioned before, the judicial reformists of the 
eighteenth century explicitly placed sin and transgression outside the limits of 
judicial and political power. One of the purposes of doing so was to ensure 
that penal law could not prescribe revenge, the redemption of transgression. 
Discernible with regard to the prisoners taken by the US in the War on Terror 
however are clear attempts to exclude terrorism from the reach of the rule of 
law and, in so doing, assume the power of the divinely ordained sovereign to 
punish transgressions. As shall be seen, the punishment to which Evildoers in 
captivity were subjected did not fall within the penal laws of any modern 
liberal society. Preceding this discussion however is an examination of the 
measures that the United States took to exclude terrorism from the domain of 
crime and thus the rule of law. 
 
The terrorist: from outlaw to outside of law 
Until the War on Terror, ‘the terrorist’ had remained outside not just the 
domain of sin but also of war. There were, as mentioned in an earlier 
discussion of existing terrorism literature, descriptions of terrorism as 
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asymmetrical warfare or guerilla warfare788, but it had not been understood as 
war proper. In ratifying Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, the 
United Kingdom stated that ‘the term ‘armed conflict’ of itself and in its 
context denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the 
commission of ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted 
or in isolation.’789 Most western societies, when confronted with ‘the terrorist’ 
in his various guises, shared this view. The United Sates, however, declared a 
war on ‘terror’, changing the traditional rules of warfare in which the enemies 
were sovereign states. President Bush took and justified several actions in the 
War on Terror using his powers as a Commander in Chief, and all three 
branches of the United States government endorsed the military approach790.  
 
Congressional debates on the Military Commissions Act 2006 demonstrate the 
United States’ perception of acts of ‘terrorism’ as acts of war. ‘Today’s war is a 
disparate bunch of terrorists, coming overnight, no uniforms, no principles, 
guided by nothing’, one senator declared during congressional debates on 
passing the Act791. The United States Supreme Court endorsed the treatment 
of prisoners in Hamdi v Rumsfeld 2004792 based on the traditional practices of 
the law of war and the 2006 Military Commissions Act.793 By equating acts of 
‘terrorism’ with acts of ‘war’, the United States changed the fundamental 
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Congress, September 28, 2006, accessed June 5, 2010, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/MC_Act-2006.html. 
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principle that wars are fought between states. Additionally, by deeming the 
‘new’ enemy as a novel figure in human conflict, the United States also 
created new rules according to which those taken prisoner in the War on 
Terror were to be subjected. They were prisoners of not just any war, but the 
War on Terror. On 7 February 2002 President Bush signed a memorandum 
denying the captives Prisoner of War status794. He declared them to be ‘illegal 
enemy combatants’ to whom Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 
did not apply. However, ‘as a matter of policy’, the United States Armed 
forces would act ‘in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva 
Conventions’, to the extent it deemed appropriate and necessary.795  
 
To many United States lawmakers it appeared laughable that traditional laws 
governing the treatment of prisoners in a war could be successfully applied to 
the ‘new’ enemy. Mr Bond, Senator from Missouri, said during a 2006 Senate 
debate, for example, that ‘Article 72 of the Geneva Conventions on treatment 
of prisoners of war says that POWs shall be allowed to receive parcels 
containing foodstuffs. Is that what critics [of the Military Commissions Act 
2006] think the 9/11 Commission conspirators deserve? Cookie care 
packages?’796  
 
Acts of ‘terrorism’ were acts of war, but the enemy in the custody of the 
United States were not prisoners of war. In the ‘new kind of war’, the United 
States could assert all powers associated with the laws of war—and more. It 
was not, however, bound by any of its constraints. In traditional laws of 
international armed conflict, for example, there can only be two types of 
individuals in enemy hands: prisoners of war covered by the Third Geneva 
Convention or civilians covered by the Fourth Convention. The Enemy 
Combatant in the War on Terror is neither. He is placed outside of 
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international law, and outside of the domestic laws of the United States. He 
would not have recourse to a trial in a court of law, but would be tried by 
military tribunals797.  
 
The US President would determine which of the Enemy Combatants had the 
right to a military tribunal, what form the tribunal would take, would appoint 
members of the tribunal, and would retain the power to overrule judgements 
of the tribunal. The defendants would not have the right to examine the 
evidence against them if evidence was deemed ‘classified’ for reasons of 
national security. The Enemy Combatant could thus be held captive by the 
United States indefinitely, even if they were found not guilty of any crime.  
 
‘[T]he people that we now hold in Guàntanamo are held for a specific reason 
that is not tied specifically to any particular crime. They're not held—they're not 
being held on the basis that they are necessarily criminals.’798 
 
If the commission of a crime was unnecessary, what act did an Enemy 
Combatant need to have committed in order to be detained indefinitely in 
United States custody? The definition of an Enemy Combatant, as it has 
evolved in the years following 11 September 2001 is: 
 
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners. This includes the person who committed a belligerent act or 
has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy forces.799   
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Detainees were held in United States custody for two years before 
proceedings began to determine whether they fit the Enemy Combatant status 
as defined above. The long delay in setting up the proceedings was contrary 
to Article Five of Geneva Convention Three, which stipulates that a prisoner’s 
status should be determined at or near the time of capture. The delay in status 
hearings was also contrary to the United States’ own laws. U.S. Army 
Regulation 190-8 requires that a prisoner’s legal status be determined quickly, 
and that he be treated as a prisoner of war until such a determination is 
made.800   
 
The Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) began in July 2004 and 
heard evidence relating to 558 detainees. By the end of November 2004, a 
majority of the cases had been completed. Most decisions regarding a 
detainee’s status were reached on the same day as the hearing itself801. None 
of the detainees were allowed legal counsel, but were assigned ‘personal 
representatives’. The government did not produce any witnesses at the 
hearings. In ninety-six percent of the cases, it did not provide the detainee 
with documentary evidence prior to the hearings, and the government’s 
classified evidence was always presumed to be reliable and valid.802  In a 
study of 102 CSRTs (the number of reviews conducted of which full records 
were made publicly available), only three found the detainee to be not/no 
longer an enemy combatant. In each case, however, the Department of 
Defense ordered a new Tribunal until the detainee was found to be an enemy 
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combatant, in one case ordering three tribunals to try the same detainee until 
he was deemed an enemy combatant803.  
 
The proceedings, which British Law Lord Johan Steyn likened to hearings at a 
‘kangaroo court’804, reinforced the US Department of Defense declaration 
referred to previously that the detainees were ‘not being held on the basis that 
they are necessarily criminals.’805 Over half were determined not to have 
committed any hostile acts against the United States or its coalition forces. 
Only eight percent of the detainees were characterised as being al Qaeda 
fighters, and of the remaining detainees forty percent were determined as 
having no connections with al Qaeda at all, and fully eighteen per cent were 
found to have no definitive connection to either al Qaeda or the Taliban.  
 
Studies have revealed that the United States government had six distinct 
categories that described the terrorist organisation with whom the detainees 
were classified as affiliated with: (1) al Qaeda; (2) al Qaeda and Taliban; (3) 
Taliban; (4) al Qaeda or Taliban; (5) unidentified affiliation; (6) other806. 
Membership of al Qaeda was so broadly defined as to mean that anyone 
whom the United States government believed to have ever spoken to an al 
Qaeda member could be deemed ‘a member’ of the organisation. Even so, 
sixty percent of the detainees were found to have had no contact at all with al 
Qaeda.807 Evidence presented as detainees’ association with the Taliban 
include possession of a Kalashnikov rifle, staying at a guest house while 
travelling through Afghanistan and Pakistan, possession of a Casio watch or 
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‘wearing olive drab clothing’808. The sweeping scope of the definition of 
Enemy Combatant as determined by the executive branch of the United States 
government has been heavily criticised by parties within and outside of the 
United States as violating the country’s Constitution as well as international 
law.809  
 
Evil is not a crime that is defined, simply or otherwise, in the penal or judicial 
systems of modern western societies. Evil, however, is the sin for which the 
Enemy Combatants were punished, and it is in order to contain this evil, and 
save Western civilisation from extinction, that the United States detained 
them indefinitely in its custody. It is also the reason why the United States 
could not, and would not, release an Enemy Combatant, even if found not 
guilty in the ‘kangaroo courts’ of the military tribunals. Furthermore, it is the 
perception of the ‘new’ enemy as Evildoers that allowed the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals to determine almost every single detainee an Enemy 
Combatant in case after case, based on ‘evidence’ seemingly as flimsy as their 
sartorial choices. It appears as if all the United States required as evidence 
was that the prisoner was deemed to possess one or more of the 
characteristics of the Evildoer that the United States knew him to have. Later 
discussions in this Chapter that analyse the treatment of the prisoners in 
custody strongly support this assertion. 
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Out of this world 
Apparent in these extra-legal mechanisms for dealing with the transgressing 
Evildoer is a return to judicial and penal practices that predate the reforms of 
the eighteenth century when crime and sin were separated, and sin was 
placed outside of the reach of political power. It also demonstrates a return to 
medieval modes of exercising power—a resurgence in a form of divinely 
ordained sovereignty in which rebellion is the gravest of sins. As discussed 
earlier, sovereignty is a repressive power—it is ‘essentially a right of seizure: 
of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself.’810  
 
Exclusion is the predominant mechanism of control that sovereign power 
exercised over categories of individuals or groups in society that were found 
to be somehow different. It was during the Middle Ages—at the height of 
divinely ordained sovereign power—that such mechanisms of exclusion as 
those to which the Evildoers in American custody were submitted were first 
put into place in Europe hundreds of years ago. It began with the rigorous 
binary division between lepers and others and later served as a model for the 
great Confinement.811 Rigid rules forbade contact between one group and the 
other. The lepers were ‘cast out into a vague, external world beyond the 
town’s walls, beyond the limits of the community’812, resulting in the 
constitution of two masses each foreign to the other.  
 
And those cast out were cast out in the strict sense into outer darkness. […] And 
finally, the exclusion of lepers implied disqualification—which was perhaps not 
exactly moral, but in any case juridical and political—of individuals thus 
excluded and driven out. They entered death, and […] the exclusion of lepers 
was regularly accompanied by a kind of funeral ceremony during which 
individuals who had been declared leprous were declared dead […] and they 
departed for the foreign, external world.813 
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The leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure the 
purpose of which was the political dream of a pure community.814 The very 
same purpose underpinned the exclusion of the Evildoers. Their presence, 
even in the enclosed spaces reserved for criminals to separate them from the 
rest of society, was deemed insufficient to prevent the goodness of the 
American homeland being contaminated by evil. This is evident from the fact 
that even a decade after the War on Terror began, none of those held in 
Guàntanamo Bay have been allowed to be transferred to any detention facility 
on American soil815.  
 
Nor does the treatment of the Evildoers in custody share the same methods of 
exclusion practised on ‘normal’ criminals who are incarcerated. This becomes 
evident from the fact that no attempts have been made to ‘rehabilitate’ these 
prisoners and prepare them for re-integration into society, as has become the 
norm in liberal societies since the judicial and penal reforms of the eighteenth 
century. As shall be seen shortly, like the lepers of the Middle Ages, they were 
instead taken into an ‘outer darkness’ where they were considered dead, or 
were left to die. A hundred detainees, at least, did die in United States 
custody816. Three committed suicide in 2006, acts which the United States 
government described as ‘a good PR move to draw attention’817.  
 
The Evildoers held in exile-enclosure were subjected to what the United 
States called ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and what others deemed 
‘torture’. Having been placed outside of national and international laws that 
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banned all ‘violence to life and person’, including ‘cruel treatment and 
torture’ as well as outrages upon personal dignity, ‘in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment’ of war prisoners,818 the prisoners were frequently 
subjected to such treatment. The Evildoers were kept shackled and hooded, 
sometimes in cages so small they were called ‘dog boxes’819, and 
‘interrogated’ for days on end.  
 
In 2002, the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld authorized a group of ‘new’ 
techniques, borrowed from the SERE Manual, which interrogators could use 
on the ‘new’ enemy. They included putting prisoners in stress positions, 
using false documents/reports, isolating them from other prisoners for up to 
a month, depriving them of light and sounds, hooding them, denying them 
all ‘comfort items’ including religious items, stripping them, enforced 
grooming, and exploiting detainee’s individual phobias.820 Authorising the 
‘new’ techniques, Secretary Rumsfeld expressed the opinion that their 
treatment was inexplicably lenient; he queried why detainees could only be 
forced to stand up to four hours: ‘I stand for 8 to 10 hours a day. Why is 
standing limited to 4 hours?’821 For Secretary Rumsfeld, the Evildoers had no 
right to expect any other form of treatment than that meted out by his 
officials: 
 
Q: Mr. Secretary, […] how do you respond to charges from some non-
governmental organizations that hooding, shaving, chaining, perhaps even… 
Rumsfeld: What are the words?  
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Q: Hooding, putting hoods on, shaving, chaining, perhaps even tranquilizing 
some of these people is violating their civil rights?  
Rumsfeld: That … that's not correct.  
Q: That you've done it or that … 
Q: That you've done it or that it violates … 
Rumsfeld: That it's a violation of their rights. It simply isn't.822  
 
As a chief legal advisor explained, there was a difference between ‘enhanced 
interrogation techniques’ and torture: ‘It is basically subject to perception. If 
the detainee dies, you’re doing it wrong.’823   
 
The torture approved for use against the Evildoers was based on an army 
instruction manual that teaches U.S. personnel to withstand interrogations if 
taken prisoner by an enemy that did not abide by the Geneva Conventions824. 
It contained a compilation of methods used over a period of fifty years by 
some of the harshest regimes in the world825. Vice President Dick Cheney 
explained that in such a war, with such an enemy, it was necessary to go to 
the ‘dark side’: the nature of the enemy himself necessitated such a cross over 
as ‘that’s the world these folks operate in.’826  
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In 2004, photographic evidence revealed United States personnel abusing 
detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The detainees were pictured 
hooded, stripped naked, made to perform sexual acts on one another, 
harassed by military dogs while naked, made to wear women’s underwear on 
their heads while shackled naked to a bed, and dragged by a leash around 
their necks by uniformed United States army personnel827. Army personnel 
were also pictured posing in front of naked detainees and at least one dead 
body. The pictures led to widespread international condemnation and a large 
number of official enquiries instigated by various United States authorities828. 
The US government inquiries initially concluded the actions were a result of 
‘a few soldiers acting on their own’ and was not systematic. Later inquiries, 
however, have contradicted these findings, concluding instead that the 
detainees were abused as a result of the procedures deliberately put into place 
by the US executive branch829. Independent studies documented over 330 
cases of abuse in the first five years of the War on Terror830. Only a fraction of 
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the United States military personnel implicated in the cases have been 
sentenced to prison, and only a third have faced any kind of disciplinary 
action. For critics, the treatment of detainees in United States custody 
amounted to ‘abuse’831; for the United States, which knew the prisoners as 
Evildoers to whom the rule of law did not apply, it was the right policy.832 
Such was life, and death, on the dark side from whence the Evildoer came 
and to where they were banished. 
 
Known knowns and the Evildoer 
Post 11 September 2001, United States legal authorities deemed torture 
necessary for acquiring information that could pre-empt a future attack by 
other Evildoers833. It was, however, not just information about potential 
attacks it sought, but also knowledge about the very nature of the ‘new’ 
enemy himself. The mechanisms of torture developed for use on the Evildoers 
were designed to validate the truth of what was already known—they were 
evil, false-Muslim, Arab barbarians who hated the liberal values of the West 
and who killed in the name of God.  
 
The role that the ‘true’ knowledge of the Evildoer played in the resurgence of 
the twenty-first century American version of divinely ordained sovereign 
power and also in the mechanisms for excluding him from civilisation is 
evident from even before they were taken into captivity. Records show, for 
example, that only five percent of those held in United States custody were 
actually captured by its soldiers—the remainder were captured by Pakistani 
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forces or the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and handed over to the United 
States, which was offering large bounties for capture of Evildoers.834 Some of 
the biggest bounties were offered for captives who were Arab, or perceived to 
be such. ‘Where is Arab?  Where is Arab?  Where is Arab?  You get thousand 
dollar for one Arab.  Thirty thousand, forty thousand, sixty thousand’, 
American soldiers have been documented as saying when on the hunt for 
Evildoers in Afghanistan835.  
 
A flyer distributed by United States forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
during the War on Terror, offered large bounties in exchange for Evildoers, 
promising locals ‘wealth and power beyond [their] dreams’ and ‘enough 
money to take care of your family, your village, your tribe for the rest of your 
life’836. By handing over Evildoers, the ‘Al-Qaida and Taliban murderers’ 
could ‘pay for livestock and doctors and school books and housing for all 
your people’837. As ‘the Arabs’ in captivity were flown to the prisons of 
Guàntanamo Bay and elsewhere, officers ‘quickly consulted counterparts in 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other countries to compile a “catalog” of 
techniques said to be effective against Arab and Muslim prisoners’.838 Once in 
United States captivity, they were subjected to torture and different forms of 
treatment tailor-made to confirm the truth of their nature as already known to 
the United States. 
 
                                                      
834 Mark Denbeaux, “A profile of 517 detainees through analysis of Department of Defense 
data,” School of Law, Seton Hall University, accessed June 7, 2010, 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.p
df. 
835 Quoted from transcript of the Television Documentary “Torturing Democracy”, produced 
by Sherry Jones. For full text, see: Washington Media Associates and the National Security 
Archive, “Torturing democracy,” George Washington University, accessed June 5, 2010, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/td_transcript.pdf. 
836 PDF copy of flyer can be viewed at: “Flyer distributed by US forces in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan after 9/11”, the International Commission of Jurists, accessed July 7, 2010, 
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/Raut2.pdf. 
837 Ibid. 
838 Shane Scott and Mark Mazzetti, “Interrogation methods are criticised,” The New York 
Times, May 30, 2007, accessed June 7, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/30/washington/30interrogate.html?pagewanted=all. 
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The prison infrastructure was custom-designed for the barbaric 
Arab/Muslim, composing six by eight feet kennel-like cages made of chain-
linked fencing furnished with ‘a bunk and a steel desk with a slot to serve as a 
Koran holder.’839  Here, various United States personnel interrogated the 
detainees over 24,000 times, often using ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’. 
Some of the techniques were individually designed to target the Muslim 
body, mind and soul. Against the Islamic emphasis on cleanliness, especially 
during prayer, detainees were regularly made to urinate and defecate on 
themselves, and to pray while ‘unclean’, an act strictly forbidden in Islam. 
Against the Islamic teachings of modesty in relations between the opposite 
sexes, male detainees were sexually harassed and assaulted by female 
interrogators.840 On one occasion, a female interrogator led a detainee to 
believe she had wiped her menstrual blood on him841. On another occasion, a 
female interrogator caressed and applied lotion on the hands of a detainee 
who remained shackled, with his hands cuffed to a chain on his waist. She 
whispered in his ear while grabbing at his genitals. The incident occurred 
during Ramadan ‘when physical contact with a woman would have been 
particularly offensive to a Moslem male’842.  
 
                                                      
839 The Camp X-Ray, where the detainees were first held in Guàntanamo Bay had 320 such 
cells. It has now been closed. Camp Delta, which upgraded accommodation to 720 steel and 
mesh shells made from shipping containers and arranged like boxcars. See Carol Rosenberg, 
“A prison camps primer,” The Miami Herald, April 27, 2010, accessed June 9, 2010, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2008/02/06/102770/web-extra-a-prison-camps-primer.html. 
840 Quoted from transcript of the Television Documentary “Torturing Democracy”, produced 
by Sherry Jones. For full text, see: Washington Media Associates and the National Security 
Archive, “Torturing Democracy,” George Washington University, accessed June 5, 2010, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/td_transcript.pdf. 
841 Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Interview Transcript with unnamed detainee, April 
21, 2003, accessed June 9, 2010, 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20030421.pdf. 
842 The observation was made by a member of the FBI Counter Terrorism Unit in a letter 
dated  July 14, 2004 sent to the Criminal Investigation Command (CID) of the army, alerting 
him to ‘suspected mistreatment of detainees’ occurring at Guàntanamo Bay. See the letter in 
full at: T. J. Harrington, Torturing Democracy, July 14, 2004, accessed June 10, 2010, 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20040714.pdf. 
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Apart from the treatment of the Muslim body in this manner, the Muslim 
mind was targeted with acts such as forcing detainees to pray at a shrine for 
another human being—Osama bin Laden—an act regarded as apostasy in 
Islam. The Qur’an, the Muslim holy book, was often disrespected too843, 
sometimes thrown into the same buckets detainees were forced to use as 
toilets844 and regularly confiscated from detainees according to the needs of 
the interrogators – the ‘cultural and religious significance of this lack of access 
added significant psychological pressure to the detainees845. The Muslim soul 
was the target of various discussions about God, sinners, and the final 
reckoning by Allah on Judgment Day846.  
 
The interrogators’ techniques were based on the knowledge of Arabs, Islam 
and ‘Islamic terrorism’ that had burgeoned in the United States during this 
period, and which itself was based on Orientalism and medieval Christian 
narratives as discussed in Chapter Four. Interrogators’ discussions show that 
certain Islamic teachings were highlighted as ‘a good argument’ for use in 
interrogations, while others were singled out as ‘good analogies to confront 
detainees’ with when they were being uncooperative. Qur’an and Islamic 
                                                      
843 Department of Defense, “Investigation into FBI allegations of detainee abuse at 
Guàntanamo,” Army Regulation 15-6, Final Report, Council on Foreign Relations, June 9, 
2005, accessed June 10, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-the-law/schmidt-report-
investigation-into-fbi-allegations-detainee-abuse-guantanamo-bay-cuba-detention-
facility/p9804. 
844 Center for the Study of Human Rights in the Americas, “The Tipton Report,” Testimony of 
four British detainees held at Guàntanamo, July 26, 2004, accessed June 9, 2010, 
http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-
project/testimonies/prisoner-testimonies/the-tipton-report, 34. 
845 International Committee of the Red Cross, “ICRC report on the treatment of 14 ‘High 
Value Detainees’ in CIA Custody,” Humane Security Gateway, February 14, 2007, accessed 
June 9, 2010, 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/ICRC_Report_TreatmentOf 
FourteenHighValueDetainees_CIACustody.pdf. 
846 “Secret ORCON: Interrogation Log Detainee 063,” compiled by Pentagon’s Joint Task 
Force at Camp X-Ray at Guàntanamo as various officers interrogated prisoner no: 063, Saudi 
national Mohammed al-Qahtani who was arrested in Afghanistan and rendered to the prison. 
For full text of the log, also published by Time, see “Secret ORCON: Interrogation Log 
Detainee 063,” Time, March 3, 2006, accessed July 9, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf. 
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teachings were thus treated as providing the knowledge that could be used as 
power against the Evildoers. ‘Arab Muslims’ were grouped together as 
considering the ‘9/11 hijackings to be acts of reaction and self-defense and not 
acts of aggression’, and ‘Arab Muslims’ were said to ‘believe that the US and 
Israel are engaged in the killing of Muslims as a matter of policy and fact’. 
Allah’s teachings were believed to be misunderstood by some of the 
detainees, a situation the interrogators would seek to correct; interrogators 
were also reminded that in Islam, Faith and Jihad cannot be separated847. 
Interrogation techniques could, therefore, both create and ascertain existing 
‘knowledge’ of the Arab/Muslim barbarian as the Evil ‘new’ terrorist of the 
twenty first century.  
 
Guàntanamo Bay was, for many manning its cages and guarding its captives, 
‘America’s Battle Lab’848 where experiments on the ‘new’ enemy would 
provide the United States with lessons that would allow them to adequately 
meet the ‘new threat framework’ that it faced849  by knowing the ‘new’ enemy. 
One prisoner, Shafiq Rasul, released without charge after years in captivity, 
saw the interrogations ‘as an experiment just to see to what extent they could 
take a human.’850 At the end of the experiment, it would be revealed to the 
United States not just everything the ‘new’ enemy knew, but also everything 
that could be known about the enemy; and all the ways in which the enemy 
should be known; all the while confirming what was already known. 
 
                                                      
847 Ibid. 
848 United States Department of Defense, “Joint Staff External Review of Intelligence 
Operations at Guàntanamo,” August 2004, accessed June 8, 2010, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf. 
849 Committee on Armed Services, “Inquiry into the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody,” 
United States Senate report, Carl Levin, United States Senate, November 20, 2008, accessed 
June 9, 2010, http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=313072, 43. 
850 Shafiq Rasul, Detainee Number 086, speaking in Television Documentary “Torturing 
Democracy”, produced by Sherry Jones. For full transcript, see: Washington Media Associates 
and the National Security Archive, “Torturing democracy,” accessed June 5, 2010, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/td_transcript.pdf. 
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That old Devil, we know 
A showcase of how these techniques were applied to draw out and test the 
validity of these characteristics that distinguished the Enemy Combatants as 
the Evildoer is the treatment of ‘Detainee No. 063’, believed to have been the 
possible ‘Twentieth Hijacker’ in the 11 September 2001 attacks – Mohammed 
Al-Qahtani (also known as Mohammed al Khatani). He was captured by 
Pakistani authorities along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border on 15 December 
2001 and handed over to the United States forces on 26 December 2001. The 
Saudi Arabian, born in 1979, was transferred to Guàntanamo Bay on 13 
February 2002. Due to his suspected direct involvement in the 11 September 
2001 attacks, he was labeled a ‘high value detainee’, and subjected to 
‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ by a variety of United States personnel.  
 
For eleven days, beginning from 23 November 2002, United States personnel 
working in shifts interrogated al Qahtani for 20 hours a day. To keep him 
awake, they played loud music, yelled, and threw water at him. From 4 
December 2003 he was incessantly interrogated for almost 80 hours, after 
which he was allowed a ‘twenty-four-hour recuperation’ period, most of 
which he spent at the hospital. A meticulous log was kept by the interrogators 
of al Qahtani’s treatment in their hands for fifty days, during which period 
interrogators regularly employed a range of tactics aimed at identifying and 
validating his Arab/Muslim/barbarian identities.  
 
The Islamic identity of the Evildoer was central to all interrogations of Al 
Qahtani. The second entry in the log reads: ‘02:35: Session begins. The 
detainee refuses to look at SGT.A ‘due to his religion’851. SGT.A is a woman. 
From then onwards, a tactic known as ‘Invasion of Space by a Female’, is used 
against al Qahtani on a regular basis. On separate occasions he is made to 
stand naked in front of a female officer; strip searched and shaved in front of 
one; and straddled by another. On several occasions al Qahtani was recorded 
as being annoyed, upset or openly crying as a result of enforced proximity to 
a female.852 Interrogators logged the point of the exercise as being to 
                                                      
851 “Secret ORCON: Interrogation Log Detainee 063,” Time, March 3, 2006, accessed July 9, 
2011, http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf, 1. 
852 Ibid., 22 - 23, 25, 28 - 29, 39, 46, 48, 56, 60. 
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‘constantly remind him’ of an alleged paradox: ‘if he was such a “religious 
man” how could he have caused such devastation [the attacks of 11 
September 2001]?’853  
 
When al Qahtani refused to engage with a female interrogator, he was told ‘if 
God keeps track of your sins he would have millions so he should not be 
concerned about something as small as looking at a woman.’854 Violating the 
same Islamic mores of sexual modesty, interrogators forced al Qahtani to 
closely scrutinise women dressed in skimpy clothing. Pictures of women in 
bikinis were put into a binder and hung around his neck several times or they 
were fashioned into masks that he had to wear855. After a month of the 
treatment, al Qahtani begged interrogators to stop, saying the experience was 
more difficult for him to endure than the physical pain and discomforts he 
was also subjected to.856 
 
Praying five times a day is one of the five tenets of Islam. Interrogators 
controlled when, how, and to whom al Qahtani should pray. Permission to 
pray was a bargaining chip, something that was withheld or granted 
according to the needs of the interrogation. On 19 December 2002, the log 
states:  
 
05:00: […] Detainee asked to pray.  Interrogators told him he could pray after he 
wrote down the location and point of contact for where he got his visa.  Detainee 
complied and was taken to another interrogation booth where a bin Laden 
shrine was constructed.  Detainee was told he could now pray to his god – UBL 
[Usama bin Laden].  Detainee was apprehensive and started to walk out of 
booth.  Detainee was not allowed to leave and interrogator played the call to 
prayer.  Detainee began to pray and openly cried857.  
 
Similarly, on 2 January 2003:  
 
                                                      
853 Ibid., 39. 
854 Ibid., 14. 
855 Ibid., 44 - 45. 57, 60. 
856 Ibid., 54. 
857 Ibid., 45. 
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01:00: […] Interrogators offered detainee coffee and detainee refused.  
Interrogators told detainee that since he was being disrespectful, he would not 
be treated nicely this session.  Detainee was shown the Bin Laden shrine and 
told that he could only pray to Bin Laden. […]858 
 
28 November 2002 
06:30: […]“Have you earned prayer?  I know you have a lot to ask forgiveness 
for, but I already told you that you have to earn it.”  Detainee says “Please, I 
want to pray here” (pointing to floor next to his chair).  Control responds no.859 
He was told he would have to pray on the same area on which he had 
urinated860; and was informed the call to prayer, revered by Muslims, was 
now ‘a call to interrogation’:  
 
13 December 2002 
01:00: Upon entering the booth, lead played the call to prayer with a special 
alarm clock. Detainee was told, “this is no longer the call to prayer.  You’re not 
allowed to pray.  This is the call to interrogation.  So pay attention.”861  
 
Interrogators frequently discussed the teachings of Islam with al Qahtani. 
They often reduced him to tears by lecturing him on the subjects of right and 
wrong, sin and forgiveness, using verses from the Qur’an.862 Al Qahtani’s 
knowledge and interpretations of Islam was often questioned, creating 
distress in his mind. He was told that ‘Al Qaida had raped the Koran’ and 
‘Usama bin Laden raped Islam’. The interrogators clearly noted his anger and 
distress at the suggestion that the Qur’an could be ‘raped’.863  
 
Al Qahtani was often forced to get involved in discussions of God’s judgment 
and repentance. The 11 September 2001 attacks were described as a ‘sin’ and 
al Qahtani was made to watch videos of the attack in an approach described 
                                                      
858 Ibid., 73. 
859 Ibid., 14. 
860 Ibid., 10. 
861 Ibid., 34. 
862 Ibid., 2 - 3, 6, 12, 18, 37, 44, 48, 53, 71, 73, 76. 
863 Ibid., 11, 13. 
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by the interrogators as ‘Judgement Day’864. Pictures of victims of the attacks 
were taped on to his body, and interrogators compared the attack on the Twin 
Towers to an attack on Mecca, the Muslim holy city. He was asked whether 
‘the people that are jumping from the burning building [the Twin Towers on 
11 September 2001] are going to go to heaven or hell’865  and to ponder ‘what 
happened to the hijackers souls on judgement day’866. He was forced to wear a 
sign saying ‘I am going to hell because I am full of hate’867. Al Qahtani was 
noted as ‘crying profusely about a story of Allah’s forgiveness’,868 and was on 
another occasion told it was not military justice that he should fear but the 
justice of Allah, thus, he was urged, ‘[m]ake things right. Repent’.869 
Interrogators discussed with him his ‘future on earth’ and ‘his status on 
judgement day’870. To drive the point home, they illustrated the Islamic Day of 
Judgment:  
 
01 January 2003 
[…] 
20:00: ‘[…] drew a diagram on the white board of a bridge over a pit of fire, the 
bridge had little razors on it. Detainee was told that this was the ‘Sirat’ or a 
diagram of judgement day. Detainee was told on judgment day everyone will be 
sorted out by beliefs.’871  
 
Interrogators discussed major sins and virtues of Islam and taunted Al 
Qahtani for allegedly having trouble asking ‘God for forgiveness’872. They 
explained to him the ‘process in Christianity for asking forgiveness’873. 
Cooperation with the interrogators would mean he could ‘be a messenger for 
                                                      
864 Ibid., 5. 
865 Ibid., 28. 
866 Ibid., 22. 
867 Ibid., 17. 
868 Ibid., 65. 
869 Ibid., 3. 
870 Ibid., 51. 
871 Ibid., 71. 
872 Ibid., 73. 
873 Ibid., 68, 71. 
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God and his cause’874, earning absolution. Any confessions he made would be 
tantamount to carrying out ‘a mission to share God’s message’875 :  
 
25 November 2002 
06:00: […] SGT R showed 9-11 DVD.  SGT R stood behind detainee and 
whispered in his ear, “What is God telling you right now? Your 19 friends died 
in a fireball and you weren’t with them.  Was that God’s choice?  Is it God’s will 
that you stay alive to tell us about his message? […] I am still talking to you, and 
you won’t leave until you’ve given God’s message.876 
 
Interrogators discussed with al Qahtani ‘the way to heaven in Christianity 
and Islam’ and addressed the evil within him several times. He was told that 
some of his physical discomforts were ‘probably the evil trying to get out’ 
from inside him877.  
 
‘Lead [interrogator] told detainee that it looked as if his left shoulder was 
sagging (a verse in the Koran states that good angels sit on the right shoulder 
and bad angels sit on the left shoulder)878.  
 
A widely circulated rumour in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 was a 
sighting of the Devil in the smoke from the Twin Towers. It is said that 
Satan’s face could be seen appearing in the smoke, and videos of the alleged 
apparition are widely circulated on the Internet879. One of the approaches 
taken by the interrogators in their questioning of al Qahtani was labeled the 
‘Devil in the smoke theme’. Although no details are available of what the 
theme entailed, it was deployed while al Qahtani was hooded and shackled in 
                                                      
874 Ibid., 5. 
875 Ibid., 6. 
876 Ibid., 6, 7. 
877 Ibid., 52. 
878 Ibid., 53. 
879 See for example “Faces in Smoke: Appearance of Fallen Angels on 9/11,” YouTube video, 
2:33, posted by “ChubbyToesJones,” April 15, 2007. Accessed June 1, 2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRocVVDvoIs&feature=fvsr,  viewed by over a million 
people. Many more videos of the same footage are available on YouTube. 
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an interrogation booth where loud music was played880. Six days later, al 
Qahtani became convinced he was literally (possessed by) evil881, and the 
interrogators then performed ‘an exorcism to purge the evil Jinns he claimed 
were controlling his emotions’882.  It was noted in the Log: ‘Detainee was more 
responsive after the exorcism’883. The following day another exorcism of the 
Devil was suggested to make al Qahtani more responsive884. During these 
discussions, interrogators also asked al Qahtani to ‘perform “crazy 
Mohamed” facial expressions’ and ‘recounted “emotional Mohammed”’ 
impressions he had allegedly ‘performed.’885 
 
The barbarian in captivity 
United States forces in Afghanistan offered premium bounties for any ‘Arabs’ 
captured. Many were handed over by Afghan war loads and others seeking 
the bounty, which promised riches they had never even dreamed of886. 
Targeting an imagined monolithic Arab culture was part of the interrogation 
tactics in Guàntanamo Bay. Hence, al Qahtani’s interrogation was often 
directed at his Arab self. He was offered a ‘home cooked Arab meal’887 and 
given ‘Arabic lessons’. One such ‘lesson’ followed this format: ‘Control [lead 
interrogator] writes the Arabic words for “liar”, ”coward” and “failure” on 
the wall.  Control asks detainee, ‘“Are you a liar? Are you a failure?  Are you 
                                                      
880 “Secret ORCON: Interrogation Log Detainee 063,” 
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882 Ibid., 30. 
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a coward?’, then answers for him, “Yes you are.”’888 . Another lesson involves 
role-play where al Qahtani is the student of Arabic and the interrogator his 
teacher889. Arabic music is played loudly in his cell, and he is questioned on 
his knowledge of ‘Arabian history’890. He is specifically interrogated about 
‘the Arabs’ as a particular group891 and the Israel/Palestine conflict is brought 
up as a subject of conversation892 .   
 
Interrogators often addressed the detainee’s inherent barbarism and lack of 
civilisation. The ‘Respect Approach’ was often used to teach al Qahtani the 
civility of Western society. He is told he can only use the latrine if he asked 
‘properly’, and is given permission when he says: ‘Please, may I go to the 
bathroom’? His previous request, made without the ‘please’, was denied893. 
He is allowed to eat ‘if he asked nicely’894, and allowed to pray if he asked 
‘respectfully’895. He is given ‘instructions on the proper way to show 
respect’896 and was made to play the role of a ‘respectful’ student while an 
interrogator played the teacher instructing him on the teachings of Islam897. 
He was ‘harshly berated’ for ‘lack of respect’ and repeatedly reprimanded for 
forgetting previous lessons on the subject898. He was instructed to salute 
interrogators and to ‘answer questions respectfully with “Sir”’899. He was 
awarded ‘respect points’ for behaviour deemed acceptable by the 
interrogators900 and rewarded for good behaviour by allowing him to return 
to ‘the good graces’ of the interrogator901. He was made to stand for lengthy 
periods of time because he ‘didn’t deserve to be seated in a chair like civilized 
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human beings’902. Al Qahtani was continuously reminded he was ‘stupid’, 
‘ignorant’ and uneducated: 
 
06 January 2003 
[…] 
23:30: […] Interrogators explained to detainee that he was so ignorant of the 
world that he could not distinguish between truth and lies […]. He needed to 
improved [sic] his education about world history and sociology so that he would 
know when someone lied to him. […]903  
 
Independent observations of interrogators recorded in the log show that such 
accusations of ignorance and stupidity made against al Qahtani were not 
merely part of the ‘Ego and Pride Down’ or other psychological tactics used to 
‘break’ the prisoner. It formed part of the repertoire of knowledge the 
interrogators already possessed about the ‘new’ enemy. The interrogation 
techniques validated the knowledge, as can be seen from observations such 
as: ‘Detainee was ignorant of historical events outside of the geographic 
region of the Arabian Peninsula’904 and that he ‘expresses great ignorance 
about dinosaurs and space, topics that are taught in U.S. grade schools. 
Detainee asked interrogator if the sun revolved around the earth.’905  
 
The Evildoer is not just an uncivilized Arab, but also a barbarian; a less than 
human being. Throughout al Qahtani’s interrogations his hands and feet were 
shackled. He was frequently hooded, often made to wear a wet towel around 
his head, forced to urinate into a bottle, and on himself. He was frequently 
denied permission to use the toilet, and was forced to have enema in the 
presence of female interrogators. He was kept hydrated by inserting IV fluids 
into his body and was subjected to extreme temperatures. He was told his life 
had no value and that he was worthless as a human being.  
 
11 December 2002: 
                                                      
902 Ibid., 51. 
903 Ibid., 79. 
904 Ibid., 48. 
905 Ibid., 83. 
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0100: […] Detainee was reminded that no one loved, cared or remembered him. 
He was reminded that he was less than human and that animals had more 
freedom and love than he does. He was taken outside to see a family of banana 
rats. The banana rats were moving around freely, playing, eating, showing 
concern for one another. Detainee was compared to the family of banana rats 
and reinforced that they had more love, freedom, and concern than he had. 
Detainee began to cry during this comparison.906 
 
Unfavourable comparison with the banana-rat, a common rodent in 
Guanatanamo Bay, was frequent907. Strict rules forbade him to talk or move; if 
the rules were broken, he was ‘reminded of his worthlessness as a human 
being’908. He was taught dog tricks so his status could be elevated ‘at least’ to 
that of a dog909. As a dog, he was made to ‘growl’ at pictures of al Qaeda 
members and to ‘bark’ at pictures of victims of the 11 September 2001 
attacks910. He was told he would not be allowed to ‘live like the pig that he is’ 
and was forced to clean the interrogation room while his hands were shackled 
together911.  
 
To reiterate his lack of worth as a human being, al Qahtani was continuously 
ridiculed. He was forced to wear a towel on his head ‘like a burka’,912 and take 
‘dancing lessons’ from the interrogators913; water was regularly poured over 
his head or thrown in his face; he was laughed at ‘uncontrollably’914; 
mocked915; ‘harshly’ berated916 and made to participate in role-play designed 
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to humiliate him. Interrogators performed a puppet show satirizing al 
Qahtani’s alleged involvement in al Qaeda917; and forced him to wear a 
‘smiley face’ mask made from an MRE (Meal, Ready-to-eat) box before taking 
‘dance instructions’ from interrogators who ‘sissy-slapped’ him with a blown 
up latex glove as he danced918. A ‘birthday party’ was organized for him at 
which he was made to wear a party hat while interrogators and guards sang 
‘God Bless America’919. Playing cards while laughing at and mocking him was 
a common practice920. He was called a homosexual, and his mother and sister 
whores921.  
 
The United States planned to continue the interrogation until al Qahtani’s 
sense of futility was raised to such a level as to make him ‘give in and provide 
the necessary information’ - or until it came to ‘a standstill’. The last phase 
was to decide how ‘the future disposition of 063 will be determined’922. On 15 
January 2003, however, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, one of the foremost 
petty sovereigns in the Administration, rescinded the blanket authority he 
had given to American personnel for using ‘enhanced interrogation 
techniques’ on detainees923. By then, however, the use of the techniques had 
become widespread at other United States detention centres across the world 
in Afghanistan, and would later be used in Iraq. Investigations into the 
treatment of detainees in United States custody have attributed a substantial 
part of the blame to the authorization of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ 
by the executive powers.924 That is, the form of divinely ordained sovereign 
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917 “Secret ORCON: Interrogation Log Detainee 063,” Time, March 3, 2006, accessed July 9, 
2011, http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf, 20. 
918 Ibid., 35. 
919 Ibid., 19. 
920 Ibid., 36, 37, 42, 44, 49, 55, 59, 60, 69. 
921 Ibid., 42. 
922 Committee on Armed Services, “Inquiry into the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody,” 
United States Senate report, Carl Levin, United States Senate, November 20, 2008, accessed 
June 9, 2010, http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=313072, 114. 
923 Ibid., 140. 
924 Ibid. 
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power that was made possible by the presence of the Evildoer, an old enemy 
that first emerged with such power in the Middle Ages. 
 
The abyss gazes back 
The use of approved ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ spread to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. When the United States began to take prisoners in the War on 
Terror after the first military strikes in Afghanistan in October 2001, the 
captives were legal non-entities. President Bush had declared they were not 
Prisoners of War and deemed the Geneva Conventions inapplicable to them. 
Until the term ‘enemy combatant’ was written into law in 2004, the captors 
were free to decide who, or what, the captive was. They were also free to 
interrogate, discipline and punish the captives as befit their perception of the 
enemy and in doing so, define the enemy. By 2006 they had murdered thirty-
four of them, were suspected of being involved in the deaths of eleven more, 
and tortured eight to death925. Over 600 United States personnel are also 
accused of having abused close to 500 detainees during the same period. The 
murders were brutal; a team of interrogators ‘beat the crap out of’ one 
detainee with sledge hammer handles before shoving him head-first into a 
sleeping bag, wrapping it with electrical cord, and then rolling him from his 
stomach to his back. One of the interrogators then sat on the detainee’s chest 
and blocked his nose and mouth. He died926.  
 
Another detainee was shackled to a window about five feet from the floor in a 
posture, known as ‘Palestinian Hanging’, that made it impossible for him to 
kneel or sit without hanging from his arm. Less than an hour later he was 
dead. His corpse still hooded with a sandbag, arms cuffed behind its back, 
was still shackled to the window that was, by then, above his head. A New 
York State pathologist gave evidence he had died of ‘asphyxia […] as in 
crucifixion’927. A group of marines ‘karate-kicked’ another detainee while he 
                                                      
925 Hina Shamsi, and Debroah Pearlstein, “Command’s responsibility: detainee deaths in U.S. 
custody in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Human Rights First, February 2006, accessed July 11, 2010, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-rep-web.pdf. 
926 Ibid., 44. 
927 Ibid., 12. 
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stood hooded and handcuffed. He developed diarrahoea and was left covered 
in his own faeces, accused of faking illness. To make room for a new prisoner, 
he was dragged out by the neck, a job made easy from the sweat and faeces 
covering his body. He was left to die in the heat of the sun. His corpse was 
stored in an unrefrigerated drawer, and his internal organs were left exposed 
on airport tarmac where they perished in the blistering Iraqi heat928. Another 
detainee was hit several times for the amusement of the interrogators. The 
detainee cried out ‘Allah’ when he was hit, ‘U.S. military personnel found 
these cries funny and hit [him] repeatedly to hear him cry out’929. He was 
beaten to death.  
 
How the United States personnel perceived the ‘new’ enemy is evident not 
just from their treatment of detainees, but the Arab/Muslim population at 
large. In Iraq, some United States personnel raided the home of an Iraqi actor 
and shot him five times within earshot of his family. They left his body 
stuffed behind a refrigerator and hidden behind a mattress for the family to 
find. They stopped Iraqis on the streets at random, once forcing two high 
school students to jump off a ten-foot bridge. One of them drowned. Nearly 
half of the detainees who died in United States custody were classified as 
having died from ‘officially unknown, natural or other’ causes. Independent 
investigations have, however, found a majority of the deaths so classified to 
have occurred following physical abuse or as a result of harsh conditions in 
detention’930. Autopsy reports of such deaths document brain haemorrhages, 
blood clots, collapsed ribs, and sudden fatal blows to the head.931  
 
All the deaths and abuse discussed above took place before the term ‘enemy 
combatant’ was codified in United States law. During this period, 
interrogators defined the enemy according to what they knew the Evildoers 
to be and punished the Evildoers accordingly. By 2006 only forty-four of the 
600 United States personnel implicated in abusing detainees were convicted 
by court martial. Tribunals and investigations found several of the alleged 
                                                      
928 Ibid., 12, 13. 
929 Ibid., 16. 
930 Ibid., 21. 
931 Ibid., 25. 
 236 
murders to have been ‘justified’ deaths. Many allegations have never been 
investigated, and several remain unresolved932. Until 2004, when 
photographic evidence of the abuse of detainees appeared in the public 
domain933, there was no requirement to perform autopsies on the corpses. 
Whether detainees died, how many, in whose hands and how, were matters 
of little or no consequence. The consequences for those who did the killing 
and the torturing was equally little.  
Summary 
The United States knowledge of ‘new terrorism’ as evil and the ‘new terrorist’ 
as an Evildoer was not the cause of the mechanisms of exclusion and 
punishment that it implemented against prisoners of the War on Terror. 
Rather, they validated the Evildoer as someone who could not be tortured or 
abused simply because when applied to the Evildoer, these terms had no 
meaning. In this way, the offender, the offence, and the punishment are all 
made extra-legal, and cross beyond crime into the realm of good and evil. In 
assuming the powers to punish sin and transgression, the United States 
exercised powers that had been possessed by divinely ordained monarchs of 
medieval Europe for whom rebellion was both a sin and a crime against 
sovereignty. For medieval sovereignty it was the omnipresence of the Devil 
that made such powers possible while, at the same time, it was these powers 
that both constituted and rendered the Devil true.  
 
In the twenty-first century, it is the presence of the Evildoer that was 
constituted by, and constituted, the resurgent divinely ordained sovereign 
powers that the United States exercised. Without the Evildoer, the 
                                                      
932 Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project (DAA), “By the numbers: findings of the 
Detainee Abuse and Accountability project,” Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
April 10, 2006, accessed June 9, 2010, 
http://chrgj.org/projects/detainees.html#bythenumbers. 
933 An archive of the pictures, which show detainees in United States custody at the Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq is archived at American online newspaper Salon and can be viewed at: 
Salon, “Introduction: The Abu Ghraib files,” March 14, 2006, accessed July 11, 2011, 
http://www.salon.com/news/abu_ghraib/2006/03/14/introduction. The pictures provide 
photographic evidence that the same tactics and methods used on Al-Qahtani discussed in 
this chapter were in use at the Iraqi prison. 
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reanimation of this anachronistic forms of exercising power would not have 
been possible nor would the mechanisms for establishing truth and 
punishment.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this study, Foucault asserted that the mechanisms of 
exclusion were later replaced by methods of inclusion. ‘It seems’, he said, the 
model of the ‘exclusion of lepers’, ‘the model of the individual driven out in 
order to purify the community, finally disappeared roughly at the end of 
seventeenth and the beginning of eighteenth centuries.’934 He did not, 
however, claim that the new mechanisms of control—inclusion—which 
replaced exclusion, also meant a replacement of sovereign power with 
governmentality. He maintained throughout that ‘sovereignty and 
disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the 
general mechanisms of power in our society,’935 and that ‘they are the two 
things that constitute—in an absolute sense—the general mechanisms of 
power in our society.’936  
 
Judith Butler has argued, that Foucault had simply not been able to foresee 
from his vantage point, what form the co-existence of sovereignty and 
governmentality would take in the present circumstances. Butler argues that 
sovereignty re-emerged in the context of governmentality once the executive 
branch of the United States government invested the person of the President 
with judicial as well as penal powers, taking the world back to a time before 
the separation of powers and the great reforms of the eighteenth century937. 
This Chapter has shown how the presence of the Evildoer made possible this 
return to the past, and gave ‘lie to history as chronology’.  
 
The next Chapter explores how the Evildoer has made possible not just a 
return to the old method of exclusion as the predominant means of 
                                                      
934 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: lectures at the Collége de France, 1974-1975 (London: Verso, 2003), 
44. 
935 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: selected interviews & other 
writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 108. 
936 Michel Foucault, Society must be defended (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 37. 
937 Judith Butler, Precarious life: the powers of mourning and violence (London: Verso, 2004). 
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punishment by extending sovereign powers to include the authority to 
punish sin and transgression, but also to extend beyond limits previously 
thought possible methods of inclusion and normalisation. It also 
demonstrates the crucial role that truth, right and knowledge plays in the 
formation of these new modes of control that are, in fact, as old as sin. 
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7. The Dangerous Muslim 
 
The plague town [in the Middle Ages] was divided up into districts, the districts 
were divided into quarters, and then the streets within these quarters were 
isolated. In each street there were overseers, in each quarter inspectors, in each 
district, someone in charge of the district, and in the town itself either someone 
was nominated as governor or the deputy mayor was given supplementary 
powers when plague broke out. There is, then, an analysis of the territory into its 
smallest elements and across this territory the organisations of a power that is 
continuous in two senses. First of all, it is continuous due to this pyramid of 
control. From the sentries who kept watch over the doors of the houses from the 
end of the street, up to those responsible for the quarters, those responsible for the 
districts and those responsible for the town, there is a kind of pyramid of 
uninterrupted power. It was a power that was continuous not only in this 
pyramidal, hierarchal structure, but also in its exercise, since surveillance had to be 
exercised uninterruptedly. The sentries had to be constantly on watch at the end of 
the streets, and twice a day the inspectors of the quarters and districts had to make 
their inspection in such a way that nothing that happened in the town could escape 
their gaze. And everything thus observed had to be permanently recorded by 
means of this kind of visual examination and by entering all information in big 
registers. At the start of the quarantine, in fact, all citizens present in the town had 
to give their name. The names were entered in a series of registers. The local 
inspectors held some of these registers, and others were kept by the town’s central 
administration. Every day the inspectors had to visit every house, stopping outside 
and summoning the occupants. Each individual was assigned a window in which 
he had to appear, and when his name was called he had to present himself at the 
window, it being understood that if he failed to appear it had to be because he was 
in bed, and if he was in bed he was ill, and if he was ill he was dangerous and so 
intervention was called for. It was at this point that individuals were sorted into 
those who were ill and those who were not. All the information gathered through 
the twice-daily visits, through this kind of review or parade of the living and the 
dead by the inspector, all the information recorded in the register, was then 
collated with the central register held by the deputy mayors in the town’s central 
administration.938  
 
The ‘Muslim town’ in the twenty-first century United Kingdom is identified as 
those in which more than 2,000 Muslims live. Within each ‘Muslim town’, 
                                                       
938 Foucault, Michel, Abnormal: lectures at the Collège de France 1974-1975 (London: Verso, 2003), 
46. 
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referred to commonly as a ‘Muslim community’, live three different types of 
Muslim: 1. The General Muslim, 2. The Extremist Sympathiser, and 3. The 
Violent Extremist. Among the first category of General Muslims are the 
Dangerous Muslims939. The Dangerous Muslim is vulnerable to the influence of 
the other two categories of Muslim – he has the potential to become an 
Evildoer. There are laws to deal with the Extremist Sympathiser and the Violent 
Extremist. There is no legislation, however, to deal with the Dangerous Muslim, 
for he has not committed a crime. The Dangerous Muslim is not a juridically 
discernible figure. He must be dealt with at the level of his potentialities.  
 
For this purpose, each ‘Muslim town’ is allocated a budget ranging from 
hundreds of thousands to millions of pounds, depending on the number of 
Muslims living in it. The funds are to be spent on identifying the Dangerous 
Muslim and treating him before he realises his potential. A programme called 
Channel has been set-up for this purpose. Each local iteration of the programme 
has a chief, known as the Channel Coordinator, selected predominantly from 
amongst members of the police force. The Channel Coordinator establishes 
strong relations with individuals from different sectors of the ‘Muslim town’ 
that they have responsibility for, including the local authority, schools, colleges 
and universities, youth services, children’s services, prisons, probation services, 
voluntary organisations and charities940. Once such relations are established, 
members of these organisations monitor the Muslims they come into contact 
with to identify the Dangerous Muslims among them. The screening is carried 
out at all levels of the General Muslim’s life, from primary school to university 
or prison. They are watched for telltale signs of being vulnerable to the ideology 
                                                       
939 Arun Kundani, “Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism,” Institute of Race 
Relations, October 17. 2009, accessed July 24, 2010, http://www.irr.org.uk/spooked, 13. 
940 “The Channel Guidance” was originally available from the UK Home Office at: 
http://www.security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-
strategy/prevent/publications.html, accessed July 3, 2010. The document is, however, no 
longer available online from the Home Office. The full text can still be accessed at the following 
address: Home Office and Association of Chief Police Officers, “Channel: Supporting 
individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists,” Internet Memory Foundation, 
March 2010, accessed October 5, 2011, 
http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http:/security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-
publications/publication-search/prevent/channel-guidance?view=Binary, 11. 
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of the Evildoer. These signs include possession of ‘extremist literature’ in any 
form, attempts to access such material on the Internet, and being in possession 
of literature related to weapons and explosives or military training. Their social 
and psychological behaviour patterns are also watched and monitored for any 
changes that signify their vulnerability to the ideology of the Evildoer. Such 
signs include a sudden withdrawal from friends and family, interest in a social 
event or venue the individual had previously been indifferent to, a sudden 
dislike of something they liked before, forming an association with an 
organisation the government had deemed illegal, or forming an association 
with an organisation that holds extremist views although it does not advocate 
violence941. 
 
The organisations with which the Channel Coordinator has established contact 
scrutinises the ‘Muslim town’s’ inhabitants to determine whether they have 
been exposed to an ideology that may have contaminated their thought process in 
such a way as to make them perceive violence as a positive force. The General 
Muslim is also carefully monitored to see whether or not they have come into 
contact, at any time, with an articulate person or group with the ability to 
connect his or her personal circumstances with the ideology they had been 
exposed to. Any General Muslim known to have experienced racism, 
discrimination, deprivation and ‘other criminality’—either as a victim or a 
perpetrator—is watched with extra care. Such an experience is known to 
increase the degree of the General Muslim’s vulnerability to the ideology of the 
Evildoer, and thus turn him into a Dangerous Muslim with the potential to 
become a Homegrown Terrorist. They are diagnosed as being likely to 
experience an identity crisis, a psychological weakness that the Violent 
Extremist exploits to his advantage. Of particular interest to the Watchers is 
also any General Muslim who is known to bear a grievance, whether imagined 
or real. Such thoughts, too, are known to increase their degree of vulnerability 
to the Evildoer’s ideology942.  
 
Once a Dangerous Muslim has been identified by one of the Watchers from any 
of the assigned organisations, the Watcher has the authority and the obligation 
                                                       
941 Ibid., 13. 
942 Ibid., 14. 
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to alert the Channel Coordinator. The Channel Coordinator then screens the 
referral to determine whether: (a) the referral was genuine or malicious; (b) the 
Muslim has already passed the Dangerous stage and become either an 
Extremist Sympathiser or a Violent Extremist, in which case he was already 
within the criminal justice system, making extra-judicial intervention 
unnecessary; and (c) the person is clearly not a Dangerous Muslim. With the 
three conditions met to the satisfaction of the Channel Coordinator, he or she 
then convenes a meeting with the line manager and representatives of Senior 
Statutory Partners (such as the local authority, offender management services) 
to carry out a Preliminary Assessment. Collectively they assess the risk the 
Dangerous Muslim faces in society and/or poses to society. Once this group is 
wholly satisfied that the individual in question is indeed a Dangerous Muslim 
vulnerable to the ideology of the Evildoer and thus has the potential to become 
a Homegrown Terrorist, the case is then referred to what is called a Multi-
Agency Panel943.  
 
The Multi-Agency Panel comprises a representative from each of the 
community organisations previously mentioned, as well as a member of the UK 
Border Agency, which controls the movement of foreign nationals in and out of 
the country. The Panel applies to the individual ‘indicators of vulnerability’ 
(possession of extremist material and other such factors mentioned above) and 
their own expertise to assess the most suitable forms of intervention. To ensure 
that the process is carried out properly, the Panel has recourse to Special 
Information Protocols that allow them to freely share between their 
organisations any information they each possesses on the Dangerous Muslim. 
Panel members need not ask the permission of the Dangerous Muslim before 
sharing the information. They are, however, free to do so should they feel so 
inclined. In cases where the Panel decides that the individual in question does 
not need any further support, it is still reviewed after six months and twelve 
months, to ensure that he still remains invulnerable to the ideology of the 
Evildoer944.  
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On occasions when The Panel is satisfied that they indeed have a Dangerous 
Muslim under their scrutiny, a Support Package is devised to deal with him. 
This involves first an Action Plan to determine which of the statutory or 
community groups involved is best suited for handling the Dangerous Muslim. 
What type of Support is provided depends on the degree of threat the 
Dangerous Muslim poses to the community, or the degree of vulnerability to 
the ideology of the Evildoer that he is determined to be facing. If the Dangerous 
Muslim is diagnosed as being only in the early stages of ‘radicalisation’—the 
process by which he is said to fully succumb to the evil ideology—he is 
prescribed ‘a diversion’. If the onset of radicalisation is deemed to be at a more 
advanced level, he is brought under custom-made one-to-one mentoring 
programmes945. 
 
Depending on the level of risk determined, the Dangerous Muslim in the more 
advanced stages of radicalisation is provided with knowledge about Islam that 
counters the knowledge he had gained from the Extremist Muslims. Having 
‘true’ knowledge of Islam provided by state-approved institutions rather than 
the false knowledge held by the Extremists gives the Dangerous Muslim the 
opportunity to challenge the falsehoods he had been taught. Alternatively, the 
Dangerous Muslim is prescribed a programme of Increased Civic Engagement, 
which involves attending Citizenship Classes that provide him with lessons on 
how to be a better Briton. Or, he is provided with knowledge of correct ways 
for political engagement and is introduced to concepts of human rights and 
social justice. To ensure that the Dangerous Muslim does not relapse and 
remains on the right path, his friends and family are also brought into the 
Support Package and/or he is provided access to mainstream services such as 
education, housing, healthcare and employment that may have been 
unavailable to him previously. At all stages of the Support Process, all the 
different organisations involved in monitoring, mentoring and scrutinising his 
emotions and behaviour keep in close contact lest he slip through their 
network946. 
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Once the Panel is wholly and entirely satisfied that the risk from the Dangerous 
Muslim has been reduced, managed or contained, a report is prepared on The 
Case with details of how and why the decision was reached. Before the 
Dangerous Muslim is released from the Support Programme, however, the 
Panel’s report is reviewed and endorsed by the group that made the 
Preliminary Assessment. If the evidence contained within the report is deemed 
unsatisfactory, however, a new Action Plan is devised that provides a different 
Support Package with which to deal with the Dangerous Muslim. He is thus 
deemed to have been unresponsive to the previous treatment. At every stage, 
meticulous records are kept of the Support Process as well as the Dangerous 
Muslim’s responses to it. This information is then transferred to a Knowledge 
Base on Dangerous Muslims that contains information on the most efficient and 
effective ways to identify, treat, de-radicalise, and re-integrate Dangerous 
Muslims into Normal Society947. 
 
The above is a relatively brief summary of the steps taken by the United 
Kingdom to deal with the Dangerous Muslim, the ‘new terrorist’ who is said to 
have emerged within its society in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
The detailed introduction to this long process involving a large number of 
institutions both governmental and non-governmental designed to control the 
Dangerous Muslim in the United Kingdom is necessary for the purpose of this 
Chapter, which is to demonstrate how the presence of the Evildoer in Western 
discourse was made possible by—and made possible—new forms of 
knowledge production, mechanisms for establishing the truth, and means of 
exercising power. The juxtaposition of the above description with Foucault’s 
description of the plague town of the Middle Ages demonstrates the striking 
similarities between the medieval measures imposed to contain the plague and 
measures imposed to contain the Dangerous Muslim in the twenty-first century 
United Kingdom. These similarities, despite the vast temporal gap between 
them shows how both sets of mechanisms are underpinned by the same 
method of exercising power and control over individuals: normalisation. 
 
                                                       
947 Ibid., 20. 
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The procedure for dealing with the Dangerous Muslim described above is part 
of the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism 
(Contest) published in 2009, which is the focus of this Chapter. Contest is 
introduced by Home Secretary Jacqui Smith as ‘one of the most comprehensive 
and wide-ranging approaches to tackling terrorism anywhere in the world.’948 
In the Foreword, then Prime Minister Gordon Brown states its objective to be 
‘ensuring that the people of the United Kingdom can go about their normal lives 
in confidence and free from fear’949 [emphasis added]. Delivery of the strategy is 
organised around what it calls four workstreams: pursue, which aims to stop 
terrorist attacks; prevent, which aims to stop people becoming terrorists or 
supporting violent extremism; protect, which aims to strengthen the country’s 
protection against terrorist attack; and prepare, which aims to mitigate the 
impact of any attack it is unable to stop.950 This Chapter focuses most closely on 
Prevent, the aim of which is to ‘stop people becoming terrorists or supporting 
violent extremism’951. In other words, it targets individuals at the level of their 
potentialities, before they become a juridically discernible figure. Overall, the 
strategy identifies the ideology of Al Qa’ida as one of the greatest challenges to 
the United Kingdom from terrorism, and points to certain communities—
‘notably but not only’ British Muslims—as the sites at which most of its efforts 
would be directed952.  
 
 
A question of knowledge: to include or to exclude? 
This study argues that terrorism is not an ontological certainty but an 
historically constructed discourse, and has traced the history of the concept of 
                                                       
948 Jacqui Smith, “The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism 
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the present knowledge of terrorism as an evil to the medieval concept of the 
Devil. It has also argued that the mechanisms for knowledge production, the 
establishment of truth, and the exercise of power are constitutive of each other. 
How terrorism is known during a particular epoch therefore and the 
mechanisms for controlling it are constitutive of each other. The preceding 
chapters have shown that neither the ‘new’ terrorism nor the ‘new kind of 
responses’ introduced to deal with it are new. The Evildoer that became known 
as the ‘new terrorist’ is a reanimation of the concept of the Devil, the oldest 
enemy and the first rebel that Western society had knowledge of. This research 
has also shown how the presence of the Evildoer made possible, and was made 
possible by, the resurgence of a form of divinely ordained sovereign power in 
the United States. It asserted from the very outset, however, that knowledge of 
a particular subject produced in a society is not just specific to the particular 
epoch during which it emerges, but also has a spatial fixity that cannot be 
wholly and entirely replicated at another location even during the same period of 
time.  
 
As alluded to in the Introduction, the Evildoer of the United States is not the 
same ‘new terrorist’ that emerged in other Western societies during the same 
period. Despite the many similarities shared between the ‘new terrorist’ of the 
United States and of Europe, there are essential differences between them. The 
main such difference is that Europe’s ‘new terrorist’ is within its communities; 
he is ‘Homegrown’. This variance is clear to see in the security strategies 
formulated by the United States and the European Union following the 11 
September 2001 attacks. The National Security Strategy of the United States953 
(2002) describes the ‘new terrorism’ as an evil threatening America from the 
outside. It speaks of shadowy networks of individuals who can bring chaos and 
suffering ‘to our shores’954, implying the enemy comes from foreign lands. The 
European Union’s Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003), on 
the other hand, describes terrorism as a phenomenon that is ‘also a part of our 
                                                       
953 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, 
September 2002, accessed June 8, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
954 Ibid., 3. 
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society’955. It does not refer to terrorism of the twenty-first century either as new 
or evil, rather it describes it as the most recent of the phenomenon’s many 
waves, linked to violent religious extremism and arising out of complex causes. 
It states: ‘Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism’956. 
 
In the years that followed the 11 September 2001 attacks, the differences 
between the United States’ knowledge of terrorism and that of most European 
societies became more apparent. The Evildoer of American terrorism discourse 
dwells in untamed mountain terrain and the desert plains of Islamic countries 
ruled by despotic Islamic regimes. The ‘Homegrown Terrorist’ of European 
discourse dwells within the cities and towns of liberal democracies—his hiding 
places are not caves, but townhouses and apartments; he is more likely to be 
found on the hallowed grounds of an Enlightenment university than in a 
cramped madhrassa; more likely to be sporting a ‘hoodie’ than a turban; more 
likely to speak a Western language (or several) than Arabic; and he is equally 
(or more) familiar with the Western ‘rule of law’ than the Sharia followed by 
‘barbaric’ Islamic regimes. In other words, the ‘new terrorist’ that Europe 
confronts in the twenty first century is equally (if not more) likely to be found 
within its own borders as it is outside of them.  
 
The Homegrown Terrorist has, without a doubt, many similarities with the 
Evildoer. It must be remembered that despite the essential difference between 
the two figures, their conceptual history is the same. As discussed in Chapter 
Two and Three, the history of the concept of terrorism begins with the Devil of 
the European Middle Ages. It is from the separation of sin and rebellion, 
politics and religion, and evil and terror that the discourse of terrorism first 
emerged in the eighteenth century. The medieval Christian narratives of Islam 
as a heresy, and terrorists as the new incarnation of the Devil originated from 
Europe, and are still very much present in European discourse. This is evident 
from the anti-Islamic sentiments and actions that have been expressed and 
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carried out in many European societies on a regular basis in the twenty-first 
century957.   
 
Orders of discourse that were particular to the United States, such as its 
foundational narratives of American Exceptionalism and manifest destiny, and 
the religiosity of American society compared to Europe958, made American 
knowledge of twenty-first century terrorism markedly different from that of 
many European societies. The goodness and the greatness of the American 
nation compared to the barbarism of the Evildoer also meant he was an 
outsider that simply could not be a part of American society. In its long history 
of confronting rebels in their various guises from the secular rebel to the 
universal and post-colonial rebels, Europe has—both conceptually and 
legally—categorised terrorism as a serious or organised crime959. It was also in 
eighteenth century Europe that rebellion was separated from the concept of sin 
which, as discussed in Chapter Three, made possible the emergence of the 
terrorism discourse in the first place. These differences made it impossible for 
European and American terrorism discourses to be ordered in the same way. 
And for these reasons, Europe could not move terrorism from the domain of 
crime to that of religion in the same way as the United States did reversing, in 
the process, the judicial and penal reforms of the eighteenth century that strictly 
separated sin and criminal offences.  
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The essential differences in the orders of the terrorism discourses of the United 
States and most European societies has meant differences in the mechanisms of 
control imposed on contemporary terrorists by each. The Evildoer, understood 
as an evil false-Muslim Arab barbarian, is an enemy outside of American 
society, and outside of civilisation itself. As explored in Chapter Six, the main 
method of control imposed on the Evildoer was exclusion. In Europe, where the 
enemy is within, and where the difference between crime and transgression 
introduced in the eighteenth century remained in place, the predominant 
mechanism of control imposed on the new terrorist is that of inclusion. The 
Homegrown Terrorist was not evil per se, but was vulnerable to the ideology of 
the Evildoer, and needed to be controlled from within and at the level of their 
potentiality.  
 
To demonstrate how these differences constitute and are constituted by 
different forms of knowledge, truth and power, this Chapter focuses on the 
figure of the Dangerous Muslim who emerged in the United Kingdom in the 
latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, as the closest ally of the United States in the War on Terror, the 
United Kingdom is particularly well suited to demonstrate the differences—as 
well as the similarities—in the knowledges of terrorism and the related 
mechanisms of control and power implemented to defend against the ‘new 
terrorist’. Furthermore, the United Kingdom like other countries in Europe has 
a long history of dealing with various terrorist figures in earlier epochs. This is 
particularly the case given its long and violent conflict in/with Ireland.  
 
Indeed, several recent analyses have drawn attention to Paddy Hillyard’s 1993 
book Suspect Community, which chronicles the experiences of members of the 
Irish community living in Britain during ‘the Troubles’ to whom the United 
Kingdom’s Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTAs) applied. Hillyard argues that 
the PTA constructed a suspect community from ‘the Irish living in Britain, or 
Irish people travelling between Ireland and Britain.’960 He asserts that the 
primary reason they were suspects was that they had contacts with Ireland961. 
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961 Ibid., 7. 
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Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton develops Hillyard’s ‘suspect 
community’ thesis further arguing that the political discourses of the War on 
Terror and ‘Islamic fanaticism’ have ‘designated Muslims as the new ‘enemy 
within’ and justified the introduction of legislation that facilitates the 
construction of Muslims as the new ‘suspect community.’962 Also drawing on 
Hillyard’s work, Henri Nickels et al have comparatively analysed the role 
played by the British media in the construction of Irish and Muslim minorities 
in Britain as suspect communities.963 This history and these similarities, which 
are not elaborated upon here, are however worth noting as essential to the 
constitution of a UK knowledge about terrorism that is different from that of 
the United States.   
 
Another reason for the suitability of the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism 
strategies for this study is that while other European countries chose to distance 
themselves from the United States once it decided to invade Iraq in 2003 as part 
of the War on Terror, the United Kingdom remained firm in its decision to 
support the invasion. Furthermore, nine Britons were imprisoned in 
Guantánamo Bay and held in captivity for years with 770 other suspected 
Evildoers964. That an ally as close as the United Kingdom was for the United 
States in the War on Terror understood the same enemy differently, and 
implemented different strategies to counter them, goes a long way in clarifying 
the lack of ontological certainty of terrorism. The material selected for the 
analysis contained in this chapter comprises mainly the strategies, official 
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speeches and legislative instruments used by the United Kingdom in defending 
itself against the Dangerous Muslim.    
 
The abnormality of the Dangerous Muslim 
Since the United States began the War on Terror in October 2001 as a ‘new kind 
of response’ to the ‘new terrorism’ of the Evildoer who carried out the 11 
September 2001 attacks, there have been similar attacks on other Western 
countries and Western interests. On 12 October 2002, for example, bomb attacks 
on the Indonesian island of Bali, popular with Western holidaymakers, killed 
202 people965. On 11 March 2004, 191 people were killed in a series of 
synchronised bomb attacks on the transport system of Madrid during the 
morning rush hour966. On 7 July 2005, a series of synchronised attacks on the 
London transport system, again during the morning rush hour, killed fifty-two 
people967 and injured more than 770968. There have also been many close calls 
and a variety of foiled plots in the intervening years in various Western 
countries and on Western interests elsewhere969.  Even before the 7 July 2005 
attacks, the United Kingdom was put on high alert for a possible terrorist 
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attack. From July 2005 onwards British citizens were warned that a ‘terrorist’ 
attack against their country was always  ‘imminent’, ‘highly likely’ or ‘a strong 
probability’970. The system for gauging ‘national threat level’ was unable to 
foresee any time at which the threat could not exist971. This was just one of many 
transformations that occurred in British perception and knowledge of terrorism 
after the July 7 bombings.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United 
States, for example, then British Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to downplay 
connections between the ‘new terrorist’ and the religion of Islam, and between 
terrorism and religion in general.  
 
[W]hen … a Protestant gunman goes out and kills a Catholic, just because they are 
Catholic, you don't call them Christian terrorists. They don't represent the 
Christianity that I believe in [...] Bin Laden […] no more represents the true spirit 
and teachings of the Koran than the person who calls himself a Protestant who 
goes out and kills a Catholic on the streets of Belfast.972  
 
Speaking about five years later on 21 March 2006, less than a year after the 7 
July bombings, in a speech with the title ‘Clash about civilisations’, the Prime 
Minister re-made the statement with some fundamental changes: 
 
‘They [‘extremists who commit acts of terrorism’] are no more proper Muslims 
than the Protestant bigot who murders a Catholic in Northern Ireland is a proper 
Christian.  But, unfortunately, he is still a “Protestant” bigot.  To say his religion is 
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irrelevant is both completely to misunderstand his motive and to refuse to face up 
to the strain of extremism within his religion that has given rise to it973.  
 
A few months later, in a speech with the title, ‘The duty to integrate: shared 
British values,’ he further clarified the connection between the ‘new terrorism’ 
and Islam: ‘It is true there are extremists in other communities. But the reason 
we are having this debate is not generalised extremism. It is a new and virulent 
form of ideology associated with a minority of our Muslim community.’974 He 
left no doubt that ‘Muslim extremism’ was more dangerous than the 
‘generalised extremism’ from other minority communities. The threat came 
from the Dangerous Muslims within the Muslim community who were 
vulnerable to the ‘new and virulent form of ideology’, which he had also 
referred to as ‘an evil ideology’ on an earlier occasion975.  
 
What the title and content of Blair’s ‘Duty to integrate’ speech suggested, and 
what later materialised as policy and mechanisms for defending against the 
threat from the Dangerous Muslims who are vulnerable to the ‘evil ideology’ of 
Al Qaeda, is that British Muslims have an obligation to integrate and wholly 
embrace ‘British values’. He said ‘those Muslims who shun integration into 
British society’ were like ‘those whites who support the policies’ of the 
rightwing British National Party, and described both segments of the 
population as contradicting ‘the fundamental values that define Britain 
today’976. Prime Minister Blair said that ‘the right to be in a multicultural society 
was always implicitly balanced by a duty to integrate’977. What are the 
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‘fundamental values’ that define Britain to which the Prime Minister referred? 
In this particular speech, he listed them as ‘tolerance, solidarity across the racial 
and religious divide, equality for all and between all’978. What gives people the 
right to call themselves British, he said, are these shared values, at which point 
‘no distinctive culture or religion supersedes [the] duty to be part of an 
integrated United Kingdom.’979 Speaking six years previously, shortly before 11 
September 2001 and long before the July 7 London bombings, he provided a 
different list of ‘British values’ in which religion of any sort did not figure at all: 
‘fair play, creativity, tolerance and an outward-looking approach to the 
world’980.  
 
These shifting changes in the concept of ‘British values’, on conforming to 
which the right to call oneself British depends, reveal the term to be a 
historically contingent discursive formation, a political concept. It is based on 
the idea of ‘the norm’, which plays an exacting and coercive role in the domains 
in which it is applied. ‘The norm is not simply and not even a principle of 
intelligibility; it is an element on the basis of which a certain exercise of power 
is legitimised.’981 And the norm brings with it a principle of both qualification 
and correction. It is this idea of the norm that underpinned the whole process of 
correction to which the Dangerous Muslim was subjected through the Channel 
programme discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
Recall the way in which Channel Coordinators set up a whole network of 
organisations that sought to first identify then correct the behaviour, thoughts, 
lifestyle, and even their religious learning to fit ‘the norm’: the accepted ‘British 
values’ to which Dangerous Muslims must submit before they were declared 
safe enough to return to the status of a General Muslim or a Normal Muslim 
(that is, as normal as a Muslim can be). It is important to note that it is not the 
function of the norm to exclude and to reject, as is the function of sovereign 
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power, to which Evildoers were subjected by the United States, as discussed in 
Chapter Six; Rather the norm is ‘always linked to a positive technique of 
intervention and transformation, to a sort of a normative project.’982 It is this 
process of ‘normalisation’ that is seen at play in the United Kingdom’s 
mechanisms for defending itself against the threat from the Dangerous Muslim. 
Governing Muslims 
The methods of inclusion deployed in the medieval plague towns as discussed 
at the beginning of this Chapter mark the time when the powers of 
‘normalisation’ first emerged in Western societies. Foucault argued that the 
technique took on a life of its own, and became the dominant form of exercising 
power in Western societies, at the end of the eighteenth century with the 
emergence of the dangerous individual and the birth of the prison. The idea of 
dangerousness meant that the individual must be considered by society ‘at the 
level of his potentialities, and not at the level of his actions; not at the level of an 
actual violation of an actual law, but at the level of the behavioural 
potentialities they represented.’983 Whereas previously the knowledge required 
by the judiciary to perform its functions was centred around the questions of 
whether a crime had been committed and who had committed the crime, 
addressing the dangerous individual required knowledge based around a 
different set of questions: was the individual behaving as he should? If not, why 
not? What could be done to make him conform to the norm before he realised 
his inherent potential for danger?  
 
The need for this type of knowledge required ‘constant supervision of 
individuals by someone who exercised some measure of control over them—
schoolteacher, university lecturer, foreman, physician, psychiatrist, prison 
warden—and who, so long as he exercised power, had the possibility of both 
supervising and constituting a knowledge concerning those he supervised.’984 
The punitive control of individuals at the level of their potentialities could not 
be performed by the judiciary itself; it required a whole network of institutions, 
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both old and new, to enclose the individuals ‘in their bounds throughout their 
existence’985. They included pedagogic institutions such as schools and 
universities, psychological or psychiatric institutions such as hospitals, 
asylums, and the police. The emergence of this ‘social orthopaedics’, centred 
around control of the dangerous individual, marked a fundamental change in 
how power is exercised over individuals, and created the ‘disciplinary society’. 
Foucault identified five distinctions that were brought into play with the 
introduction of the disciplinary regime to which the dangerous individual 
needed to be subjected:  
 
[I]t refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space 
of differentiation, and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates 
individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule 
be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected, or as an 
optimum toward which one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and 
heirarchises in terms of value the abilities, the level, the ‘nature’ of individuals. It 
introduces, through this ‘value-giving’ measure, the constraint of a conformity that 
must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to 
all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal […]. The perpetual 
penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary 
institutions compares, differentiates, heriarchises, homogenises, excludes. In short, 
it normalises.986  
 
The ‘exclusion’ practised by normalisation is not the same as the form of 
exclusion exercised by the sovereign whereby a person is expelled from certain 
social circles or from society itself, such as the medieval confinement of lepers 
or the expulsion of Evildoers by the United States in the last decade. Rather, it is 
a form of ‘inclusion through exclusion’987 whereby a whole network of 
institutions—both state and non-state—form a complex web that takes 
complete control of an individual by subjecting him to ‘the norm’. This ‘power 
of the norm’, exercised through discipline, heralded the invention of a new 
form of power that acts not by excluding, ‘but rather through a close and an 
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analytical inclusion of elements’. It is a power that acts not ‘by separating into 
large confused masses, but by distributing to differential individualities’ and it 
is a power that is linked not to ignorance, but ‘to a series of mechanisms that 
secure the formation, investment, accumulation and growth of knowledge.’988  It 
is this form of power by which an individual is continuously subject to ‘the 
penalty of the norm’ through a variety of techniques of power that can be 
transferred to a variety of different institutional supports, state apparatuses, 
and institutions that Foucault described as the ‘art of governing’ in his 1974-75 
series of lectures on the abnormal,989 and which he later defined as 
‘governmentality’990.  
 
In relation to its counterterrorism strategy, the United Kingdom is particularly 
proud of its Prevent stream, which it says incorporates lessons previously 
learned about ‘radicalisation (the process by which people become terrorists or 
lend support to violent extremism)991; and is ‘unique and ground-breaking’ in 
the sheer range of local, national and international partners.’992 This is indeed no 
idle boast, for Contest names fifty-nine institutions ranging from the UK Border 
Agency to Department of Health and the Department of International 
Development as having designated roles to play in implementing its 
mechanisms for preventing the Dangerous Muslim from attaining his potential 
as a Homegrown Terrorist. These institutions are to work in partnership with 
various community groups and organisations from educational institutions to 
places of religious learning and worship. The Channel programme, which was 
summarised at the beginning of this Chapter is one of three separate initiatives 
launched under Prevent. The other two, Preventing Violent Extremism Programme 
and Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan, are also embedded deep within the 
community and call upon neighbourhoods and community groups to be 
involved in identifying and monitoring the Dangerous Muslim at the level of 
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his potentiality993. The chief point of focus of all these programmes is the 
‘Muslim community’ because, as Contest explains, ‘the greatest threat at present 
is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam.’994  
 
When the fifty-seven million people who make up the total population of the 
United Kingdom are categorised according to religious affiliation, Muslims 
emerge as the third largest group comprising a total of 1.5 million people. 
Christians are the largest group making up seventy-two percent of the 
population while ‘people with no religion’ are the second largest group 
comprising fifteen percent of the population. In total, Muslims make up 2.8 
percent of the British population995. Despite the careful qualifications in official 
speeches and documents that extremism is not a threat that arises only from 
Muslim communities, and the statement in Contest that its anti-extremist 
strategies can be applied equally to forms of extremism that were not related to 
Islam, it is the Muslim population and its conduct that became the most 
pressing concern in the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategies. 
Power/knowledge and the Dangerous Muslim 
The mechanisms of inclusion, unlike those of exclusion discussed in the 
previous chapter, do not drive out individuals from the community. America’s  
Evildoers were driven outside of civilisation and humanity itself. Processes of 
normalisation, instead, keeps the individuals within society, establishes them 
within it, fixes them, assigns places for them, defines within it their presences 
and subdivided presences. What was seen in the methods of exclusion 
examined in the last Chapter was a global division between ‘those who are with 
the terrorists’ and those who are not, and an even stricter division between 
Evildoers and the rest of humanity. Instead of such divisions between two 
masses, what is seen in the process of normalisation is ‘a series of fine and 
constantly observed differences’996: between individuals who are Muslims and 
who are not; Muslims who are dangerous and who are not, Muslims who are 
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vulnerable to the Evildoer’s ideology and who are not, Muslims who are 
moderate and who are not, and Muslims who are acceptable and who are not. 
And, instead of the severing of contact that was enforced between the Evildoers 
and the rest of humanity what is seen in the processes of normalisation put into 
place by Prevent are methods of close contact, of constant observation and ‘an 
always finer approximation of power to individuals.’997 In the mechanisms of 
normalisation there is no longer the purification of society by casting the 
individual or group outside its boundaries as was the case with the Evildoers 
whose places of confinement and incarceration themselves had to be outside 
the borders of the United States.  
 
What is found, instead, are attempts to help the Dangerous Muslim by lessening 
his vulnerability to the Evildoer’s ideology thereby reducing the risk to him and 
from him to society. Some of these methods of assistance include, for example, 
teaching him the right Islam. To this effect, Prevent includes a programme in 
which government institutions and local partners work with Muslim scholars, 
faith groups and ‘many other credible and influential voices’ to challenge the 
Evildoer’s ideology while at the same time supporting the scholars who 
‘develop positive alternatives.’998 In another productive form of inclusion, 
Prevent also includes plans to provide ‘theological advice’ that will appear 
prominently on the Internet, providing messages that counter the violent 
theological arguments uploaded by the Evildoers and their followers. 
Additionally, Prevent also includes strategies to engage with institutions of 
pedagogy to ‘address gaps in [their] Islamic teaching’, and also an Islamic 
Citizenship Education Project, which teaches British Muslims to be both ‘good 
Muslims’ and good citizens at the same time999.   
 
As Prime Minister Tony Blair had said, no religious affinity could take 
precedence over ‘British values’, and by running such a programme, the 
government was assisting Muslims, the General and the Dangerous, to achieve 
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both. To ensure success, Prevent also published in October 2008 a special ‘toolkit 
for preventing extremism’, ‘Learning together to be safe.’1000 The toolkit is 
intended ‘to equip young people with the knowledge and skills to be able to 
challenge extremist narratives.’1001 Prevent also allocated a million pound 
budget to strengthen how religious education is taught in schools, and 
introduced a new strand in the citizenship curriculum: ‘identity and 
diversity’1002. The purpose of such programs is to help General and Dangerous 
Muslims to learn how to be good Muslims and good citizens so that they can 
conform to the desired norm of ‘British values’. Without such conformity, 
British General Muslims and Dangerous Muslims posed a threat to the well 
being of society and disrupted the normal lives1003 of normal citizens. Tony Blair 
summed up the situation—and the extent to which the United Kingdom had 
become a society of normalisation—thus: ‘Our tolerance is part of what makes 
Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don't come here’.1004 
 
Normalisation is a form of power that is linked not to ignorance, but to a ‘series 
of mechanisms that secure the formation, investment, accumulation and growth 
of knowledge.’1005 As mentioned in the description of the Channel programme 
summarised at the beginning of this Chapter, organisations and individuals in 
charge of monitoring the ‘Muslim towns’ and their inhabitants gathered and 
freely shared information on suspected Dangerous Muslims in the community. 
This is the knowledge that subsequently informs the strategies and mechanisms 
for control the state formulates. Contest 2009, for example, states that the 
original Prevent strategy was revised in October 2007 ‘based on better 
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understanding of the causes of radicalisation’1006 acquired from previous 
experience.  
 
The importance that the mechanisms of normalisation implemented through 
Contest places on knowledge is also evident from the government’s booklet on 
Countering the terrorist threat: social and behavioural science, which outlines ‘How 
academia and industry can play their part.’1007 The booklet describes terrorism 
as ‘a complex phenomenon’ that needs the application of social and behavioural 
sciences to ‘improve our knowledge and understanding’ of terrorism. It also 
states that such sciences can ‘directly inform strategy, policy and operations 
and help ensure that the Government’s response is robust and effective.’1008 
With regard to Prevent, it asks for help from academia and industry in finding 
out how and why Dangerous Muslims succumb to the ideology of the Evildoer 
and progress from extremism to violent extremism; and also to establish the 
factors which make the Dangerous Muslim more resilient to violent 
extremism1009. It also calls for help from the social and behavioural sciences to 
develop methods for measuring changes in attitude and behaviour of the 
Dangerous Muslim, also in order to scientifically assess the best practices and 
methods for intervention from fields such as health and crime1010.  
 
The booklet encourages the social sciences community to help in the Pursue 
workstream of the Contest by developing methods and ways to ‘identify 
suspicious behaviour’, so that the activities of Dangerous Muslims who 
succumb to the evil ideology can be frustrated and deterred.1011 It calls for help 
from the social sciences in developing techniques that enable identification of 
terrorist actions and behaviours in a range of contexts because ‘an individual’s 
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behaviour may contain clues as to their intent.’1012 The booklet also refers to 
attempts being made to develop research in the field of what it calls ‘counter-
terrorism science’, overseen by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism 
(OSCT), established within the Home Office in March 20071013.  
 
As discussed in detail in Chapter Five and Six, methods of establishing the truth, 
production of knowledge and the exercise of power are constitutive of each 
other. Foucault asserted that it was the emergence of the dangerous individual 
in the eighteenth century that required development of a new type of 
knowledge, characterised by supervision and examination, organised around 
the concept of the norm, and exercised through the supervision of the 
individual throughout their existence that forms the basis of ‘the power, the 
form of knowledge-power, that was to give rise […] to what we call the ‘human 
sciences’—psychiatry, psychology, sociology.’1014 These new knowledges are 
what gave rise to power that did not require an all-powerful king, monarch or 
state presiding over subjects, but was exercised through power/knowledge 
constituted by and through the discipline of individuals according to the norm. 
It is quite possible that the level of supervision, monitoring and information 
gathering as well as the need for information regarding the Dangerous Muslim 
and his vulnerability to the evil ideology may yet secure the status of a science 
for the field of ‘Terrorism Studies’. Already, a specific stream within the field 
has emerged focusing on Jihadi terrorism, and ‘radicalisation’ with publications 
and papers that dig into the psyche of the Dangerous Muslim and seek to 
explain why, when and how this new figure becomes a full-blown Evildoer1015. 
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Contest cites many of these studies, such as Quintan Wiktrowitz’s Radical Islam 
rising: Muslim extremism in the West1016  and Edwin Bakker’s Jihadi terrorists in 
Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an 
exploratory study1017, as the source of its own knowledge. If a science of terrorism 
does emerge, despite the existence of journals such as Critical Studies on 
Terrorism (CST), it is bound to be subjected to the will to truth and the will to 
knowledge discussed in Chapter Five. Supported by institutions of pedagogy, 
the science of terrorism is likely to ground in ‘true discourse’ what is already 
known about ‘Islamic terrorism’, Jihad, and the Dangerous Muslim, opening up 
possibilities for new forms of power/knowledge. As discussed below, the 
development of new types of sciences or domains of knowledge such as these 
are important in considering the power of terrorism, for it is from such 
knowledge and not from the rule of law that disciplinary power increasingly 
derives its jurisprudence.  
 
The norm and the law 
Mechanisms of discipline define ‘not a code of law, but a code of normalisation’ 
and they ‘necessarily refer to a theoretical horizon that is not the edifice of law, 
but the field of human sciences.’1018 What explains the overall mechanisms of a 
‘normalising society’, Foucault asserted, is that it exercises power through both 
right and disciplines where ‘the techniques of discipline and discourses born of 
discipline are invading right, and […] normalising procedures are increasingly 
colonising the procedures of the law.1019  
 
A substantial part of the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy derives 
its jurisprudence from different types of knowledges, and not from the rule of 
law. This is evident from the manner in which the Channel programme, 
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described at the beginning of the Chapter, seeks to intervene in the lives of 
Dangerous Muslims before they become juridically discernible entities. The 
bedrock of the Prevent strategy is the knowledge of the process of 
‘radicalisation’, which Contest defines as ‘the process by which people become 
terrorists or lend support to violent extremism’1020. One of the most pressing 
issues once the Homegrown Terrorist emerged in European discourse, and 
especially after 7 July 2005 in the United Kingdom, was to find out why the 
attackers had done what they did1021. All four men who carried out the attacks 
were British citizens, three of whose respective parents were of Pakistani origin 
and had ‘taken British citizenship’ after arriving there ‘many years before’; the 
fourth man was a Jamaican who married ‘a white British convert’. All four were 
Muslims1022. 
 
The UK government introduced a variety of new legislation and new offences 
relating to the perpetration of terrorist acts in the first decade of the twenty first 
century that are different from normal criminal investigations and procedures. 
Many of these powers are contained within the Terrorism Act 2000, and have 
allowed a whole range of new mechanisms of power from detention without 
charge for long periods of time to powers of stopping and searching 
pedestrians at a whim to stopping people from taking photographs. The 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 authorises interception of 
communication between people, covert surveillance and also ‘covert human 
intelligence sources’—establishing relationships with people specifically for the 
purpose of covert intelligence gathering. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) also provides additional legislation and powers 
against terrorism.   
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Even with all the powers created by such anti-terrorism legislation, many of 
which already overlap existing criminal law provisions and other laws 
designed to deal with ‘normal’ criminals, one of the chief aims of the Contest, 
especially Prevent, is to reach where the law cannot:  
 
It is not always possible to prosecute people who intelligence indicates are 
engaged in terrorist-related activity: for this reason the Government has developed 
a range of alternative non-prosecution actions to protect the public. They include 
control orders (which impose restrictions on the movements and contacts of an 
individual who has been engaged in terrorist-related activity); the exclusion of 
foreign nationals from entering the UK; revocation of citizenship; and deportation. 
These powers directly affect only a very small number of individuals [emphasis added]. 
 
What is important for the development of disciplinary power in the long run is 
not the number of people that it initially affects or is aimed at, but the 
mechanisms themselves and their longevity. As Foucault put it, the bourgeoisie 
don’t ‘give a damn’ about the mad, the poor, the incarcerated or the 
delinquents.1023 What interests them are the mechanisms of power developed to 
deal with them, all of which have been appropriated and adopted by the state 
system.  
 
The Control Orders the Contest refers to, for example, may apply to ‘only a very 
small number of people’, but they contribute to the consolidation of the 
counter-terrorism discourse and help its functioning as a whole. Moreover, the 
Control Orders, as well as the other non-prosecution actions, Contest refers to are 
prime examples of how normalising procedures are increasingly taking over 
procedures of the law. Control Orders were introduced in 2005 as emergency 
legislation after the House of Lords ruled that powers allowing the detention of 
foreign nationals suspected of terrorism was unlawful even if there was no 
possibility of deporting them. They are thus designed precisely to circumvent 
the law. Control Orders do not authorise the imprisonment of suspected 
terrorists in a prison, but allow the imposition of similar control, surveillance 
and discipline over the ‘controlee’s life’. Contest explains Control Orders as a 
mechanism that allows the Home Office to ‘place one or more obligations on an 
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individual in order to prevent, restrict or disrupt his or her involvement in 
terrorist-related activities’.1024 The ‘obligations’ increasingly include the 
requirement for controlees to relocate to another area of the country, causing 
major disruptions to their personal lives. ‘Obligations’ of lesser enormity but no 
less disciplinary in nature often include restriction of movement to within a 
specified area; ‘often a mile, sometimes less’; and prohibition of using the 
Internet or a phone other than the one at his address1025.  
 
The controlee’s passport is confiscated and they can also be banned from using 
public transport such as buses, trains and the underground rail system. Many 
are placed under curfews lasting up to sixteen hours a day, restricting them to 
the confines of their home, often one that he has been forced to relocate to. 
Furthermore, they are also required to report to the police on a daily basis, 
while the police have the power to arrive at his house unannounced and 
confiscate or examine any object inside. Persons placed under Control Orders 
are also electronically tagged and are required to seek ministerial permission 
for daily activities, which members of the ‘normal’ population take for granted 
such as visiting a place of worship.1026 The Control Orders are subject to review 
every year, but can continue indefinitely. From the time Control Orders was 
introduced in December 2005 to January 2011 a total of forty-eight people were 
placed under Control Orders, twenty-eight of them foreign nationals. Two of 
the foreign nationals spent more than four years restrained under Control 
Orders before the orders were revoked1027. At the end of 2010, five years after 
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the mechanism was introduced as ‘emergency legislation’, there were eight 
individuals—all of them British citizens—under Control Orders. Two of them 
have been restrained under the Orders for less than a year while four have been 
under them for over a year. Two were placed under the Orders four years ago, 
and two have been under them for over two years1028. 
 
Contest describes Control Orders as ‘a means of managing the risk posed by 
suspected terrorists in this country who we can neither prosecute (because the 
material about the individuals cannot be adduced as evidence or is not 
sufficient to enable a charge to be made) nor deport […]’1029. In other words, it 
allows the detention of an individual who had neither committed nor been 
charged with a crime, removing the principle of habeas corpus, one of the most 
fundamental and universal of rights enshrined in the judiciary system of the 
sovereign. This principle underpinned the ‘rule of law’ in the United Kingdom 
for 790 years. Control Orders also deny the controlee other fundamental legal 
rights such as the right to know the charges against him and to representation 
by a lawyer with whom he can communicate freely and enjoy the lawyer-client 
privilege with. Investigations into the effect of Control Orders on those placed 
under their disciplinary mechanisms have shown that:  
 
[T]he degree of control over the minutiae of controlees’ daily lives, together with 
the length of time spent living under such restrictions and their apparently 
indefinite duration have combined to exact a heavy price on the mental health of 
those subjected to control orders1030. 
 
Three controlees have made serious attempts to take their own lives1031. Control 
Orders, introduced as a replacement for legislation that was found unlawful 
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because it breached an individual’s human rights now negates the same human 
rights of another individual. This time lawfully.  
 
Respect for ‘the rule of law’ promised by the Contest is fulfilled by incorporating 
law into the system of normalisation, and making it function as a coordinating 
point between normalising mechanisms. Methods such as these by which 
‘normalising procedures are increasingly colonising the law’1032 are 
complemented by procedures that transform practices of the law into 
‘instruments of review and mechanisms of accountability for government’ by 
establishing various tribunals, commissions and inquiries that operationalise 
the language and procedures of the law against abuses found in various 
governmental mechanisms1033. This use of the law as a regulatory mechanism 
for normalisation can, in fact, be seen at work in the various legal bodies that 
review the Control Orders itself. The latter are reviewed annually by a State-
appointed ‘statutory reviewer’ who provides advice on whether the Control 
Orders regime remains a necessity and is also reviewed annually by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights of the House of Lords. The latter published nine 
reports, including one that expressed ‘disappointment’ at government’s 
‘passivity’ in paying any heed to legal advice criticising the fairness of Control 
Orders.1034 Despite the criticism, until January 2011, the government’s decision 
after each review was that the Orders were necessary to defend society from 
terrorism, and the Dangerous Muslims placed under Control Orders. The 
Home Office recommended in January 2011 that the Control Orders should be 
repealed. This does not, however, mean that they are to be done away with, 
even if Parliament does agree to the recommendation. The Home Office has 
suggested that they simply continue in ‘a less intrusive manner’ instead.  
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Power without terrorism 
Retaining powers introduced for a specific purpose, during times of heightened 
fear of terrorism, or under other exceptional circumstances, even after the risk 
or fear appears to have passed has been a common feature in the United 
Kingdom’s efforts to govern terrorism. It is, as mentioned above, a defining 
characteristic of governmentality in a normalising society. The January 2011 
review of terrorism powers by the Home Office, for example, considered the 
need for eight different mechanisms that have been in operation in the United 
Kingdom for the last decade, and have been criticised for their intrusive nature 
or have been found to be in breach of international human rights laws.  
 
These include Section 41 and Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which 
introduced pre-charge detention of terrorism suspects from the previous forty-
eight hours to seven days. It was later extended to twenty-eight days in the 
Terrorism Act 2006, a ‘compromise’ reached with the government, which 
wanted the period to be extended to ninety days1035. In ‘normal’ crimes, the 
maximum time period a suspect can be held without charge is four days. The 
purpose of pre-charge detention is not preventing terrorism, but securing 
sufficient evidence for use in criminal proceedings1036. The extended twenty-
eight day period is subject to an annual affirmative order; that is, unless 
renewed, the period relapses to a maximum of fourteen days. Despite 
criticism1037, ‘the government did not face any challenge in renewing the order’ 
annually.1038  
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In January 2011, however, the period relapsed to fourteen days when the 
government failed to apply for a renewal. This is, however, not the end of the 
matter, as the Home Office review published shortly after reveals that the plan 
is that ‘emergency legislation extending the period of pre-charge detention to 28 
days should be drafted and discussed with the Opposition, but not introduced, 
in order to deal with urgent situations when more than 14 days is considered 
necessary […]’. In other words, the government is retaining for itself the power 
to reinforce the mechanism whenever it deems it necessary. It also recommends 
a variety of other mechanisms to compensate for the loss of the two weeks 
detention period, including an extension to how long an individual can be 
detained post-charge.1039 
 
Another mechanism of power introduced to defend society from terrorism is 
the authority given to the police to stop and search pedestrians and their 
vehicles to look for articles of any kind that could be used in connection with 
terrorism, whether or not the police suspect such articles are present. In January 
2010, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found this power, 
provided by Section 44-46 of the Terrorism Act 2000, to be in breach of the right 
to privacy provided by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)1040. 
Despite this, and despite there being a variety of other mechanisms that allow 
police to stop and search suspects, the Home Office review decided there was 
too much risk involved in repealing the Section1041. Under consideration was 
‘whether and how to create a more precise and specific power that could be 
used in more tightly defined circumstances.’1042 The Home Office found that use 
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of the power is ‘operationally justified’ ‘in exceptional circumstances.’1043 Its 
final recommendation, thus, was ‘Section 44 should be replaced with [a] new 
power’1044 which is more limited than the current Section 44, but is still more 
extensive than other mechanisms that perform the same tasks of stopping and 
searching.  
 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) is another piece of 
legislation ‘sometimes’ used for terrorism prevention purposes that was 
reviewed by the Home Office in January 2011. It allows extensive surveillance 
of individuals in public places and also the interception of their 
communications. It also allows Covert human intelligence sources (CHISs) or, 
to put it more plainly, the power to form covert relationships with particular 
people solely for the purpose of getting information from them. ‘At present’, 
the Home Office says, ‘there is no limit on the type of criminal case for which 
the RIPA techniques can be employed.’1045 The ‘no limit’ character of these 
mechanisms of surveillance became evident in May 2010 when it emerged that 
local councils were using them to carry out surveillance on members of the 
public for a whole range of purposes from catching those who failed to pick up 
after their dogs to those who break the smoking ban.1046  
 
The Councils’ wholehearted embrace of the new power saw them mounting the 
equivalent of eleven surveillance operations a day between May 2008 and May 
2010, with 372 local authorities in Britain carrying out a total of 8,500 
surveillance operations during this period1047. Apart from catching smokers and 
lazy dog owners, councils also used the powers to spy on their own employees 
and check-up on employees’ car parking, working times, and sick pay claims, 
and to spy on the wardens they themselves employ to spot crime. One of the 
most notorious cases occurred in 2008 when: 
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Jenny Paton and her family in Poole, Dorset, found themselves the subject of a 
three week covert surveillance operation, including being secretly followed by 
council officials, after Paton was wrongly suspected of lying about her address to 
get her daughter into a particular school1048. 
Of the eight different mechanism of power introduced in relation to terrorism 
that the Home Office reviewed in January 2011, Councils’ authority to use RIPA 
was only one of two mechanisms which it deemed should be curbed or 
curtailed. The other was the power acquired by the police under five sections of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 to stop members of the public from taking photographs. 
Deciding to curtail the powers, the Home Office declared with all seriousness 
that, ‘the public […] have a right to take photographs without fear of being 
stopped, questioned or searched by the police.’1049 
 
Clearly, powers that are introduced for the intention to pursue, prevent, protect 
and prepare British society in relation to terrorism do not retain their original 
intention, remit or scope for very long. Terrorism still dominates Western 
discourse to too great an extent for it to stop giving a damn about Homegrown 
Terrorists or Evildoers like the bourgeoisie of earlier centuries to whom what 
mattered were the mechanisms introduced to deal with the poor, lepers, plague 
victims, prisoners, or other ‘abnormal’ members of society. When it does get to 
the stage, when terrorism discourse undergoes a re-ordering and a new 
transformation what will remain are the laws, mechanisms of discipline, 
surveillance, monitoring, and knowledge production that--as is currently 
happening--will become part of the state apparatus further governmentalising 
sovereignty in an increasingly ‘normalised’ society. 
 
Summary 
The mechanisms of inclusion implemented by European states, specifically the 
United Kingdom, to deal with the ‘new terrorist’ are fundamentally different 
from the methods introduced by the United States in its treatment of the 
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Evildoers in captivity. These differences are a result not of the United States 
having more military strength, being more belligerent, or having a penchant for 
unilateralism when compared with European states. The differences, instead, 
are due to the differences in their knowledges of terrorism. The twenty-first 
century terrorist known in the United States is an Evildoer, a false-Muslim Arab 
barbarian driven by hatred of liberal values that Western civilisation—
represented by the United States—holds dear. The Evildoer is foreign, and alien 
to the United States, and to the rest of humanity. As such, the United States 
excluded the Evildoer, cast him out of not just society, but of civilisation. In 
Europe, the twenty-first century terrorist is a Dangerous Muslim, an enemy 
within who is vulnerable to the ideology of the Evildoer and, if not normalised 
and made to conform, threatens the safety of its own ‘normal’ population. The 
knowledge/power relations that underpin a discursive formation such as 
terrorism mean that knowing the enemy differently constitutes different forms 
of power. In the United States’ treatment of Evildoers was seen the resurgence 
of a form of divinely ordained sovereign power last practised in Western 
societies when rebellion was still a sin and crime and transgression had not yet 
been separated. In the United Kingdom what is seen is a multiplication of the 
powers of normalisation; where discourses born of discipline are increasingly 
invading the right, and where law is being increasingly displaced by a 
discursively constituted norm. The powers of governmentality and that of a 
resurgent sovereignty have not worked together in tandem to such an extent in 
the history of Western civilisation. And not since the Devil has the presence of 
such an omnipresent enemy controlled and disciplined its populations so.  
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Epilogue 
 
‘Monty Python’s Terry Jones has revealed that he would shy away from making the 
comedy Life of Brian today, because of a resurgence in religious belief.’ ----- The 
Guardian, 10 October 2011 
 
Western thought struggled to accept Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik as a 
terrorist because terrorism discourse today is so ordered that it is difficult, if not 
wholly impossible, for any other figure except the evil Muslim barbarian to be 
conceived of as a true terrorist. Certainly the laws that define ‘terrorism’ in 
Norway categorise Breivik as a terrorist1050. But, an absolute singularity to 
which there appears no alternative such as the Evildoer-terrorist of today, 
requires much more than the sum of its legal, linguistic or theoretical 
definitions for the establishment of its whole truth. As Foucault argued, nothing 
can exist as an element of knowledge: 
 
if on one hand it does not conform to a set of rules and constraints characteristic, 
for example, of a given type of discourse in a given period, and if, on the other 
hand, it does not possess the effects of coercion or simply the incentives peculiar to 
what is scientifically validated or simply rational or simply generally accepted, etc. 
Conversely, nothing can function as a mechanism of power if it is not deployed 
according to procedures, instruments, means, and objectives which can be 
validated in more or less coherent systems of knowledge.1051 
 
In Norwegian law terrorism is broadly defined as the pursuit of a political, 
religious or ideological goal using violence or the threat of violence1052. But the 
knowledge that informs the law—that which exists at the point of linkage 
(enchaînment) between what is said and what is done about terrorism—in that 
knowledge, terrorism in the twenty-first century is violence threatened or 
committed against the Western civilisation by Arab/Muslim barbarians, 
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Evildoers. Anders Breivik’s actions may have fallen within the limits of 
terrorism as defined in law, but what is stated in law and what Norway knows 
terrorism to be are different. The Norwegian Security Service’s Annual Threat 
Assessment 2011, for instance, assumes terrorism to be ‘extreme Islamism’1053. 
Boldly headlined in the Assessment as the chief threat to Norway is: 
 
Politically motivated violence – terrorism 
Few individuals in Norway support extreme Islamism. Yet…1054  
 
Without hesitation or explanation, terrorism is stated as ‘extreme Islamism’. 
The three main threats the Assessment sees as arising from terrorism confirm 
this given of terrorism: radicalisation of Muslims in Norway, Norwegian 
Muslims travelling abroad to train as terrorists, and extreme Islamists in 
Norway going global.1055 In other words, in Norwegian thought of today, the 
terrorist is a Dangerous Muslim, the would-be Evildoer living within its 
communities, not the non-Muslim or secular terrorist defined in its laws. This 
becomes even clearer when we consider the Assessment’s explanation of the 
second most dangerous threat that Norway faces:  
 
Politically motivated violence – national extremism 
As in previous years, far-right and far-left extremist communities will not pose a 
serious threat to Norwegian society in 2011.1056 
 
That the Assessment was emphatically proven wrong is not the point. What the 
heading, ‘Politically motivated violence - national extremism’, shows is a 
division between a form of politically motivated violence that is terrorism—
committed by Muslims—and other forms of political violence perpetrated by 
non-Muslims and, therefore, also non-terrorists. These non-terrorist terrorists 
                                                       
1053 Norwegian Police Security Service, “Annual Threat Assessment 2011,” accessed October 12, 
2011, 
http://www.pst.politiet.no/Filer/utgivelser/trusselvurderinger%20engelsk/Unclassified_thre
at_assessment_2011.pdf. 
1054 Ibid., 4. 
1055 Ibid., 4-6. 
1056 Ibid., 8. 
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are ‘national extremists’ sub-divided into the categories of ‘far-right extremists’, 
‘far-left extremists’, and ‘anti-Islamic groups’1057. All of them threaten or commit 
violence in the pursuit of specific political/ideological/religious goals, but none 
of them are Muslims and, therefore, are not true terrorists1058. The inclusion of 
the third, ‘anti-Islamic groups’, in the non-terrorism category of political 
violence affects a specific category of political violence that is not terrorism 
when carried out against ‘Islamic groups’. Whereas the law, broadly speaking, 
defines terrorism as sub-state political violence per se, the will to truth existing 
in the unspoken body of societal rules in Norway (and other Western societies) 
of today makes it difficult to conceive of the non-Muslim as a terrorist, or acts of 
violence committed by non-Muslims as terrorism.  
 
The truth of the Evildoer became evident in the first two hours or so after 
Breivik’s attacks began, when the public sphere on both sides of the Atlantic 
jumped to what the United Kingdom’s The Guardian newspaper stated as ‘the 
obvious conclusion’: the attacks were being carried out against Norway by 
‘Islamic radicals’1059. Television news stations, Internet editions of newspapers, 
and social media pundits began rolling coverage of the attacks, some calling it 
‘Norway’s 9/11’1060. ‘Terrorism experts’ appeared on all such platforms to 
                                                       
1057 Ibid., 8-9. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 The Guardian newspaper first published the conclusion in an article by Peter Beaumont 
headlined ‘Oslo bomb suspicion falls on Islamist militants’, which appeared on 22 July 2011 as 
news of the attacks on the island of Utoya were just emerging. Later that afternoon it 
substituted the article with one headlined ‘Norway attacks suggest political motive’, also by the 
same author. See: Peter Beaumont, “Norway attacks suggest political motive,” The Guardian, 
July 23, 2011, accessed September 15, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/23/norway-attacks-oslo-bombing-youth-camp. 
There was no explanation for the removal of the article, nor any notification. The earlier article 
was simply substituted with the latter. The original article is available in cached form from 
news monitoring website Ongo at: 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:K03_nAxCwoYJ:www.ongo.com/v/
1437250/-1/D9C05D426014974B/oslo-bomb-suspicion-falls-on-islamist-
militants+peter+beaumont+guardian+norway+suspicion&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk, accessed 
September 15, 2011. 
1060 Brian Flynn and Simon Hughes, ‘’Al Qaeda’ Massacre: Norway’s 9/11,” The Sun, July 23, 
2011. For a picture of the front page as it appeared on the day, visit: http://twitpic.com/5u6n2l, 
accessed September 28, 2011. 
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explain the many reasons that existed for ‘Islamic terrorists’ to hate Norway, 
ranging from the openness of its society and the degree of Norwegian freedom 
of expression to the exemplary liberalism of its governance.  
 
What doubly clarified the degree to which terrorism has come to be accepted 
only as acts committed by Evildoers and no other was the rapidity with which 
Western terrorism discourse abandoned Breivik once details of his identity 
began to emerge just two hours after he began the attacks. The terrorism 
experts, who had so freely expounded on their theories of why terrorists would 
hate Norway enough to attack it, beat a hasty retreat then. Not because they 
had got the whodunit wrong by a very wide margin, but because Breivik—
‘tall’, ‘blonde’, ‘Nordic looking’, ‘native Norwegian’—could not be recognised 
as a coherent element of the present knowledge of terrorism. Even if motivated 
by politics/religion/ideology a terrorist who is neither Arab nor Muslim by 
birth or by conversion appears a falsehood in relation to the truth of the 
terrorist as an Evildoer. This explains the sudden paralysis in Western 
discourse when confronted by the non-Muslimness of Breivik, as witnessed in 
the chaotic scramble in the Western public sphere for the right term—Lone 
wolf? Mass murderer? Psychopath? Madman? Islamophobe? Rightwing 
Extremist?—to describe Breivik without using the word ‘terrorist’. To be 
considered as belonging within terrorism discourse, the terrorist has to conform 
to the truth of the Evildoer. Anders Breivik did not. Hence, the struggle with 
which Western thought was confronted with in conceiving of, speaking about, 
and acting on Breivik as a terrorist.  
 
The degree of truth that the knowledge of terrorism as committed by 
Arab/Muslims waging a Holy War against the Western civilisation has attained 
was also evident from Breivik’s actions and in his own justifications for them.  
His aim, as stated in his own words was to draw Western political attention to 
the truth he knew today’s terrorism to be: a war of conquest and destruction 
being waged by Jihadhists (or Evildoers by their Arab/Muslim name) against 
the Western civilisation1061. Breivik found validation of this truth in the vast 
                                                       
1061 Andreas Breivik, “2083: A Declaration of European Independence”. Full text accessed 
September 25, 2011, http://www.scribd.com/doc/60849766/Anders-Behring-Breivik-
Manifesto-2083-–-A-European-Declaration-of-Independence-By-Andrew-Berwick. 
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body of terrorism literature published during the War on Terror—largely 
accepted as knowledge attained independent of power. In the 1500 page 
manifesto that Breivik published on the Internet shortly before he embarked on 
the violence are many carefully cited references to many of the same authors 
whose works were discussed in Chapter Five as making significant contributions 
to the production of the ‘true’ knowledge of terrorism as Arab/Muslim 
barbarians waging a Holy War against the Western civilisation. In seeking to 
change Norwegian government policies, which he interpreted as facilitating the 
conquest of Europe by Muslim Jihadists, Breivik sought to defend his society 
from an enemy that threatened not just its norms and values but also its very 
existence. When the Evildoer is the terrorist, how can anybody who defends 
civilisation from the Evildoer possibly be a terrorist himself?  
 
Just as the Evildoer cannot exist as a coherent element of true terrorism 
knowledge without the mechanisms of power that speak of and act upon 
terrorists as Evildoers, it is difficult to use mechanisms of power against a 
terrorist who cannot be validated in true discourse as an Evildoer. The type of 
judgement and punishment that can be legitimately applied to Breivik, or the 
mechanisms of defence that can be rightfully exercised against him and other 
non-Muslim perpetrators of political violence, depends on whether or not they 
conform to the truth of terrorism. By October 2011, Norway had not yet 
brought a formal indictment against Breivik, but it was widely reported as a 
possibility that he may be charged with ‘crimes against humanity’ rather than, 
or in addition to, terrorism1062. Clearly, the status of Breivik as a terrorist is not a 
given in Norwegian thought. 
 
Similarly, instruments of control that are designed for perpetrators of political 
violence who are not Evildoers cannot be deemed legitimate—or sufficient—
when used in relation to the Evildoer. It is one of the central arguments of this 
study that the Evildoer is a juridically indiscernible figure who was made 
possible by, and has made possible, mechanisms of power that exist outside of 
the limits of sovereign power as delimited by the rule of law. Evidence to 
support this assertion emerged in how Western societies treated Osama bin 
                                                       
1062 “Police ponder new Andreas Breivik charge,” BBC News, July 26, 2011, accessed July 27, 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14288941. 
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Laden when he came within the reach of United States military personnel 
almost ten years after the hunt for him began.  
‘Bastard in the Sand’1063: killing Osama, the law, and right 
Shortly before midnight on 1 May 2011, in the darkness of what was a moonless 
night, two American Black Hawk helicopters flew across the Afghan border 
into Pakistan1064. The aircraft travelled without lights and deliberately off the 
radar of Pakistani intelligence towards Abbottabad, a town north of the 
Pakistani capital Islamabad. Inside the helicopter were twenty-three United 
States Navy SEALS, the most elite and the best-trained killers among American 
military personnel. Their destination was a residential compound in 
Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden had been discovered hiding. Their 
mission was to kill him. 
 
If all went according to plan, the SEALS would drop from the helicopters into the 
compound, overpower bin Laden’s guards, shoot and kill him at close range, and 
then take the corpse back to Afghanistan1065.  
 
Except for one Black Hawk crashing into the compound, all did go as planned. 
About two hours after the mission began, a Navy SEAL had the infrared laser 
of his gun trained on an unarmed Osama bin Laden’s chest. ‘Nine years, seven 
months, and twenty days after September 11th, an American was a trigger pull 
from ending bin Laden’s life’, as The New Yorker magazine described the split 
                                                       
1063 ‘Bastard in the Sand’ is the title of a song sung by Canadian comedian Martin Short on 
popular American television programme the Late Show with David Letterman on 16 May 2011 to 
mark the killing of Osama bin Laden. The song is a parody of the highly popular song ‘Candle 
in the Wind’ dedicated to British Princess Diana on her death by British musician Elton John. 
Martin Short dedicated ‘Bastard in the Sand’ to Osama bin Laden. As he sang live, his backing 
group were dressed as Navy SEALS, and pictures of Osama—and illustrations depicting the 
Devil in popular imagination—appeared on a large screen in the background. To view a 
recording of the performance, see “Martin Short Sings ‘Bastard in the Sand’,” YouTube video, 
3:03, posted by “skill2u,” May 18, 2011, accessed September 10, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G52W0m2EKjY.  
1064 Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting bin Laden: what happened that night in Abbottabad,” August 
8, 2011, The New Yorker, accessed September 10, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle?currentPage=all. 
1065 Ibid. 
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second before the first shot was fired at Osama bin Laden1066. The bullet hit him 
in the chest. As he fell backward, the SEAL fired a second round into his head. 
Osama bin Laden was dead. ‘For God and country’, relayed the SEAL, ‘E.K.I.A.‘ 
[enemy killed in action]1067. At dawn the following day, the United States 
military flew bin Laden’s body out to a thousand-foot-long nuclear-powered 
aircraft carrier sailing off the coast of Pakistan. Here ‘Bin Laden’s body was 
washed, wrapped in a white burial shroud, weighted, and then slipped inside a 
bag’—all done ‘in strict conformance with Islamic precepts and practices’—after 
which his body was thrown from about ‘twenty and twenty-five feet above the 
waves’ into the open Arabian Sea. Across America people gathered to 
celebrate1068. President Barack Obama declared: ‘Justice has been done.’1069 
 
Prior to the emergence of the Evildoer it was not possible to speak of as justice 
the process by which one state sends specially trained assassins into the 
sovereign space of another, with neither permission nor notification, for the sole 
purpose of killing an individual enemy discovered to be hiding in that state. 
Nor would it have been possible to present casting out into the sea the dead 
body of an enemy as the logical conclusion of a long battle for justice. The limits 
of justice as it had been conceived prior to the Evildoer did not involve the 
assassination of the offender; it involved the rule of law, the judiciary, due 
process. But judicial power, by its very constitution, is limited to crime—it 
cannot be legitimately applied to actions beneath or beyond offences defined in 
law. Evil is not a crime; and Osama bin Laden was the Chief Evildoer. Judging 
and punishing Evildoers, especially Osama bin Laden, could be nothing but 
extrajudicial because the limits of modern sovereign power did not stretch far 
enough to accommodate evil. Osama bin Laden’s killing, like the treatment of 
prisoners taken into United States custody in the War on Terror, is evidence not 
of illegal behaviour by the United States, but the demonstration of an additional 
authority sovereign power has (re)assumed with the emergence of the Evildoer: 
                                                       
1066 Ibid. 
1067 Ibid. 
1068 Time, “Celebrating the death of Osama bin Laden,” accessed October 12, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2068860,00.html. 
1069 Barack Obama, “Address to the Nation,” The White House, May 2, 2011, accessed August 
15, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead. 
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the right to punish sin and transgression. In American terrorism discourse 
Osama bin Laden and evil had a symbiotic relationship, as evident from the 
many references former President George Bush made to Osama the Evil One.  
 
It was also a view often expressed in general public discourse. Influential 
British/American commentator Christopher Hitchens wrote, for example, that 
‘Osama bin Laden was a near-flawless personification of the mentality of a real 
force: the force of Islamic jihad […] this force absolutely deserves to be called 
evil’.1070 The United States had never intended to punish Osama bin Laden as a 
terrorist—the ‘justice’ it spoke of bringing him to was always going to be death 
and not due process. Speaking a month before he was elected, President Obama 
promised: ‘We will kill bin Laden. We will crush Al Qaeda. That has to be our 
biggest national security priority’1071. When asked if President Barack Obama 
had done a good job in killing Osama, former United States Secretary of 
Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, replied: ‘Oh, my goodness. Yes, of course, how can 
you ask a question like that? Did you want him to live?’1072 In an interview 
broadcast on American news network CNN on the tenth anniversary of the 11 
September 2011 attacks, both Rumsfeld and interviewer, Fareed Zakaria, were 
clear that the United States only had two choices in bringing Osama bin Laden 
to justice: kill him using drones, or kill him using SEALs, ‘those enormously 
competent, brilliantly trained and brilliantly equipped people’1073. Sending the 
SEALs in was ‘the correct choice’, Rumsfeld said. ‘I think he [President Obama] 
did the right thing. They thought about it. They discussed it. They made the 
right decision. And the world is a better place because—‘1074 of it. The justice 
that was meted out to Osama bin Laden was not a justice based on the rule of 
law, it was based on right. Killing the Evildoer was the right thing to do; it did 
not have to be legal. Evil was beyond law, so was the right to punish it. 
                                                       
1070 Christopher Hitchens, The Enemy (Amazon: 2011). 
1071 Barack Obama, quoted in Kelli Arena, “Obama administration to ratchet up hunt for bin 
Laden,” CNN, November 12, 2008, accessed October 15, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-
12/politics/binladen.hunt_1_tora-bora-bin-intelligence-officials?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
1072 Donald Rumsfeld, “Interview with Donald Rumsfeld, Fareed Zakaria GPS,” CNN, 
September 11, 2011. Full transcript can be viewed at: 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1109/11/fzgps.01.html, accessed August 14, 2011. 
1073 Ibid. 
1074 Ibid. The interview ended before Rumsfeld could finish his sentence.  
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When the news of Osama’s death was announced, there was jubilation across 
the cities and towns of the United States1075. Once the raucous celebrating 
ended, the celebratory gunfire ceased, and the Stars and Stripes were put away 
for another occasion, the question that American society asked itself was not 
simply: was it right to celebrate the death of another in such a manner? Rather, 
the question was: was it right to celebrate the death of an other, ‘even as evil as 
Osama bin Laden’, in such a manner? The wide acceptance of Osama bin 
Laden’s death as justified, even if not wholly just, was not confined merely to 
American discourse. The Western world universally saluted the killing of 
Osama1076 and, also almost universally, failed to condemn it. Evidently, 
although blatantly illegal, Western thought widely accepted the killing of 
Osama as right. This perception emanates from, and is validated by, the truth of 
terrorism, which is itself established by the same mechanisms of power that 
made the knowledge possible in the first place.  
 
In the decision to disregard international law and liberal values as insufficient 
for punishing Osama bin Laden, for instance, was confirmation that terrorists 
exist beyond the realm of crime, in the domain of evil; in the casting out of his 
body into the sea was confirmation of his existence as a figure unworthy of 
being on the same territory as civilised human beings; in the announcement 
that Saudi Arabia did not want Osama bin Laden’s body back was the 
confirmation of bin Laden’s status as an outcast; and in the carefully 
orchestrated and well publicised administering of ‘Muslim burial rites’ before 
dumping him into the (Arabian) sea was confirmed both his Muslimness and the 
respect that the civilised nation of the United States accorded even a creature 
such as Osama bin Laden, the worst of ‘the worst of the worst’. In these 
confirmations are validated the knowledge of the Evildoer, the same 
knowledge which is said to have made the mechanisms necessary in the first 
                                                       
1075 Rachel Quigley et. al, “Together as one: Americans around the world gather to celebrate the 
death of Osama bin Laden,” Mail Online, May 3, 2011, accessed September 15, 2011, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1382652/Osama-Bin-Laden-dead-Pictures-USA-
celebrating-death-Al-Qaeda-leader.html. 
1076 “Osama bin Laden’s death political reaction in quotes,” BBC News, May 3, 2011, accessed 
September 15, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13256956. 
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place. With such power/knowledge relations at play the Evildoer cannot but be 
true and the actions, grounded in this truth, cannot but be right.  
 
This truth about terrorism can, however, remain true only ‘on the basis of 
political conditions that are the very ground on which the subject, the domains 
of knowledge, and the relations with truth are formed.’1077 Truth, as is asserted 
in this study, is not an immutable abstract, and what is accepted as the only way 
of knowing terrorism now would not necessarily possess the same, if any, 
cognitive authority under temporally (and/or spatially) different socio-political 
conditions. This also means that the truth about terrorism can change only with 
changes in the socio-political conditions that both constitute and validate the 
truth about terrorism. Simply saying or doing something differently and calling 
it terrorism, or simply refusing to use the term evil to describe terrorism, cannot 
by themselves result in the exclusion of the Evildoer from terrorism discourse, 
or of terrorism from the discourse of the Evildoer, for that matter. Such 
attempts can be seen in the failed efforts to label acts such as the exposé by 
Wikileaks of a huge cache of United States diplomatic secrets as terrorism1078, 
and the conscious rejection by senior officials of some Western governments of 
the concept of the War on Terror1079. The gap that exists between what is said 
                                                       
1077 Michel Foucault, Power: Essential works of Michel Foucault, ed. James D. Faubion, vol. 3, 1954-
1984 (London: Penguin Books), 15. 
1078 On 29 November 2010, Wikileaks, an Internet organisation that provides a secure forum for 
whistleblowers from governments and large corporations to publish their information, 
published a cache containing over 200,000 secret cables exchanged between United States 
diplomats and the State Department. With the publication of the cache, which Wikileaks did in 
conjunction with several Western newspapers, various US government officials as well as 
members of the public demanded that Wikileaks be declared a terrorist organisation. Fox News, 
one of the most popular sources of news in the United States, for example, asked its audience 
for an answer to the question: “Is Wikileaks a terrorist organisation?” Almost 65 percent chose 
the answer – “Yes – clearly their intention is to damage the United States of America”. See Fox 
News, “Do you think Wikileaks is a terrorist organisation?,” November 29, 2010, accessed 
November 30, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/11/29/think-wikileaks-terrorist-
organization. A total of 66,859 people participated in the poll. 
1079 David Milliband, “’War on terror’ was wrong,” The Guardian, January 15, 2009, accessed 
August 14, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/15/david-miliband-
war-terror. 
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and what is done, however, ensures that the Evildoer remains the true 
knowledge of terrorism.  
 
It is entirely possible, of course, that the discursive formation of the Evildoer 
can subsume within itself the discourse of terrorism to become a figure that is 
no longer a terrorist-Evildoer, but an Evildoer proper—as a truth that can exist 
independent of, or in place of, the figure of the terrorist. This possibility is 
glimpsed in the increasing frequency with which enunciative authorities within 
the discourse of terrorism derisively dismiss as ‘political correctness’ any 
practices that do seek to separate terrorism from the Evildoer and, therefore, 
from the Arab/Muslim barbarian and Islam. This is a process that seeks to 
exclude as a delusion, a folly, the proposition that terrorists are not necessarily 
Evildoers, or that Evildoer-terrorists are not necessarily Arab/Muslim 
barbarians waging a Holy War against the Western civilisation. It is also one 
that, at the same time, separates the Evildoer from terrorism—violence 
committed in the pursuit of a political/religious/ideological goal—by 
individuals or groups other than Muslims. It constitutes for the Evildoer an 
identity that is focused simply on his Muslimness, an ‘Islamic radical’ who is a 
dangerous enemy whether or not he had committed, or even threatened, an act 
of violence in the pursuit of his goals. Simply being an Islamic radical, in such 
conditions, is enough to be the Evildoer. 
 
Donald Rumsfeld, speaking in the same interview with CNN referred to above, 
said one thing he would have done differently in the War on Terror would have 
been to call it by its name: a battle of ideas with ‘Radical Islam and Islamists’. 
 
We’ve put a lot of pressure on terrorist networks. But for whatever reason, 
Americans are very reluctant to talk about radical Islam and Islamists. We don’t 
want to be seen as against a religion.  
And so the Bush Administration didn’t do a good job. We were careful and words 
were always sensitive. And we never—you  can’t win a battle of ideas, a 
competition of ideas unless you describe the enemy, say who it is, say what’s 
wrong with it, say what we do, and say why that’s right. We did that in the Cold 
War, and we defeated Communism. And we were tongue-tied over this.  
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And the Obama Administration is much worse—they won’t even use the word1080.  
 
The truth about the Evildoer is clear in this discourse: they are Islamic radicals. 
Not simply terrorists. Only some of liberalism’s more extreme and mistaken 
values—such as ‘political correctness’—prevent this truth being properly 
spoken about, known, and acted upon. ‘Political correctness’, in this case the 
reluctance to wholeheartedly accept that the terrorist is always and necessarily 
an Arab/Muslim barbarian, is the falsehood on the basis of which the truth of 
the Evildoer is established. The proposition that political correctness is 
obfuscating the truth about what the present conflict really is—a war of 
ideologies with radical Islamists who want to conquer or destroy the Western 
civilisation—is not a fanciful notion or merely a discursive tactic. Anders 
Breivik, too, pointed to ‘political correctness’ as the main reason why Europe 
has been unable to name, speak about, and therefore properly confront the real 
enemy: Arab/Muslim barbarians who are waging a Holy War against the West. 
Coercing the Norwegian government into abandoning this ‘political 
correctness’ was one of Breivik’s main motivations for the violence he 
perpetrated on 22 July 2011. Such an understanding of the new enemy of the 
twenty-first century does not require the Evildoer to be an object of terrorism 
discourse—the Arab/Muslim barbarian who is fanatical in his belief in Islam 
and in his hatred of liberal freedoms out to destroy the Western civilisation can 
exist here as its own discourse, a new ‘new’ enemy who does not have to be a 
terrorist. Whether terrorism will be subsumed in the discourse of the Evildoer, 
replaces it, or is replaced by it, depends on chance, and how the orders of 
discourse change along with the socio-political conditions that govern the 
truths of the present epoch.  
 
Whether the Evildoer will survive future transformations in the orders of 
terrorism discourse is not, however, the matter of most consequence. What is 
more important is the present and future survival of the new mechanisms of 
                                                       
1080 Donald Rumsfeld, “Interview with Donald Rumsfeld, Fareed Zakaria GPS,” CNN, 
September 11, 2011. Full transcript can be viewed at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/15/david-miliband-war-terror,  
accessed August 14, 2011. 
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power and discipline that arose round the figure of the Evildoer and the untold 
dangers that he is said to represent. 
 
Punishing evil: normalising new powers 
The (re)assumption by sovereign power of the authority to punish sin and 
transgression represents a significant reconfiguration of how power is exercised 
in modern Western societies. Not since the Devil’s politico-religious domination 
of Western societies ended with the separation of divinity and monarchy has 
sovereign power been able to reach so far beyond the limits that constitute the 
system of rule of law on which it is based. The exercise of this power is evident 
in the ‘new’ mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion introduced as necessary for 
defending civilisation from the Evildoer that were discussed in the final two 
chapters of this study. These mechanisms of power, validated not by law but by 
right, are increasingly becoming the norm as they are colonised and absorbed 
into the entire state system. Consider again the various ‘new’ mechanisms of 
exclusion and inclusion discussed in the preceding chapters that were 
implemented in response to the ‘new’ threats arising from the Evildoer: 
invading the sovereign space of others to hunt for Evlidoers; the indefinite 
detention and torture of suspected Evildoers in Guàntanamo Bay; and 
surveillance and monitoring of Dangerous Muslims within Western societies. 
 
The norm of extrajudicial military invasion and assassination 
First, take the military invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and that of Iraq in 2003. 
The decisions to invade both countries were contentious and controversial. The 
latter triggered the biggest anti-war demonstrations in Western history. Over a 
million people are said to have marched in London alone, demanding that 
plans for the invasion be halted not just because it was illegal but because it was 
also perceived to be wrong. About a decade later, invading the sovereign space 
of other countries is now a commonplace activity for the United States Army. 
Investigative research has shown that the United States are conducting covert 
military operations in 120 countries1081. So routine, even mundane, have become 
                                                       
1081 Nick Turse, “The secret war in 120 countries,” The Nation, August 4, 2011, accessed August 5, 
2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/162566/secret-war-120-countries?page=0,0. 
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‘evening raids’ of the sort carried out in Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden that a 
United States Defence Department official likened it to ‘mowing the lawn.’1082  
 
Reports of drone attacks being carried out in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen 
and Somalia is now part of the regular global news cycle, and provokes little 
reaction from the wider public let alone the type of dissent surrounding the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. And, with the widespread accolade and 
salutations that greeted the extra-judicial killing of Osama bin Laden, the 
practice of sending ‘kill teams’ in to ‘take-out’ suspected terrorists in foreign 
countries, too, is beginning to appear little out of the ordinary. Just four months 
after Osama bin Laden’s killing, the United States assassinated another ‘Al-
Qaeda leader’, Anwar Al-Awlaki, and Samir Khan on 30 September 2011 in 
Yemen1083. Al-Awlaki was commonly described as the ‘bin Laden of the 
Internet’, and Khan was the editor of the English language ‘sophisticated 
terrorism online magazine’ Inspire. Both men were killed by missiles—called 
Hellfire—sent in their direction by an unmanned American drone operated by 
the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from ‘a new base somewhere 
in the Arabian peninsula.’1084 United States President Barack Obama described 
Al-Awlaki as ‘a key al-Qaeda operative’ behind a number of failed terror 
attacks in the United States and hailed the killing as ‘another milestone in the 
broader effort to defeat Al Qaeda and its affiliates.’1085 Both men were American 
citizens, and neither had been tried for, let alone indicted, for a crime. The Fifth 
Amendment to the American Constitution states that no person shall be 
deprived of life without due process of law. Yet, the killings were widely 
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praised by American political leaders1086, and proved controversial only within 
the ‘US legal left’1087, some liberal media1088, specific civil liberties organisations 
and among some vocal critics of United States foreign policy such as Noam 
Chomsky1089 who, as discussed earlier in the study, is excluded from ‘serious’ 
terrorism discourse.  
 
In European societies, ‘with a few notable exceptions’1090, the tactic went ‘largely 
without discussion in popular or academic legal community.’1091 Recall the 
secret memoranda, discussed in Chapter Six, written by President Bush’s legal 
advisors that ‘justified’ the extra-legal detention and torture of Enemy 
Combatants at Guàntanamo Bay. Shortly after the killing of Al-Awlaki and 
Khan, it emerged that the same mechanism—a secret ‘legal memo’—formed the 
                                                       
1086 Fox News, “Washington Praises Killing of al-Awlaki,” September 30, 2011, accessed October 
15, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/30/washington-praises-killing-al-
awlaki; See also: “Dick, Liz Cheney praise Anwar Al-Awlaki killing, say Obama owes Bush 
Administration an apology,” Huffington Post, October 2, 2011, accessed October 15, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/02/dick-liz-cheney-obama-awlaki-
apology_n_991062.html. 
1087 For a critique of the killings and their implications for American rule of law, written by 
Georgetown Law Centre Professor David Cole, see: David Cole, “Killing citizens in secret,” The 
New York Review of Books, October 9, 2011, accessed October 16, 2011, 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/oct/09/killing-citizens-secret. Among the 
Republican candidates running for the United States President in 2012 all but one candidate 
praised President Obama’s decision to assassinate Al-Awlaki and Khan. Only Ron Paul was 
critical. See: Rachel Streitfeld, “Paul criticises Obama on al-Awlaki killing,” CNN, September 30, 
2011, accessed October 15, 2011, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/30/paul-
criticizes-obama-on-al-awlaki-killing.  
1088 Amy Davidson, “Question about killing Awlaki,” The New Yorker, September 30, 2011, 
accessed October 15 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2011/09/questions-about-killing-
anwar-al-awlaki.html. 
1089 Cian Murphy, “Chomsky takes Obama to task,” The Guardian, October 13, 2011, accessed 
October 16, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/oct/13/noam-chomsky-
extradition?INTCMP=SRCH.   
1090 Michael Ratner, “Anwar al-Awlaki’s extrajudicial murder,” The Guardian, September 30, 
2011, accessed October 1, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/sep/30/anwar-awlaki-
extrajudicial-murder. 
1091 Ibid. 
 289 
basis on which President Barack Obama could ‘legitimately’ order the killing of 
American citizens without due process1092. The fifty-page memorandum, issued 
in January 2010, argued that ‘killing Awlaki was justified because America was 
involved in a state of war with Islamic radicals’, meaning that ‘militants like 
Awlaki are effectively high level enemy soldiers who represent a real threat to 
US forces and so can be killed legally.’1093 The ‘legal grounds’ for indefinite 
detention in Guàntanamo  Bay was that the ‘Detainees’ were soldiers engaged 
in a Holy War against the Western civilisation, and thus were not entitled to the 
rights afforded to ‘normal’ Prisoners of War. The ‘legal grounds’ for killing Al-
Awlaki and Khan was that they were soldiers in a Holy War against the 
Western civilisation, and thus were not entitled to the rights offered to ‘normal’ 
citizens of the United States. Clearly, the Evildoer—whether an American 
citizen or not—is widely accepted to be an abnormal individual outside the laws 
and norms of civilisation.   
 
Although confined only to certain circles, the controversy surrounding the 
killing of the two American citizens has—perhaps unintentionally—
strengthened the case for the extrajudicial killings of non-American Evildoers. 
As the debate was centred around the rightness or wrongness of killing 
American citizens in such a manner, the epistemic space was created in which 
the assumption could take hold that if the Evildoers were non-American, like 
Osama bin Laden, it was legitimate to assassinate them without due process. 
An Agence France Presse article widely published in news media across the 
world begins: 
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The killing of US-born al-Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaqi has rekindled the debate 
over how far Washington can go in hunting down and assassinating alleged terror 
suspects who are American citizens [emphasis added]1094. 
 
Barely two weeks after the killing of Al-Awlaki and Khan, for example, the 
United States killed another ‘Al-Qaeda operative’. Yet again the method was 
airstrikes, again in Yemen, and the main target was ‘the media chief for al-
Qaida’s Yemeni branch’, Egyptian Ibrahim al-Bana and ‘six other militants’1095. 
This time there was no talk of extrajudicial killing in the Western public sphere, 
nor was there any explanation or attempts of justification put forward by 
United States officials. The targeted assassination of Evildoers no longer 
appears much of an exception, and is fast becoming widely accepted as the 
norm.  
 
The norm of torture and extra-judicial detention 
Now consider the second major ‘new’ mechanisms introduced to deal with the 
‘new’ Evildoer—indefinite detention and torture of the enemy in geographical 
locations that exist outside of the reach of United States national and 
international laws. When evidence emerged of the torture and the denial of due 
process and rights to which the prisoners in Guàntanamo Bay (and other 
detention facilities set up by the United States) there was international outrage 
and condemnation. One of the first official actions taken by the newly sworn in 
President Barack Obama was to order the closure of the prisons especially set 
up for the Evildoers in Guàntanamo Bay1096.  
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Three years later, not only does Guàntanamo Bay remain open, but the practice 
of imprisoning suspected Evildoers in detention facilities where the law cannot 
reach continue at new locations in countries such as Afghanistan1097 where 
milder versions of the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ continue to be 
applied to the ‘detainees’.  The mechanism is also expanding in ever more 
ingenious ways—such as holding suspected terrorist-Evildoers on no land at 
all—that is, detaining them without charge at sea.  A significant example is the 
detention of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a Somali man the United States has 
charged with nine counts related to supporting Somali organisation Al Shabab, 
a designated terrorist group, and also Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 
Yemen.1098 Prior to charging him, the United States held Warsame in the brig of 
the U.S.S Boxer, a big-deck amphibious assault ship for at least two months.1099 
His detention, according to senior officials in the Obama administration, ‘was 
justified by the laws of war’ but the officials declined to say: 
 
whether their theory was that the Shabab are covered by Congress’s authorisation 
to use military force against the perpetrators of Sept.11, 2001 attacks; whether the 
detention was justified by his interactions with Al Qaeda’s Yemen branch; or 
something else [own emphasis]1100. 
 
Another aspect to consider in the retention and expansion of mechanisms 
developed specifically for Evildoers is that they can now legitimately be applied 
to not just those who do terrorism but also those who speak it. Al-Awlaki was 
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regarded as a top target, and put on America’s Most Wanted list of terrorists 
not only because he allegedly directed various failed terror plots against the 
United States, but also because his ‘incendiary’ sermons shared on various 
Internet platforms made him ‘a significant terrorist inspiration.’1101 Samir Khan 
who was killed in the same strike as al-Awlaki was a legitimate target because 
he was the editor of Inspire, an Internet magazine that publishes Al-Qaeda’s 
‘evil ideology’. Egyptian Ibrahim al-Bana, killed in Yemen in October was a 
similarly legitimate target because he was ‘Al-Qaeda’s Yemen media chief.’1102 
Killing those who speak Al-Qaeda’s ‘evil ideology’ is an expansion of 
mechanisms of control that were first developed for the purpose of controlling 
the Dangerous Muslim within Western societies from realising his potential as 
an Evildoer. These mechanisms now take in Dangerous Muslims outside of 
Western societies where they are put under surveillance and watched—not for 
the purposes of inclusion and normalisation as was the initial purpose, but to 
confirm they are Evildoers before or after killing them.  
 
Know thy enemy, to kill him right 
Mechanisms of surveillance against Dangerous Muslims, introduced in the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe were adopted by the United States to 
work in tandem with their mechanisms of exclusion. In October 2007, for 
instance, the United States House of Representatives passed the ‘Violent 
Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007’ (H.R. 1955). 
The Act defines ‘violent radicalisation’ as ‘the process of adopting or promoting 
an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based 
violence to advance political, religious, or social change’1103. The definition 
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includes not just the promotion of ‘an extremist belief system’ but also its 
adoption. The Act, provides for the appointment of experts from ‘behavioural 
science, constitutional law, corrections, counterterrorism, cultural 
anthropology, education, information technology, intelligence, juvenile justice, 
local law enforcement, organized crime, Islam and other world religions, 
sociology, or terrorism’1104 to research, study, analyse and know the potential 
homegrown ‘terrorist’ in their midst. A university-based ‘Centre of Excellence 
for the Study of Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in the 
United States’ would also be established under the Act to conduct social 
scientific research on those adopting or likely to adopt the process of violent 
radicalisation.1105 
 
Furthermore, evidence is emerging that these mechanisms of surveillance are 
now being formally adopted by the United States as a legitimate war strategy. 
One striking example is Project Lawrence run by the Special Operations 
Command of the United States Army to ‘infuse its ranks with cultural and 
language specialists’ who are ‘inspired by the British officer T.E. Lawrence.’1106 
As Edward Said argued, T.E. Lawrence, or Lawrence of Arabia is one of the 
most prominent figures in the ‘intellectual genealogy of Oritentalism’ which has 
long informed Western conceptions of Arab/Muslims1107 and, which this study 
argues, has contributed to the construction of the Evildoer. Admiral Eric Olson, 
Special Operations Commander explained that he was seeking ‘the next 
Lawrence of Pakistan, Lawrence of Afghanistan, Lawrence of Mali or Lawrence 
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of Indonesia’1108 or ‘Lawrences of Wherever’ to be deployed in over fifty ‘high 
priority’ countries in the war against terrorism.1109  
 
As part of the project, the Special Operations Command aims to ‘deploy teams 
of female “cultural support teams” in order to gain better insight into local 
populations’1110 of the countries which are seen as containing large populations 
of Dangerous Muslims. Women are being sought because they ‘have access to 
the fifty percent of the population that male special operators cannot reach’, 
ensuring there is infiltration of the entire populations of these countries.1111 
Preferably the Lawrences would be natives of Wherever-the-United-States-is 
Waging-War, recruited from among students and professionals living in the 
United States with temporary permits. The Lawrences’ ultimate reward for 
spying on their own people is a Green Card—the permission to become a 
citizen of the United States1112. It is the end-goal of the deployment of Lawrences 
that is the most fascinating: they will gain ‘better understanding’ of the targeted 
population so that the Army can know what it is doing in these places—
‘shooting, moving and communicating’—is ‘right’1113 [own emphasis]. In other 
words, infiltrate populations by covert means, send out spies into the 
communities and gather the knowledge that the United States requires to 
validate its actions as legitimate. According to Admiral Olson, since 11 
September 2001, the Special Operations Command had made great strides in 
the realms of ‘shooting, moving, communicating’, increasing its abilities to 
‘change targets on the way to an objective, the ability to sort out who is good 
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and who is bad’. Now the command must concentrate on ‘understanding’ 
which ‘must follow the shooting, the moving and communicating.’ In Admiral 
Olson’s words: ‘You can shoot, you can move, you can network the battlefield, 
but how do you then know what you are doing is right?”1114 
 
Spectacle of the scaffold returns? 
Libyan rebels on the ground and NATO forces in the air killed the country’s 
former ruler of forty years, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, on 20 October 2011. 
The rebels had found the former leader hiding in a drain in the ground after 
NATO had bombed the convoy in which he was travelling1115. Both sides vied 
to claim credit for the killing. Later it emerged that the rebels may have killed 
Gaddafi in cold blood1116. When questions were raised by the international 
community about the legality of the killing, rebel leader Moustafa Zoubi, 
replied: ‘Did anyone complain when the Americans shot Osama [bin Laden] in 
the head?’1117 The rebels filmed Gaddafi’s last moments, although the exact 
moment of execution was not available for viewing. Still, there was plenty of 
footage to play on television and computer screens across the world1118. 
Newspapers across the world from Europe to Australia, Asia and the Middle 
East to the United States, carried pictures of Gaddafi, blood on his face and 
body, dead or dying1119. Victorious Libyan rebels put his body on public display 
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in a meat freezer for days1120 while they contemplated how to dispose of it1121. 
As the body, ‘stripped down to the waist and wearing beige trousers, [lay] on a 
bloody mattress on the floor of a room-sized freezer where restaurants keep 
perishables’, Libyan people posed near it with their loved ones for pictures and 
videos1122.  
 
Hundreds of ordinary Libyans queued up outside […] where the dead dictator 
was being stored as a trophy. A guard allowed small groups into the room to 
celebrate next to Gaddafi’s body. They posed for photos, flashing victory signs, 
and burst into jubilant cries of “God is great”.1123 
 
This public spectacle of torture and punishment is another mechanism of power 
that appears to be returning with the Evildoer and the re-assumption by 
sovereign power of the right to punish sin. As discussed in Chapter Six, the use 
of torture was seen as right, even if not legal, when applied to the Evildoers. 
United States military personnel took trophy pictures of the torture, 
degradation and death of several prisoners taken in the War on Terror, which 
were later made widely available to the public on the Internet1124. When 
Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader who was sentenced to death was hung on 30 
December 2006, videos of the execution were broadcast on Iraqi national 
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television1125. While the official video stopped short of showing the precise 
moment of his death, an amateur video was broadcast around the world on the 
same day, which included not just the sight of his death but also the sound of 
his neck snapping, as he was hanged.1126 
 
After killing Osama bin Laden, President Barack Obama said releasing ‘very 
graphic photos of somebody who was shot in the head’ might be ‘an incitement 
to additional violence’ or ‘a propaganda tool’1127. The decision not to release the 
photos was not unanimous. Before President Obama announced the decision, 
then head of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Leon Panetta promised their 
public display: ‘We got Bin Laden and I think we have to reveal to the rest of 
the world the fact that we were able to get him and kill him.’1128 To make up for 
the public’s disappointment in not being able to feast their eyes on Osama’s 
lifeless form, the Pentagon released ‘home videos’ of Osama engaged in 
mundane tasks, such as watching himself on television1129. The videos were 
released without a sound, extending the exclusion of his words, a predominant 
practise in Western discourse as discussed in Chapter Five, well beyond 
death1130. He was ridiculed posthumously, first by a lie released by the White 
House, claiming he hid behind his wife to save his life, and next by the news 
released by United States officials of a ‘surprising’ discovery of ‘a huge stash of 
pornography’ under his bed. ‘This is one of those discoveries that stunned 
everyone. In fact, it was so stunning that officials are worried that some people 
                                                       
1125 “Saddam Hussein executed in Iraq,” BBC News, December 30, 2006, accessed October 23, 
2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6218485.stm. 
1126 LiveLeak, “Full Saddam execution video leaked from cellphone,” December 30, 2006, 
accessed October 23, 2011, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=863ce7d4a3. 
1127 Barack Obama, “60 Minutes,” YouTube video, 1:00, from CBS News on May 8, 2011, posted 
by “CBS,” May 8, 2011, accessed October 23, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwHfL1NdlqY&NR=1. 
1128 Jake Pearson, Lukas I. Alpert, and Bill Hutchinson, “Osama Bin Laden photos will be 
released, says CIA boss as White House weighs ‘gruesome reveal,” New York Daily News, May 3, 
2011, accessed October 23, 2011, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-05-
03/news/29523708_1_cia-boss-death-photos-osama-bin-laden-death. 
1129 “Osama bin Laden: Pentagon releases home videos,” BBC News, May 7, 2011, accessed 
October 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13323060. 
1130 “Osama bin Laden videos,” BBC News, May 7, 2011, accessed October 24, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13323849. 
 298 
won’t believe it,’ an ABC News report said. ‘The US did not want to officially 
release the news feeling that there would be suspicions it was planted. It was 
not, says the official.’1131 In the absence of a dead body, people in Abbotabad 
flocked to view the compound in which Osama was killed. In what was 
described as ‘a carnival atmosphere’,  
 
The curious of all ages milled about in front of the high walled compound, which 
was still sealed under police guard. An elderly man sold savoury snacks. Young 
children skipped between Western camera crews. One boy clutching at a 
basketball just stared at the house.1132 
 
Making a public spectacle of torture and punishment is not new, nor was it 
always illegal. In fact, prior to the separation of religion and political power, it 
was seen as ‘the poetry of Dante written into laws.’1133 In the public torture and 
execution of criminals and sinners:  
 
the fact that the guilty man should moan and cry out under the blows is not a 
shameful effect, it is the very ceremonial of justice being expressed in all its full 
force. Hence no doubt those tortures that take place even after death: corpses 
burnt, ashes thrown to the winds, bodies dragged on hurdles and exhibited at the 
roadside.1134 
 
What the very public executions, and the posthumous humiliation and 
degradation of the bodies, shows is the extent to which the Evildoer’s presence 
has allowed the anachronistic reanimation of sovereign powers, but also the 
return of means and methods of punishment that predated the separation of 
religion and sovereign power. Whereas the right to do so was written into law 
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during earlier times, it is now assumed by sovereign power in place of the law, 
or over and above the law. And, although widely represented as an example to 
dictators around the world, the purpose of such public executions is ‘to make 
everyone aware, through the body of the criminal, of the unrestrained presence 
of the sovereign.’1135 Today, when torture, execution without trial, and making a 
public spectacle of such executions are illegal, its purpose is to demonstrate the 
right that sovereignty has assumed on behalf of the people and of right, to 
punish sin.  
It’s not the Evildoer, stupid 
The changes in how power is exercised in the twenty-first century that have 
emerged around the Evildoer are perhaps best assessed away from its extremes 
such as torture and war, and at more regular sites of ‘normal’ daily life. As 
Foucault asserted, a more general and therefore a more accurate assessment of 
the extent to which a particular form of power stretches is best analysed at the 
extremities of its reach—‘its ultimate destinations, […] where it becomes 
capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions.’1136 Such 
an assessment also allows an understanding, in a new context, of what Foucault 
was referring to when he said the bourgeoisie ‘didn’t give a damn’ about the 
poor, the mad or the delinquents but were only interested in the mechanisms of 
power implemented to control them1137. While the Evildoer cannot exist without 
the mechanisms of power that constituted him, the mechanisms of power 
against the Evildoer can, and do, exist without him. 
 
Across the world, the domains of politics and religion have come together more 
closely than they have since the eighteenth century, when it was in their very 
separation the discourse of terrorism first emerged. Religion is once again at the 
forefront of political power, be it in the exercise of sovereign power or in 
revolutions and rebellions against it. In the United States, the campaigns for 
2013 presidential elections are getting into full swing and candidates’ faith is a 
deciding factor in their popularity with the electorate. One of the greatest slurs 
                                                       
1135 Ibid., 49. 
1136 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writing, 1972-1977, ed. Colin 
Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 96. 
1137 Michel Foucault, Society must be defended (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 33. 
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against the incumbent President Obama is that he is a Muslim1138, born as he 
was to a Muslim father and given the middle name Hussein. No Muslim, all 
potential Evildoers, can be allowed to play a leadership role in the United 
States; in a land which has no room for Arab/Muslim barbarians even in its 
maximum security prisons.  
 
All Republican presidential hopefuls have thus taken care to distance 
themselves from Muslims and anything to do with Islam while at the same time 
proclaiming as loudly and as piously as possible one’s deep belief in a faith 
other than Islam. Herman Cain, for example, stated that he was ‘not 
comfortable’ appointing a Muslim to his Cabinet or to a federal judgeship1139. 
Mitt Romney, meanwhile, appointed one of the ‘apostate Muslim’ authors 
referred to in Chapter Five, Walid Phares, as a foreign policy advisor1140. Any 
candidate who distances themselves from anti-Muslim sentiments are ridiculed 
by conservative voters. Candidate Ron Paul, for example, was booed during a 
Republican debate for saying that not all Muslims are responsible for the 11 
September 2001 attacks1141. One of the frontrunners, evangelical Christian 
Republican Governor Rick Perry has held a prayer meeting in which 30,000 
people took part1142, and has stated that ’my faith requires me to support Israel’ 
in his policies towards Israel/Palestine1143. Michele Bahcmann, too, is decidedly 
                                                       
1138 Wajahat Ali, “Muslims for America,” The Guardian, October 22, 2008, accessed October 24, 
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/oct/22/mccain-obama-
muslim-powell?INTCMP=SRCH. 
1139 “Cain’s message—Muslims need not apply”, CNN, June 16, 2011, accessed on June 18, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-16/opinion/obeidallah.cain.muslim_1_american-muslims-
mitt-romney-quran?_s=PM:OPINION. 
1140 Jarad Vary, “Meet Mitt Romney’s Radical, Right-wing, Sharia-phobe Foreign Policy 
Advisor,” The New Republic, October 24, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/96519/romney-walid-phares-sharia-caucus-iowa-
pawlenty. 
1141 Jason M. Volack, “Ron Paul booed during debate,” September 13, 2011, accessed October 24, 
2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/09/ron-paul-booed-during-debate.  
1142 Ewen MacAskill, “Rick Perry’s call to prayer draws crowd of 30,000,” The Guardian, August 
7, 2011, accessed August 8, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/07/rick-
perrys-call-to-prayer. 
1143 Justin Elliot, “My faith requires me to support Israel: Rick Perry’s Christian Zionist foreign 
policy,” Salon, August 11, 2001, accessed August 12, 2011, 
http://www.salon.com/2011/08/11/perry_israel_faith.  
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conservative and a born-again Christian who supports the proposition that 
America ‘was and to a large extent still is a Christian nation’, and has worked to 
establish school curricula guided not by the Constitution but by the Bible.1144.  
 
Religion has also been central in the revolutions against sovereign power in 
various North African and Middle Eastern countries in 2011. With each 
revolution in what has been dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’, the biggest question in 
Western thought has been: if democratic elections were held, would Islamists 
come to power? It was thus with the Egyptian revolution in January 20111145; the 
Tunisian revolution earlier in January 20111146 and during its first democratic 
elections in October 20111147; and during the Libyan uprising1148 as well as 
following its liberation after the killing of Gaddafi1149. 
                                                       
1144 Ryan Lizza, “Leap of faith: the making of a Republican frontrunner,” The New Yorker, 
August 15, 2011, accessed August 23, 2011, 
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2011, accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/31/egypt-
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1146 Reuters, “Tunisian Islamist leader returns after 22 years in exile,” The Guardian, January 30, 
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accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/27/libya-
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2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/africa/in-libya-islamists-growing-sway-
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News, August 31, 2011, accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
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1149 Mary Beth Sheridan, “Libyan leader hails wider role for Islam,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 
October 25, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, http://www.smh.com.au/world/libyan-leader-
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In everyday life, spying and surveillance have become the norm in most 
Western societies. In the United Kingdom, for instance, where the Prevent 
programme discussed in Chapter Seven became the biggest spying operation in 
its history, surveillance has become all pervasive.  Similar operations of spying 
on Muslims have since been uncovered in the United States. In August 2011 it 
emerged that the New York Police Department (NYPD) was spying on the 
city’s Muslims with the help of the CIA1150. And, became evident over the 
course of July 2001, for example, that listening in on people’s private 
conversations was widely practised by one of the world’s biggest media 
companies, News International at its newspapers in Britain for the better part of 
the last decade1151.  
 
Moreover, throughout the year, evidence emerged that spying and surveillance 
of rebels in general—whether they were Muslim or not, violent or not—has 
become a norm in law enforcement as well as among big businesses. In July 
2011, for example, it emerged that undercover British police officers had been 
spying on environmental activists for seven years, some establishing long-term 
relationships with activists in order to acquire information about their 
activities1152. Similar surveillance activities against environmental dissidents 
were also carried out by French and British energy companies during the same 
                                                                                                                                                                
toward Islamic law,” October 23, 2011, accessed October 24, 2011, 
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1151 “Q&A: News of the World phone hacking scandal,” BBC News, August 17, 2011, accessed 
October 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11195407. 
1152 Rob Ewans and Paul Lewis, “Undercover police officer unlawfully spied on climate activists, 
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decade1153. Earlier in 2007, it was revealed that police in New York had spent 
more than a year spying on ‘would-be protestors’ ahead of President Bush’s 
second term elections.1154 German police, meanwhile, infiltrated protests against 
the established economic order by sending undercover officers to the 
demonstrations against the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 20071155.   
 
Law, whether international or domestic, is increasingly being cast aside to make 
room for disciplinary power. And it is not just those in authority that have 
taken this attitude to law. This became evident in the riots that broke out across 
several cities in the United Kingdom in August 2011 when the general 
lawlessness, looting and violence of rioters stunned the country and the 
world1156. The financial cost of the riots in London alone was estimated at 300 
million pounds1157. Sovereign power appeared confounded when domestic laws 
were broken by the senseless violence of the rioters; and in response, imposed 
some of the harshest sentences handed down to offenders of similar crimes in 
its history1158. Yet, it was sovereign power that had involved the people, actively 
encouraged them to celebrate lawlessness in the unlawful killings of the various 
leaders and suspected ‘terrorists’ discussed earlier. The law, it appears, can only 
be cast aside by sovereign power and not those who rebel against it. The 
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Evildoer-terrorist has allowed the techniques and discourses of discipline to 
invade right, and for normalising procedures to colonise procedures of law, to 
an extent not seen in Western history before. It has allowed the creation of a 
global normalising society in which a form of divinely ordained sovereignty 
and mechanisms of discipline, working in tandem, exercises forms of power 
and control that exist outside of all known limits of domestic and international 
law.  
 
If it became widely known that the Evildoer does not exist, the world would 
surely be a different place.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The archaeological and genealogical analysis of terrorism provided in this 
study does not provide a solution to the problem that inspired it: the present 
knowledge of terrorism as an evil perpetrated by Arab/Muslim barbarians who 
hate liberal values and against whom Western civilisation must be defended. 
Neither does it claim to have found out what is true or what is false about the 
present discourse of terrorism, what is founded or unfounded, real or illusory, 
scientific or ideological. What it does is undermine some of the most dearly 
held convictions about one of the most omnipresent discourses of the present: 
that terrorism is an ontological certainty that exists outside of its discourse.  
 
In analysing terrorism as a discourse, this study does not deny the reality of 
violence perpetrated on a daily basis for political, religious and other goals. A 
Foucaultian analysis does not entail, as many critics such as Charles Taylor, 
Jürgen Habermas have alleged, ‘a universal assault on the notion of truth’1159. 
Using Foucault to analyse the history of the present of terrorism does not, 
therefore, mean that this study refuses to accept all truth and objectivity related 
to political violence. Rather, it demonstrates how complex power/knowledge 
relations make it possible for certain acts of politically motivated violence to be 
regarded as terrorism while excluding others from the discourse. Neither does 
the analysis deny causal values in the construction of the discourse of 
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terrorism—what it does deny is that the most valid explanation of terrorism can 
be offered by bringing a whole group of derived phenomena back to a cause, a 
final authority valorised as a profound and unique agency.  
 
Rather than denying causal values, what it shows is the existence of a complex 
and tight causal network formed that—instead of being saturated by a deep 
and necessary principle—comprises a multiplicity of relationships and 
differentiations between different types of relationships. As Foucault put it, 
‘There is, therefore, nothing more foreign to such an analysis than the rejection 
of causality’1160. Using a combination of archaeological and genealogical 
methods, enabled this study to demonstrate the essential symbiotic relations 
that exist between knowledge and power. Like conventional histories, it shows 
that changes that have occurred in the discourse of terrorism are due to a wide 
variety of economic, social and political changes that have occurred in society 
during various epochs. What is different about this history of terrorism is that it 
maintains, like Foucault’s histories, that these causes cannot fit into any simple, 
unified teleological scheme.1161 
 
While this study does not offer solutions, it demonstrates that the possibility 
exists to think otherwise about terrorism. Any change in what is said and done 
about terrorism can only come with a change in what is possible to think about 
terrorism.
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